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There is mounting consensus among NATO allies that the resurgent Russian naval and 
submarine activity in the High North needs to be closely monitored and kept in check. And in 
spite of the rise of satellite technology and unmanned aircraft, the key instrument in that 
effort, at least for now, remains the Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) with its Anti-Submarine 
Warfare (ASW) capabilities. However, after three decades of focus on expeditionary and 
counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare, there has taken place an atrophy within the MPA 
community of knowledge, resources, experience and practice when it comes to the ASW 
aspects of maritime surveillance. This atrophy occurred just as the concept of intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) came to play an increasingly important role in 
operational planning. The concept of ISR, however, is linked to expeditionary and COIN 
warfare, and it pays insufficient attention to the challenges of maritime airborne surveillance 
and the specific challenges of ASW. This thesis seeks to address this gap. It does so by 
analysing the past in order to find solutions for the future.  
The thesis examines the entwined evolution of airborne maritime surveillance by MPA and 
ASW in the High North, both during and after the Cold War, and focuses on the key NATO 
allies of Norway, the US, and the UK. The thesis further seeks to identify the fundamental 
‘building blocks’ and tenets of these historical surveillance operations that are then used to 
craft a novel theoretical framework for understanding the nature and function of maritime 
airborne ISR and its relationship to ASW. That framework is then applied to make 
recommendations for the future for maritime surveillance in the High North. 
The thesis’s key findings of this thesis are that:  
• Russian submarines as the capital ships of the Russia Navy. They have morphed from 
noisy, predictable vessels operating in known patrol areas, to superbly silent vessels 
operating in unpredictable patterns, carrying world-leading cruise missiles technology 
that constitute a renewed threat to both European and American targets;  
• the traditional airborne tool to meet the submarine threat, the MPA, is crucial but not 
adequate in a modern context. A multi-layered, international approach is required, 
which will benefit from utilizing artificial intelligence for complex acoustic sensor 
processing.    
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1.1 Background for the project 
The requirement for military surveillance in the High North has become somewhat of a 
dogma for Norwegian authorities – it is regularly taken as self-evident and self-explanatory. 
The main reasons emphasized are unexploited natural resources, fishery surveillance, 
increased maritime traffic along the coast, and perhaps most importantly: Russian military 
activities in the High North stemming from the bases on the Kola peninsula. The surveillance 
missions have been the responsibility of the Norwegian Armed Forces. The Kola peninsula is 
the home of the Russian Northern Fleet, the most powerful fleet in the Russian Navy, and 
with year-round ice-free passage to the Atlantic. Among the Russian naval capabilities, 
submarines played a key role in naval strategy throughout the Cold War and increasingly do 
so again today, both for assuring a nuclear second-strike capability, but also in posing a threat 
towards Western surface forces and carrier battle groups in the Atlantic. Moreover, the 
Russian Navy has historically been, and still is, carrying out sub-surface, surface and air 
testing and development of weapons systems and platforms just outside the Russian coastline 
in the North.  
NATO’s strategy towards the Soviet Union was from the beginning one of containment of 
Soviet expansion. This led to a forward maritime posture in the 1950s in the North Atlantic, 
and information and early warning on an attack by the Soviet Union against Norway and the 
Norwegian coast was viewed as crucial. The main NATO deterrent was the strategy of 
Massive Retaliation and a threat of nuclear annihilation should the Soviet Union attack a 
NATO member. However, in the 1960s the Soviets themselves achieved a credible capability 
to strike the United States with nuclear weapons, making the NATO deterrent less credible 
when a retaliatory nuclear attack by the Russians was likely. In the mid-1960s, the new 
strategy of Flexible Response came into being, which would affect the defence of the flanks 
in particular. In the case of the northernmost parts of Norway, i.e. the county of Finnmark, 
these areas were considered to be of higher military value to the Soviet Union than to NATO 
because they provided staging areas for aircraft into the North Atlantic, whilst NATO aircraft 
carriers could launch their attacks into the Soviet Union from positions further south, in 
addition to from Norwegian bases further south. This led to a rising concern that the Soviet 
Union would be able to claim certain parts of Northern Norway without reaching the 
threshold for a retaliatory nuclear response from the United States. This further rocked the 
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notion of a credible security guarantee for the Alliance members. Thus, a loss of Finnmark 
turned into a political problem, if not a significant military one.1 This risk had to be reduced 
through a strengthened defence of Northern Norway. In addition, the build-up on the Kola 
peninsula included a growing number of attack submarines that posed a threat against the Sea 
Lines of Communication (SLOC), the logistical lines between the United States and 
continental Europa during times of war. These were considered to be of high strategic 
importance, particularly now that NATO were through the strategy of Flexible Response 
planning on a protracted conventional war in Europe. To maintain control of the Norwegian 
coast therefore increased in importance. In addition to a build-up of presence of Norwegian 
armed forces in North Norway during the 1960s and 70s, the most important contribution to 
the United States as a bilateral partner and to the NATO alliance as a whole, would become 
intelligence on Soviet Union capabilities and early warning of an attack in the North.2 The 
intelligence was of strategic nature, and the information gathered became the core of the 
close bilateral military strategic relationship between the United States and Norway. Several 
collection tools were utilized, from stationary electronic intelligence stations in Northern 
Norway to intelligence ships sailing on a daily basis just off the Kola coastline. A crucial 
element of the intelligence contribution to the United States and NATO was the fleet of 
maritime patrol aircraft (MPA), which contributed initially with basic surface surveillance 
and early warning. With the introduction of more capable aircraft first in the early 1960s and 
then again to an even more capable aircraft in 1969, Norwegian MPAs conducted 
increasingly advanced intelligence operations against the Soviet Northern Fleet, in particular 
against the growing submarine menace. The submarines in themselves did not pose a direct 
threat to Norway per se. There were no threat assessments that projected Soviet strategic 
nuclear submarines attacking Norwegian cities or harbours, or Soviet attack submarines 
posing a direct threat to Norwegian bases or infrastructure. The threat from the Soviet Navy 
was in essence directed towards American cities (strategic nuclear submarines) and NATO 
forces and SLOCs (attack and multi-role submarines). This means that the intelligence 
gathering in the High North was inherently a contribution to alliance partners and the 
collective defence of NATO. In addition, the Americans thought the contributon of such a 
crucial nature that they contributed with MPA under the weapons support program at no cost 
in 1961, then later by contributing significantly to the Norwegian procurement of an updated 
 
1 Jacob Børresen, Gullow Gjeseth, and Rolf Tamnes, History of the Norwegian Armed Forces 1970-2000 
(“Norsk Forsvarshistorie, 1970-2000”) (Bergen: Eide Forlag, 2004), 86–87. 
2 Børresen, Gjeseth, and Tamnes, 89. 
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MPA fleet in 1969. This support was again manifested through covering more than half of the 
procurement costs in 1989 for  new aircraft yet again. To the Norwegian government, then, 
the maintenance of credible intelligence services in the High North, to which the MPA fleet 
contributed significantly, the military investment provided high political returns.  
Traditionally, Norwegian foreign and security politics have rested on a balancing act between 
integration/deterrence and screening/reassurance.3 Integration/deterrence with alliance 
partners, both bi-laterally with the USA and multi-laterally through NATO, and 
screening/reassurance through the denial of a permanent presence of foreign troops and bases 
on Norwegian soil. Surveillance missions flown on a case-by-case basis by allied partners 
from Norwegian bases have been restricted to stay west of 24-degrees East, justified by the 
requirement to maintain low tensions with Russia. This in turn means that in essence it has 
been Norwegian aircraft that have monitored Russian activity on and outside the Kola 
peninsula. Norwegian MPA would throughout the Cold War serve as a crucially important 
security policy tool for the Norwegian government in the High North.  
Historically, the ability to monitor the operational movements of the Soviet and Russian 
submarines have been given a high priority by NATO nations. As this thesis will describe, 
the battle between the hunting ASW forces and the hunted submarines were for several 
decades conducted in favour of the hunter: NATO nations were in the lead technologically, 
and had the geographical advantage of staging areas along the Norwegian, Scottish and the 
Icelandic coasts for MPAs. In the 1980s, however, the quieting measures of the Russians took 
hold, which made hunting for Russian submarines significantly more complex. After a 
decade of downturn in activity and force levels on both sides following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, Russian submarines are once again patrolling the Atlantic, this time more 
capable than ever. The new Russian submarines and the renewed aggressive Russian posture 
in the Atlantic are questioning NATO’s ability to hold them at risk.  
The Norwegian Defence Review white paper of 2015 (Fagmilitært Råd (FMR) 2015) 
highlighted strategic intelligence as the first tier of defence for Norway. Situational 
awareness in the High North is additionally brought to the front by military as well as 
political leaders when discussing military capabilities and requirements for Norway. The 
FMR of 2015 proposed changes to how the Norwegian Armed Forces would approach 
 
3 Johan J. Holst, “Norsk Sikkerhetspolitkk i Strategisk Perspektiv,” Internasjonal Politikk 24, no. 5 (1966): 463–
90; Rolf Tamnes, “Integration and Screening - The Two Faces of Norwegian Alliance Policy,” Forsvarsstudier, 
no. 6 (1987). 
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surveillance in the High North through phasing out the P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft 
(MPA), and acquiring new unmanned systems to take over much of the intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) portfolio of the P-3 fleet. There is, however, a crucial 
gap between the intelligence collection and types of warfare that a modern MPA can perform, 
and those that an unmanned aircraft can perform. This gap is acoustic intelligence and anti-
submarine warfare (ASW). In practical terms, the FMR of 2015 proposed to phase out the 
Norwegian long-range, airborne ASW capability in the North.  
The proposal of the Norwegian CHOD to phase out the P-3 Orion raised questions regarding 
the importance of the ability to monitor sub-surface activity in the High North. What role 
have the Russian submarines of the Northern Fleet played in the High North? What role has 
the MPA fleet played historically in monitoring Russian submarines operating in the 
Atlantic? What are the elements required for conducting efficient and credible maritime 
airborne surveillance and reconnaissance in the High North? And in continuation of this: 
What role does the modern, emerging Russian submarine missile threat play in the High 
North today? There is currently no theoretical framework within which we can discuss the 
requirements for maritime airborne ISR. There is a definition of ISR, there is a definition of 
ASW, and there are doctrines for both. But there exists no theoretical framework that 
explains the basic elements of airborne ISR, how these facilitate the analysis and 
dissemination of intelligence products, and how these eventually fit into the execution of 
military operations. This thesis answers the questions above by establishing a new theoretical 
framework for airborne ISR in general, and airborne ASW more specifically. This new 
framework then provides the basis for the concluding discussion of the thesis, where future 
requirements for airborne ISR are discussed and the role of ASW in the High North is further 
highlighted.   
 
1.1.1 Main research question 
This thesis discusses the airborne surveillance that took place in the North Atlantic during the 
Cold War, and thus underlines the place of submarines in Soviet and later Russian naval 
strategy and naval operations. Based on this, the role of airborne ASW capability can be 
outlined. In the contextualization of these questions, one seems forced to evaluate other 
technologies that can conduct the range of tasks that have traditionally belonged to the MPA, 
or at least elements of that portfolio. A theoretical framework that brings these different 
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elements together will facilitate, structure, and benefit any discussion on airborne ISR and 
ASW going forward. 
Also, it is an ambition of this thesis to inform the public debate on these issues. Much of the 
discussion is either taken for granted and not properly explained, or it remains classified and 
hidden from public discourse. However, the principles are not classified, and should 
constitute the basic premises for the ongoing discussion on the future of airborne surveillance 
in the High North. The fundamental question to be answered by this thesis is therefore: 
What is the role of anti-submarine warfare capabilities in airborne 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance in the High North? 
Through studying the developments of airborne surveillance and reconnaissance over the past 
century or so, elements stand out that can be considered the basis for a theoretical framework. 
A theoretical framework on airborne/maritime ISR should have a generic approach, in which 
the specificities of airborne ASW can be discussed. Underlying questions on maritime 
airborne ISR that come to the fore when attempting to place it in a more holistic ISR context, 
are how airborne ASW can be explained within a theoretical framework for airborne ISR; 
whether manned MPAs can be replaced by unmanned aircraft and technology; what role 
force integration and interaction with other units play for modern maritime airborne ISR 
units; and what role sensor processing and ISR product dissemination play for maritime 
airborne ISR units. These are all secondary questions deriving from the main research 
question above.   
 
1.1.2 Limitations 
The Arctic is gaining increased focus from many nations. This increased focus has led to 
American intelligence services increasingly utilizing personnel full time for studying the 
Arctic, cooperating ever more closely with the Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS).4 
Several factors come into play. Climate change is facilitating changes to the dynamics in the 
Arctic. The North-Eastern Sea Route (NSR) might become a feasible sea route for 
commercial traffic between Europe and Asia, and the first voyage by a commercial vessel 
 
4 Brian Bennett and W.J. Hennigan, “U.S. Builds up Arctic Spy Network as Russia and China Increase 




mid-winter took place in the winter of 2017/2018.5 Climate change is also forcing fish stocks 
further north, due to warming waters and changes to the oxygen level in waters at lower 
latitudes.6 Security politics are also changing in parallel to increased Russian activity. China, 
too, is eyeing infrastructure investments in the Arctic, in support of their own ambitions for 
the High North.7 Factors such as climate change, new security policy actors in the North, and 
resource management in the Arctic are all important to the overall international dynamics of 
the region. It would, however, be too time consuming to include them all in this study.8 The 
role of the Russian surface fleet and airborne platforms based on the Kola peninsula is also 
worthy of thorough discussions, but would take away too much of the focus from the original 
research question of this thesis. The submarines in the Atlantic have posed unique challenges 
with regards to surveillance technology and the organisational framework set up to monitor 
their movements. In an overarching context, it is impossible to detach the most important 
element of the Russian defensive bastion in the High North from other supporting and 
supported elements without losing important understanding of how the Russian military 
operations in the North Atlantic are organised. The focus here, however, is on the unique 
challenge posed by conducting ISR in the subsurface domain by airborne assets. The 
discussion thus focuses on the submarines of the Northern Fleet and their interaction with 
airborne surveillance and reconnaissance historically, today, and in the future. 
 
1.1.3 Personal standpoint – the researcher  
This thesis builds on research conducted for a Master’s thesis submitted through the Scottish 
Centre for War Studies, University of Glasgow, in 2009. That thesis focused on one, specific 
element of search technology, LIDAR, in the hunt for submarines. The current thesis is 
significantly more encompassing, both with regards to the timeframe involved but also with 
regards to the broadened focus of study.   
 
5 Harald Vikøyr, “Historisk Vinteråpning Av Polhavet,” VG, March 4, 2018, 
https://www.vg.no/nyheter/utenriks/i/0Er3n0/historisk-vinter-aapning-av-polhavet. 
6 Susanne Skjåstad Lysvold, “Klimaendringene Tapper Havet for Oksygen - Fisken Rømmer Nordover,” NRK, 
October 10, 2018, https://www.nrk.no/nordland/klimaendringene-tapper-havet-for-oksygen---fisken-rommer-
nordover-1.14240007. 
7 John Simpson, “How Greenland Could Become China’s Arctic Base,” BBC News Online, December 18, 2018, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-46386867. 
8 See for example Pan Min, “Fisheries Issue in the Central Arctic Ocean and Its Future Governance,” The Polar 
Journal 7, no. 2 (2017); Mariia Kobzeva, “China’s Arctic Policy: Present and Future,” The Polar Journal 9, no. 
1 (2019); Arild Moe, “The Northern Sea Route> Smooth Sailing Ahead?,” Strategic Analysis 38, no. 6 (2014); 
Alexander Sergunin and Valery Konyshev, “Russia in Search of Its Arctic Strategy: Between Hard and Soft 
Power?,” The Polar Journal 4, no. 1 (2014). 
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The professional background for writing this thesis is as a Tactical Coordinator (TACCO) 
onboard Norwegian P-3 Orions. After flying aircraft in the High North, time was spent at the 
Norwegian National Joint Headquarters leading MPA operations, and then at the Royal 
Norwegian Air Force’s Inspectorate for Air Operations. Further, four years at NATO’s 
Maritime Command at Northwood in the UK have provided insight into NATO operations 
and the workings of the Alliance command structure. In addition to the sources gathered, 
experience has played a great part for the general understanding of the workings and 
development of MPA operations in the North Atlantic. This experience has been fundamental 
to the development of the theoretical framework that is presented in this study.  
A factor of concern for the validity of this study is the ability to “read between the lines” of 
operational reports that comes with such experience. It is much easier to envision what took 
place, the details that are mentioned and the factors that might have been omitted from an 
operational report, when it has been a part of the duty to write such reports oneself. Personal 
experience and knowledge of MPA operations have thus also been useful in the interpretation 
of archival materials for the historical chapters of this thesis. 
 
1.2 Historiography 
1.2.1 Geopolitics in the High North 
The literature on geopolitics in the North Atlantic as well as Norwegian security and defence 
policy provide an overarching baseline for analysing the requirements for situational 
awareness in the areas in question. A significant body of studies was published in the later 
years of the Cold War. 
The Russia expert Marion Leighton published in 1979 The Soviet Threat to NATO’s Northern 
Flank. Based on original Soviet sources, she analyses the offensive nature of Soviet security 
politics in the High North, and warns of the USSR’s expanding naval power, the increasingly 
offensive-oriented airpower, and the mounting ground forces on the Kola peninsula. There 
seemed to be an agenda to isolate and neutralize NATO’s Northern Flank.9 In The Military 
build-up in the High North, Sverre Jervell and Kåre Nyblom edited papers that were written 
ahead of the seminal conference in 1985 at the Harvard Center for International Affairs. The 
aim of the conference was to bring attention to the military developpments in the High North, 
 
9 Marion K. Leighton, The Soviet Threat to NATO’s Northern Flank (New York: National Strategy Information 
Centre Inc, 1979). 
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in a context where most strategic attention of the West was given to Central Europe.10 
Similarly, the publication of Northern Europe: Security issues fot eh 1990s by Paul Cole and 
Dougles Hart (eds.) focusses on the relative tranquility that has characterized the High North 
post-World War I. At the same time, they point to the fact that the North Atlantic cannot 
escape a general East-West confrontation, and that a clash in the north will bleed into theatres 
elsewhere.11 Clive Archer and Arthur Scrivener were members of the Royal Institute of 
Internatioanl Affairs’ Northern Waters Study Group. Their publication in 1986 of Northern 
Waters. Security and Resource issues shed light on the study group’s concerns for the water 
space between the Canadian eastern seaboard to the Barents Sea. These range from strategic 
issues to questions of resource management in the North.12 Walter Goldstein edited Clash in 
the North – Polar summitry and NATO’s northern flank in 1988, where focus is given to the 
increasing superpower tensions in the North Atlantic and the Baltic, as well as arms control 
and NATO decision making in a tense geopolitical setting.13 In Cold Water Politics – The 
Maritime Strategy and Geopolitics of the Northern Front, Ola Tunander assesses the 
offensive strategy of the United States in the early and mid-1980s. He claims that a 
decreasingly credible nuclear deterrence in the side of the Americans demanded a 
conventional offensive strategy that aimed to neutralize the Soviet Union strategic naval 
assets early in a conventiaon conflict.14 Brassey’s Atlantic Commentary NATO’s Defence of 
the North, edited by Eric Grove in 1989 summarizes the complexities of security politics in 
Northern Europe, with three Alliance members and two non-NATO members all aiming to 
maintain peace and low tensions in a highly strategic area, both the Barents Sea and the 
Baltic.15 In Soviet Sea Power in Northern Waters from 1990, John Skogan and Arne 
Bruntland (eds.) draw attention more specifically to the growth and motivation of Soviet sea 
power, and the impact that these have on some of the nations of North West Europe. In 
addition, a discussion on Western responses to the Soviet expansion is debated.16  
 
10 Sverre Jervell and Kare Nyblom, The Military Buildup in the High North. American and Nordic Perspectives 
(London: UP of America, 1986). 
11 Paul Cole and Douglas Hart, eds., Northern Europe: Security Issues for the 1990s (London: London 
Westview Press, 1986). 
12 Clive Archer and David Scrivener, eds., Northern Waters (London: Croom Helm, 1986). 
13 Walter Goldstein, ed., Clash in the North (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey’s International Defense 
Publishers, 1988). 
14 Ola Tunander, Cold Water Politics - The Maritime Strategy and Geopolitics of the Northern Front (London: 
SAGE Publications, 1989). 
15 Eric Grove, ed., NATO’s Defence of the North (London: Brassey’s, 1989). 




Rolf Tamnes has published an array of studies throughout his career, but his The United 
States and the Cold War in the High North is a standard work for anyone studying historical 
military issues in the North Atlantic.17 Tamnes provides a holistic overview of the bilateral 
relationship between the US and Norway, from WWII through the 1980s, on security policy, 
strategy and military cooperation. He gives a comprehensive account of how the North 
Atlantic and the High North emerged as the focal point of the bilateral relationship. He points 
to how the growing concern of the military build-up on the Kola peninsula has forced policy 
discussions in Norway throughout the Cold War. But the emphasis and importance given to 
the High North in strategic terms for the US has also varied, and fluctuating strategic 
emphasis have caused insecurity in Noregian policy circles. On the other side, Norway has 
displayed somewhat of an ambivalent posture towards encouraging American presence and 
activities simulatenously as Norway´s strongest ally has been held at arm´s length in order to 
maintain low tensions towards the Soviet Union. This dichotomy is a clear constant 
throughout Tamnes´analysis.    
The overarching framework for understanding Norwegian security politics and historical 
defense policies is constituted by two main volumes of work. The six volume Norsk 
utenrikspolitikks historie18 published in 1996/1997, provides essential overview of Norwegian 
security policy in a larger international context. The analysis underlines the different aspects 
of alliance coordination and cooperation, as well as formative domestic discussions and 
challenges that have shaped that interaction. In this work it is emphasized that maritime 
strategic questions and the surveillance of the High North have played important roles in 
foreign relations and the transatlantic relationship. Most relevant for this study has been 
Jakob Sverdrup´s Inn i storpolitikken, 1940-1949,19 Knut E. Eriksen and Helge Ø. Pharo´s 
Kalg krig og internasjonalisering, 1945-1963,20 and finally Rolf Tamnes´ Oljealder, 1965-
1995.21   
The five volume series on Norsk forsvarshistorie22 published in 2004 gives a thorough 
account on the development of the Norwegian defense establishment and armed forces. 
 
17 Rolf Tamnes, The United States and the Cold War in the High North (Oslo: Ad Notam, 1991). 
18 “The history of Norwegian foreign policy” 
19 Jakob Sverdrup, Inn i Storpolitikken, 1940-1949, vol. 4, Norsk Utenrikkspolitikks Historie (Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget, 1996). 
20 Knut E. Eriksen and Helge Ø. Pharo, “Kald Krig Og Internasjonalisering, 1945-1965,” vol. 5, Norsk 
Utenrikspolitisk Historie (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1997). 
21 Rolf Tamnes, Oljealder, 1965-1995, vol. 6, Norsk Utenrikspolitikks Historie (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 
1997). 
22 “The history of the Armed Forces of Norway” 
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Several of the security policy related issues are treated more in detail in this analysis than in 
the foreign policy history account mentioned above. In addition, the works go into detail on 
the development of the Norwegian command structure, the respective units and their 
relationship to the overarching development of the Armed Forces writ large, as well as the 
important evolution and development of the leadership of the armed forces and their 
connection to the Ministry of Defense and the political establishment. Operations, exercises 
and interaction with NATO units are also dealt with in detail. Most relevant for this study are 
the two latest volumes, that is Kjetil Skogrand´s Alliert i krig og fred, 1940-1970,23 and Jacob 
Børresen, Gullow Gjeseth and Rolf Tamnes´ Allianseforsvar i endring, 1970-2000.24  
Also, Olav Njølstad´s encompassing and detailed biography of the war hero and later defence 
minister Hauge, Jens Chr. Hauge – Fullt og helt from 2008, not only describes in impressive 
detail the life and work of a formative political figure in the post-war years.25 It also sheds 
light on the intense political dynamics in the aftermath of WWII in Norway, and the 
orientation westwards that would culminate in the NATO membership. As a crucial part of 
this analysis stands the background for the basing policy and the formal restrictions on allied 
presence and activities on and from Norwegian soil. 
The works of Katarzyna Zysk, professor and deputy director of the institute, have also 
informed this thesis through providing thorough analysis on Russian military strategic and 
political developments, developments and modernization of the Russian defence sector, and 
Russian sea power and maritime security.26  
Academics serving at the military academies and the staff college of the Norwegian Armed 
Forces have also made valuable contributions to the analytical literature on the High North. 
Gjert Lage Dyndal has for some time been an active voice in this regard. In his How the High 
North became central to NATO strategy: Revelations for the NATO Archives published in 
2011, he portrays the elements that actually constituted the change in NATO perception of its 
Northern Flank. He goes into detail on the background for NATO´s Flexible Reponse 
 
23 Kjetil Skogrand, Alliert i Krig Og Fred, Norsk Forsvarshistorie 4 (Bergen: Eide Forlag, 2004). 
24 Jacob Børresen, Gullow Gjeseth, and Rolf Tamnes, Norsk Forsvarshistorie - Allianseforsvar i Endring, 1970-
2000, Norsk Forsvarshistorie 5 (Bergen: Eide Forlag, 2004). 
25 Olav Njølstad, Jens Chr. Hauge - Fullt Og Helt, 4th ed. (Oslo: Aschehoug, 2008). 
26 See for example Katarzyna Zysk, “Russia’s Arctic Strategy - Ambitions and Constraints,” Joint Force 
Quarterly (JFQ), no. 57 (2nd Quarter 2010); Katarzyna Zysk, “The Evolving Arctic Security Environment - An 
Assessment,” in Russia in the Arctic, ed. Stephen J Blank (Carlisle, USA: Strategic Studies Institute of the US 
Army War College (SSI), 2011), 91–138; Katarzyna Zysk, “Mot et Moderne Russisk Forsvar? Utviklingstrender 
i Militær Modernisering Og Strategisk Tenkning,” Norsk Militært Tidsskrift 183, no. 3 (2013). 
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strategy, the way the concerns of the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) fed 
into important strategic studies in the 1960s and the awakening to the Soviet strategic 
submarine threat in the late 1960s, among other elements. These paved the way for the 
Northern Flan to emerge as an independent strategic theatre of war.27 Further, in The rise of 
the Soviet Navy, a re-visited Western view he gives an account of how the Soviet Navy under 
admiral Gorshkov developed into a balanced fleet, particularly suited for its purpose in the 
High North.28 In addition, an important collaboration between Dyndal and Eystein Espenes of 
the Royal Norwegian Air Force Academy provides important insight into the developments 
of NATO’s intelligence focus towards the High North. They examine at the time newly 
released archive material in order to portray the chronological development in NATO 
intelligence assessment of the Baltic and the High North. They show that the change in 
intelligence focus from the southern parts of Scandinavia and the Baltic Sea to the High 
North occurred in 1956 and 1957.29 This coincides with the intelligence foundation for the 
work of the NATO Group of Experts and the common MPA procurement project in the late 
1950s and early 1960s, as we shall see. 
 
More recently, John Andreas Olsen has edited three Whitehall papers for the Royal United 
Services Institute (RUSI), which discuss different aspects of geopolitics and strategy in the 
North Atlantic. In NATO and the North Atlantic – Revitalizing collective defense from 2017, 
the authors underline the importance of maintaining and sustaining the transatlantic link in an 
increasingly complex and multifaceted security environment, and offer particular analysis on 
the US, the UK and Norway.30 In Security in Northern Europe – Deterrence, defence and 
dialogue from 2018, the authors expand the discussion to include the members of the 
Northern Group and Canada.31 Together they offer security proposals both for individual 
nationas and for a collective effort. Finally, in Future NATO – adapting to new realities 
published in 2020, the essays turn to NATO as an organisation and the security landscape it 
 
27 Gjert Lage Dyndal, “How the High North Became Central in NATO Strategy: Revelations from the NATO 
Archives,” Journal of Strategic Studies 34, no. 4 (2011): 557–85. 
28 Gjert Lage Dyndal, “The Rise of the Soviet Navy, a Re-Visited Western View,” Tidsskrift (Kungliga 
Krigsvetenskapsakademien), no. 3 (September 2013), 
http://www.academia.edu/5972744/The_rise_of_the_Soviet_Navy_a_re-visited_Western_view. 
29 Øystein Espenes and Gjert Lage Dyndal, “The Changing Focus of NATO-Intelligence - From Southern 
Scandinavia to the ‘High North’ at the End of the 1950s,” Tidsskrift (Kungliga Krigsvetenskapsakademien), no. 
2 (June 2013), http://kkrva.se/hot/2015:2/HoT_2_2015.pdf. 
30 John A. Olsen, ed., NATO and the North Atlantic - Revitalizing Collective Defence, Whitehall Paper 87 
(London: Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 2017). 
31 John A. Olsen, ed., Security in Northern Europe: Deterrence, Defence and Dialogue, Whitehall Paper 93 
(London: Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 2018). 
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must face in order to stay relevant.32 Together, these volumes provide insight in the security 
terrain that NATO in general, but also the nations surrounding the North Atlantic specifically, 
must manouever.  
Håvard Klevberg´s seminal PhD on the place of historical maritime airborne surveillance in 
Norwegian security politics, Maritime surveillance in the North – the 333 squadron in 
Norwegian security politics covers in significant detail the development of the Norwegian 
maritime patrol aircraft community in Norway during the Cold War.33 He approaches his 
analysis from three levels. Firstly, he looks at the way maritime air surveillance has played a 
significant role in Norwegian security politics throughtout the Cold War. Secondly, he looks 
at how the development of the Norwegian MPA community is closely intertwined with the 
overarching development of the Norwegian armed forces as a whole, both with regards to 
intra-service rivalry, to the development of the joint command institutions and command 
structure, as well as the emergence of the Norwegian Coast Guard. Finally, he discussed how 
certain individuals during specific periods during the Cold War have been formative for the 
development of the maritime air operations community in Norway.  
This thesis does not challenge existing literature on the geopolitics of the High North. 
However, it has for the North Atlantic been necessary to describe the development of naval 
strategy and the role of submarines within it, in order to understand the relevance of airborne 
ISR in the subsurface domain in the past and the present. The mentioned literature provides 
the background for the political and strategic context for the development of maritime ISR in 
the High North. The gaps that this thesis seeks to fill are those of the operational and tactical 
understanding for maritime surveillance within that context. It is in the shape of the basic 
tenets that constitute such an understanding, that from a lower level will seek to meet the 
overarching strategic context, that there is a gap in analysis that must be filled. 
 
1.2.2 Russian submarine and missile development  
It is hard to discuss naval warfare, technology and strategy without touching on works by 
Norman Friedman. His ability to combine historical developments, technological details and 
insight and strategic aspects of warfare often provides an important contribution to any 
military discussion in the maritime domain. His work is represented in this thesis by 
 
32 John A. Olsen, ed., Future NATO: Adapting to New Realities, Whitehall Paper 95 (London: Royal United 
Services Institute (RUSI), 2019). 
33 Håvard Klevberg, “Maritime Surveillance in the North: 333 Squadron in Norwegian Security Politics” (PhD, 
History, Oslo, University of Oslo, 2011). 
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Submarine Design and Development, The US Maritime Strategy, and Seapower and Space – 
in addition to a range of articles published in the US Navy journal Proceedings. Another 
prominent naval historian is Norman Polmar, who through both his writings for Jane’s, his 
numerous articles and books on naval affairs have contributed significantly to this thesis. 
Likewise, Jan Breemer not only contributed to the bastion debate in the 1980s, but followed 
up on his studies with a range of articles on submarine development and naval strategy, for 
example Soviet Submarines – Design, Development and Tactics. He also wrote one of the 
Newport Papers issued by the US Naval War College, entitled Defeating the U-boat – 
inventing anti-submarine warfare. Yet another naval historian with an impressive portfolio of 
titles concerning naval ships and warfare is John Jordan. Currently the editor of the annual 
release of the Warships series by Osprey Publishing, he has written extensively on historical 
battleship development, including a book on Soviet Submarines – 1945 to the present. Most 
of the authors mentioned also discuss the development of weapons, including missiles fired 
from submarines. However, contemporary writings on missile development available in open 
sources are usually from the media, or from online blogs with sources that by definition are 
impossible to confirm without committing a breach of security oneself. Some blogs and 
authors stand out with credibility due to their background, and consistency in reporting. Pavel 
Podvig seems to be one of the most credible sources on Russian strategic force development. 
His project Russian Nuclear Forces runs the blog russianforces.org, which posts reports on 
Russian weapons development with a high degree of currency. His work has also produced 
the detailed and encyclopaedic book Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, which has informed 
this thesis substantially.  
 
1.2.3 ASW development in general 
A lot about the role of maritime airborne surveillance and reconnaissance can be learned 
through studies of the Western approach to the Soviet submarine threat during the Cold War. 
Owen Cote wrote in the early 2000s about the Third Battle [of the Atlantic], where the first 
and the second battle are considered to be the fight against German submarines in WWI and 
WWII, respectively. The third battle entailed the tracking and containment of Soviet 
submarines during the Cold War. Cote’s discussion does not apply to maritime airborne 
surveillance specifically, but he covers the roles that MPA played in concert with submarines 
and fixed, underwater listening systems such as Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS). The 
different elements of the ASW effort were dependent on each other, and filled essential roles 
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in order to track enemy submarines in vast masses of water. Cote’s work from 2003 is mostly 
descriptive in nature, but there are principled takeaways from his historical depiction of 
events. One example is how the lack of ASW capabilities in interaction with improved 
subsurface technologies led to changes to doctrine and strategy.  
Kathleen Hicks et al. of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) published in 
2016 a thorough account of the status of underwater warfare in the North Atlantic.34 The 
article provides a thorough discussion of the underwater capabilities of the Northern Fleet, 
and gives an introduction to NATO’s present-day approach to the North Atlantic. In order to 
meet the emerging underwater threat, specific recommendations are provided on restructuring 
organisations, upgrading capabilities and revising NATO’s posture. Although elegantly 
argued, the article does not provide an explanation as to the fundamental reasons for the 
requirement for the respective capabilities, to include airborne platforms. Another example of 
an analysis of the current status of naval affairs in the North Atlantic is the 2019 release of 
The New Battle for the Atlantic – Emerging Naval Competition with Russia in the Far North, 
by Magnus Nordenman. Motivated by a lack of maritime focus in NATO over the past two 
decades, Nordenman brings to the fore the re-emerging Russian naval threat in the North 
Atlantic. Based on discussion with NATO commanders, US Navy officials and Nordic 
ministries of defence he provides a range of generic recommendations for NATO’s and the 
United States’ approach to the North Atlantic. Several of his conclusions are supported by 
this thesis. 
Through the theoretical framework for airborne ISR presented in this thesis new ASW 
technology can be discussed in a structured context, a framework that has not been available 
until now. By deconstructing the elements of airborne ISR one can from an objective 
standpoint discuss the relevancy of the platforms conducting ASW, and thus develop 
recommendations for a future construct of ISR platforms.  
 
1.2.4 Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) 
Not very much has been written comprehensively on airborne ISR. There are quite a few 
publications on elements of airborne ISR, such as electronic intelligence, communications 
intelligence, or imagery intelligence. And there is a substantial array of books on different 
 
34 Kathleen Hicks et al., “Undersea Warfare in Northern Europe,” CSIS International Security Program (Center 
for Strategic and International Studies, July 2016). 
30 
 
specific aircraft, and a growing literature on unmanned aircraft. However, the most 
comprehensive publication to this date on the history of airborne ISR as a whole seems to be 
Tyler Morton’s PhD dissertation from 2016 on the historical development of manned 
airborne ISR in the US Air Force.35 This work, together with others on airborne surveillance 
and reconnaissance during World War II and the Cold War, have substantially informed this 
thesis as to the historical backdrop of the theoretical framework for airborne ISR. The 
emergence of ISR as a concept in the 1990s will be discussed in section 1.3.2 below. 
 
1.2.5 Maritime airborne surveillance, reconnaissance and patrol 
Likewise, little has been written on maritime airborne ISR. There are no comprehensive 
studies on maritime airborne surveillance in the North Atlantic, except for Håvard Klevberg’s 
PhD thesis on Norwegian developments within maritime air operations during the Cold War, 
mentioned above. Klevberg discusses in his dissertation from 2011 the development of 
maritime air surveillance in Norway from the inter-war period leading up to WWII until the 
end of the Cold War.36 He places the activities of the sole, maritime air squadron of the 
Norwegian Air Force, the 333 squadron, in a tactical, strategic as well as a political context, 
and shows how the evolution of Alliance dynamics and bilateral interaction with the USA, 
and of the Norwegian Armed Forces (in particular the Air Force) shaped the development of 
maritime air operations for Norway. His work, however, is more of a case-study of the 333 
squadron than a conceptual-theoretical study on maritime ISR per se, although the former 
sheds light on the latter in an organizational construct. Moreover, much has happened since 
the end of the Cold War with regards to maritime airborne surveillance, particularly in the 
High North, which must be analysed and contextualized. This thesis thus develops the 
operational and international parts of the discussion that Klevberg initiated in his thesis.    
Existing studies typically focus on specific operations and/or aircraft that have been 
performing those operations. A noteworthy publication is the Maritime Patrol Aviation, a 
magazine that were issued starting in 1988 by VP International, the international MPA 
alumni with headquarters in Greenwood, Canada. The magazine is a venue for exchanging 
ideas, doctrinal discussions and lessons learned, as well as noteworthy operations from the 
maritime air patrol community. In essence constituting an internal discussion forum for the 
 
35 Tyler Morton, “From Kites through Cold War: The Evolution of United States Air Force Manned Airborne 
ISR” (PhD, Maxwell AFB, Montgomery, Alabama, Air University, 2016). 
36 Klevberg, “Maritime Surveillance in the North: 333 Squadron in Norwegian Security Politics.” 
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MPA community, the magazine has articles of significant interest to this study, but has in 
itself had little impact on the broader discussion on ISR.  
If we look at military journals with a broader impact such as the US Naval Institute’s 
Proceedings, most articles about maritime air surveillance and reconnaissance were 
published after the Cold War. They are generally related to the requirements associated with 
maritime airborne ISR, and the future of that particular profession in times of over-land focus 
by the rest of the military organization.  
Specific writings on maritime aircraft offer insight into operational requirements, in addition 
to giving some descriptions of specific maritime surveillance operations – these are usually 
writings that cover the main maritime aircraft operated by the nations that operated the most 
and the most capable maritime aircraft: the USA and the UK.37 David Reade offers a 
thorough study of the history of the P-3 Orion, and Tony Blackman has written somewhat 
more compressed on the history of the Nimrod.38 
One missing piece on maritime airborne surveillance and reconnaissance is a more detailed 
case-study of the NATO weapons procurement program for MPA in the 1950s, the 
Atlantique. The procurement was described from a Norwegian standpoint by Klevberg and 
briefly from an airframe development standpoint by Chris Gibson, but a holistic explanation 
of the background, the details of the negotiations, and the results is missing.39 Drawing on 
technical details, minutes from negotiations on aircraft and system requirements, operational 
characteristics, details on procurement, and documents on the operational background for the 
NATO acquisition program, this thesis will for the first time offer a holistic explanation of 
the background, evolution, and results of these efforts. The study points to fundamental 
elements of the theoretical framework for airborne ISR, which is presented later in the thesis.    
The literature on airborne ISR in the High North during the Cold War is sparse and usually 
focusses on specific MPA operations.40 They do not provide, in themselves, much discussion 
 
37 David Reade, The Age of Orion - The Lockheed P-3 Story (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing, Ltd., 1998); Chris 
Gibson, Nimrod’s Genesis - RAF Maritime Patrol Projects and Weapons since 1945 (Manchester: Hikoki 
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38 Reade, The Age of Orion - The Lockheed P-3 Story; Tony Blackman, Nimrod - Rise and Fall (London: Grub 
Street Publishing, 2011). 
39 Gibson, Nimrod’s Genesis - RAF Maritime Patrol Projects and Weapons since 1945, 104–7. 
40 Examples of such articles are M. Coleman, “Journal 33,” Royal Air Force Historical Society Journal 33 
(2005): 89–102; Jasjit Singh, “Aerial Surveillance for Maritime Security,” Strategic Analysis 7, no. 12 (1984); 
David Reade, “Worldwide P-3 Status Report,” Maritime Patrol Aviation, September 1992, 62–68; David Reade 
and Bob Harper, “Naval Air Station Keflavik, Iceland,” Airborne LOG, no. Fall 1994 (1994): 8–11. 
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of overarching tenets of maritime surveillance operations. Nor do they offer insight into the 
ways in which maritime surveillance operations interacted with the rest of the intelligence 
community, tasking, analysis, or the dissemination of maritime airborne intelligence 
products. This thesis places maritime airborne ISR operations into a contextual and theoretic 
framework, and thus provides a basis for discussing the requirements for maritime airborne 
ISR for the future. 
Harald Håvoll’s study of the future Norwegian airborne maritime surveillance on behalf of 
the Norwegian Foreign Policy Institute in Oslo in 2015 aims to provide the basis for an 
informed discussion on future requirements for maritime long-range surveillance.41 Håvoll’s 
report describes the basic components of maritime surveillance with regards to capabilities 
and sensors. His report does not, however, place Norwegian maritime airborne ISR in an 
expanded, organisational context, except for opening for the option of combining unmanned 
systems with manned MPA. Meanwhile, Norwegian officer Jan Egil Rekstad’s 2018 master’s 
thesis examines the P-8 Poseidon and the potential for trilateral partnership between the US, 
the UK and Norway on maritime surveillance in a contemporary context. Although not set in 
a theoretical framework, he discusses speed, range and altitude for maritime aircraft, 
networked operations, joint ASW, and presents a good operational discussion on submarine 
prosecution.42 The study points to the inherent potential in three key nations flying the same 
aircraft, but overestimates the continuity and persistency in presence and search capabilities 
the P-8 can provide. The discussion on maritime surveillance and its role in deterrence is 
good but short, and deserves further examination.  
In sum, it can be argued that current writings on maritime airborne ISR in the High North 
lack contextualization within a theoretical framework. Little to no link is made between 
airborne ASW efforts and a general understanding of airborne ISR. This is a weakness that 
the maritime airborne ISR community must confront as soon as possible if they are to stay 
relevant. This thesis aims to bridge some of this gap. 
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1.3.1 Outline of the study 
This thesis focuses on of the historical development of MPA operations in the North Atlantic, 
which together with the overarching historical development of airborne intelligence 
collection facilitate the establishment of a theoretical framework for airborne ISR. Any 
discussion of these developments must be situated within a broader framework that highlights 
the evolution of the geopolitical context in the North Atlantic, including the evolution of 
Soviet/Russian grand and naval strategy, the place of submarines within that strategy, and 
NATO responses to them. Parallel to this, the discussion also pays attention to crucial 
technological and operational developments on the part of both Russian submarines and 
MPAs (as well as other relevant surveillance elements). A structured depiction of these 
historical developments assists in establishing a theoretical framework for airborne ISR. It is 
within this framework that we can then objectively discuss the requirements for future ASW 
capabilities in airborne ISR in the High North. 
There is no internationally recognized definition of the High North. The term North can be 
somewhat misleading in general geographical naming conventions, all the while it can be 
applied in relative terms: An Italian travels north to Denmark, and a Norwegian travels south 
to Denmark. The North Sea, which is the basin between the UK, the European mainland and 
Scandinavia, is situated south of the Norwegian Sea. The High North is for the sake of this 
thesis defined as the ocean and land areas north of the Arctic circle, which is a very long 
distance towards North for most of the world’s population.  
 
1.3.2 ISR as a concept 
The term ISR was not in use until the 1990s. Before this, the common terms were 
“intelligence collection”, “surveillance”, and “reconnaissance”, often prefixed by the word 
“airborne”. In the maritime domain, the terms “maritime surveillance and reconnaissance” 
and “maritime patrol” have been used interchangeably. The concept of ISR evolved in a time 
where maritime surveillance and reconnaissance was overshadowed by modern expeditionary 
warfare in the Balkans and the Middle East in the 1990s. As warfare has evolved since the 
Cold War, so has our understanding of intelligence support to operations, and intelligence 
being integrated into operations. In the beginning of the 1990s, the main foe for the West 
seemingly disappeared, and the decisive naval battles, the great land campaigns, and the fight 
for air superiority seemed to turn into anachronisms. Warfare became limited in time, scope 
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and space, and armed forces were forced to think joint. Expeditionary warfare in the 1990s 
(Gulf War I, Somalia, the Balkans) became the contemporary way of fighting wars, and 
intelligence stepped up as more of a core tenet of modern warfare as opposed to the more 
classic interpretation of intelligence as having an auxiliary, supporting role.43 In addition, 
there was an explosion in the use of unmanned aircraft in support of ground operations in the 
1990s and early 2000s. The availability of ISR products from the tactical to the strategic level 
has been a giant leap forward for military organizations, although the immense amounts of 
information accessible also pose significant challenges. It was in this context that “ISR” grew 
into its own, and became an integrated part of the “net-centric warfare” movement. “ISR” as 
a term came into daily usage in the mid-1990s, after first being coined by the United States 
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Owens, pointing to ISR as a vital 
component of modern warfare, implemented through the concept of net-centric warfare.44 A 
network-centric approach to warfare is essentially the military embodiment of information 
age concepts. It is the linkage of computers, communications, sensors and military units in 
order to improve efficiency and effectiveness of military operations.45 Or as John Ferris puts 
it, it is “the idea that armed forces will adopt flat structures, working in nets on the internet, 
with soldiers at the sharp end able to turn data processing systems at home into staffs 
through ‘reachback’, real time, immediate and thorough inter-communication.”46 In short, it 
is about gathering, interpreting, disseminating, and acting upon information in the battlefield 
– faster than your opponent. The tenets of netcentric warfare are thus a networked force in 
order to improve information sharing, which in turn will enhance the quality of information 
and shared situational awareness, which will enable collaboration, self-synchronization, 
sustainability and speed of command, which finally will increase mission effectiveness.47 
Critical voices in the early and mid-2000s pointed to important elements of command and 
warfare in general being eroded in favour of an emphasis on quantitative measurements 
(number of targets hit, numbers of areas covered through surveillance etc.), and what some 
 
43 Gregory Elder, “Intelligence in War: It Can Be Decisive,” Studies in Intelligence 50, no. 2 (2006); Brian P. 
Tice, “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles - The Force Multiplier of the 1990s,” Air & Space Power Journal 5, no. 1 
(1991). 
44 David A. Deptula and R. Greg Brown, “A House Divided - The Indivisibility of Intelligence, Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance,” Air & Space Power Journal 22, no. 2 (Summer 2008). 
45 Clay Wilson, “Network Centric Warfare: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress” (Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Research Service, June 2, 2004), CRS-2. 
46 John Ferris, “Netcentric Warfare, C4ISR, and Information Operations: Towards a Revolution in Military 
Intelligence?,” Intelligence and National Security 19, no. 2 (2004): 199–225, 199. 
47 John Luddy, “The Challenge and Promise of Network-Centric Warfare” (Arlington, VA: Lexington Institute, 
February 2005), 3. 
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commentators have termed the “fetishisation of speed and tacticisasion of strategy.”48 
Netcentric warfare is not the topic of discussion for this thesis; however, any discussion of 
modern ISR must take into account developments of modern armed conflict as a whole, in 
order to make the gathered intelligence products actionable to the rest of a joint force.  
The development of ISR in the 1990s occurred with maritime airborne ISR standing on the 
sidelines. As warfare became more expeditionary and focused on counterinsurgency, and the 
level of foreign submarine activity was in free-fall, the open ocean MPA community found 
itself in search of a mission. This sudden identity crisis led to more and more MPAs 
executing surface and over-land surveillance and reconnaissance, in place of what historically 
had been their primary mission – anti-submarine warfare.49 This ambiguity is one of the 
factors that makes the study of modern maritime ISR an interesting topic for discussion, all 
the more so as Russian submarine activities are once more on the rise. 
To the extent possible, this thesis will rest on definitions endorsed by NATO. NATO defines 
surveillance as 
“the systematic observation of aerospace, surface, or subsurface areas, 
places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other 
means.”50 
This definition covers those activities concerned with observing objects, people, and areas 
over time, in support of building empirical knowledge on an adversary. Reconnaissance, 
meanwhile, is defined as 
“a mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection 
methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or 
potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, 
hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area.”51 
 
48 See for example Ferris, “Netcentric Warfare, C4ISR, and Information Operations: Towards a Revolution in 
Military Intelligence?”, 201. 
49 Scott Jasper, “Does Maritime Patrol Have a Future?,” United States Naval Institute Proceedings 123, no. 4 
(April 1997); Birkeland, “The Potential of LIDAR as an Anti-Submarine Warfare Sensor”, 54-44; Perkins, 
“Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare - A Forecast for Maritime Air ASW in the Future Operational 
Environment”, 45-46. 
50 AAP-6, “NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions” (NATO Standardization Agency, April 3, 2013), 2-S-15. 
51 AAP-6, 2-R-4. 
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Reconnaissance is thus information gathering in more specific terms. An asset or a person is 
tasked to observe a specific adversary person, unit, or activity, at a given time and place. 
Finally, intelligence builds on these collection activities, and is defined as 
“the product resulting from the processing of information concerning foreign 
nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or 
potential operations. The term is also applied to the activity which results in 
the product and to the organizations engaged in such activity.”52 
Collection is carried out through the overarching activities of surveillance and 
reconnaissance – the products stemming from those activities will then be analysed and 
contextualized, eventually facilitating intelligence.53 The three are thus inherently 
indivisible.54 This indivisibility has matured into the concept “ISR” over the past two 
decades, although never maturing and developing into a theory. Doctrine, yes eventually, but 
not theory as an academic would understand it. Although the term ISR has not yet matured 
into an official NATO definition, the United States Department of Defence defines ISR as 
“an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of 
sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in 
direct support of current and future operations. This is an integrated 
intelligence and operations function.”55  
This definition underlines the integrated relationship between ISR and ASW. As will be 
emphasized in the new theoretical framework of this thesis, ISR is the foundation for ASW, 
and it is futile to discuss ASW without a thorough understanding of ISR. 
There is no internationally acknowledged definition of airborne ISR. However, as the 
definition of ISR has been given above, the question then becomes with what type of asset 
can this activity be executed if it is airborne. Without going into the technical differentiation 
between classifications of aircraft that is commonly established by aviation authorities, this 
thesis simply refers to aircraft that depends on lift from the air. For the sake of this discussion 
 
52 AAP-6, 2-I–6. 
53 The collection of intelligence is carried out in the framework of the respective intelligence disciplines 
(HUMINT, GEOINT, SIGINT, OSINT, MASINT, TECHINT, ACINT), which will not be elaborated on at this 
stage. For details, see for example US DoD (2012) Joint Pub. 2-01 “Joint and National Support to Operations”. 
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it is important to note that satellites do not fly through the air, but they have become 
significant contributors to overall intelligence gathering from an elevated position.  
 
1.3.3 ASW defined 
Any discussion on maritime airborne ISR will (or should) include a discussion on the 
requirement for ASW capabilities, as the surveillance of and warfare against adversary 
submarines have historically been a significant, though not the only, part of maritime 
airborne surveillance. The NATO definition of ASW is:  
“operations conducted with the intention of denying the enemy the effective use 
of their submarines”56 
Clearly, ASW is not solely executed by aircraft. On the contrary, the main ASW force has 
traditionally been surface vessels with hull mounted sonars and towed arrays, and 
submarines. Airborne ASW assets include ship-based helicopters, ship-based fixed-wing 
aircraft, shore-based helicopters and shore-based maritime patrol aircraft. The only airborne 
platform designated for large area, long-range ASW, however, has been MPAs, and this 
thesis provides a detailed case study of MPA operations in the High North.   
As part of an introduction to maritime airborne ISR it is necessary to have a common 
understanding of the term patrol, as it is used extensively to describe the role of many 
maritime airborne ISR missions. NATO defines the term patrol as: 
“a detachment of ground, sea, or air forces sent out for the purpose of gathering 
information or carrying out a destructive, harassing, mopping up, or security 
mission.”57 
The term maritime patrol is ingrained in military terminology, but is not properly defined in 
military doctrine. The understanding of maritime patrol is one of active observation of a 
given area, conducted by a unit that is capable of engaging hostile units within that area. The 
more passive surveillance, reconnaissance and general monitoring of ISR is not considered 
patrol in the full sense of the term, however, the surveillance and reconnaissance parts 
comprise significant parts of the act of patrolling an area. Mainly, the difference between a 
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maritime surveillance aircraft and a maritime patrol aircraft is just this: the ASW capability. 
As a continuation of this, if the aircraft is capable of searching for, finding, tracking, and 
subsequently engaging enemy submarines, the aircraft can be considered a maritime patrol 
aircraft, or MPA. The reason that this matters is that NATO members poured significant 
money and resources into procuring, maintaining, and operating MPAs during the Cold War, 
but the inventory of MPAs took a significant downturn after the Cold War. An important part 
of discussions related to future maritime airborne surveillance is the requirement for an ASW 
capability. With all the costs associated with operating an MPA fleet, this is an important 
political and military-strategic decision in either direction. This question goes to the core of 
the discussion on future ISR in the High North.  
Airborne ASW is complicated business. The flying crew must understand the environment 
they are working in and they need to have a working knowledge of the particular equipment 
they use and how well it might function. Speed of reaction, flexibility to change operating 
areas quickly and efficiently, and the ability to deploy sophisticated buoys are all an 
advantage to the aerial ASW platform. The aircrew has an array of additional sensors on 
board that will help them accomplish their mission, be it covertly following the enemy 
submarine or hunting it down in order to neutralize her. As submarines have become quieter, 
in addition to operating in unpredictable patterns and large operating areas, the task of 
searching for, locating and tracking a modern submarine has grown more challenging, even 
with state-of-the-art sensors and computers. It is important to note that ASW is not 
necessarily about neutralizing the enemy submarine by sinking it with a torpedo. It also 
involves putting on an extensive search that the submarine commander is aware of, and thus 
has to evade or move around or through in order to accomplish his or her mission. The use of 
active sonar sensors in the water is one way of informing the submarine of the ASW force’s 
presence. And when a naval force must traverse a given part of the ocean to reach an 
operational area, the water space ahead of the force must be searched for any threats. This is 
often termed sanitization. ASW forces will operate ahead of the naval force to ensure that 
there are no enemy submarines operating enroute. These are but a few examples of ways for 
airborne ASW assets to hinder a submarine from operating effectively.  
 
1.3.4 Types of submarines 
ASW, of course, has had to adapt to the evolution of submarines. This will be discussed in 
greater depth in the chapters that follow. Suffice it to say here that early submarines were 
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diesel-electric, but as the nuclear powers developed smaller and more efficient reactors, the 
desire to move faster and longer with bigger submarines without replenishment over an 
extended period of time could be satisfied. Most submarines carrying ballistic missiles 
(SSBN) are nuclear powered and are able to operate almost anywhere in the world for months 
at a time. Attack submarines can be nuclear (SSN) or diesel-electric (SSK). SSKs usually do 
not operate very far from the shore due to their smaller size and manoeuvrability, in addition 
to their requirement to replenish diesel, a need the SSNs don’t have. Some new submarines 
have Air Independent Propulsion (AIP), and are powered by fuel-cells that are charged 
without air. These submarines are as quiet as the SSKs.58 Submarines that carry guided 
missiles can be conventional (SSG) or nuclear powered (SSGN), and are often in a modern 




Primary sources for this study include declassified documents retrieved through archival 
research, interviews with knowledgeable persons, and official transcripts, reports, and 
communiques from national governments and NATO.59 Three particular archives have been 
used for this thesis. The NATO archives in Brussels, the National Archives in Kew, London, 
and the archives of the US Navy and the Naval History and Heritage Command in 
Washington, D.C. In order to properly analyze and understand the political as well as 
operational context from a Norwegian standpoint, it would be necessary to access Norwegian 
archives in Oslo. This was not possible in the given timeframe due to severe Covid-19 
restrictions. In order to shed light on and verify those important viewpoints, this will be done 
at a later stage. In the meantime, much of the Norwegian political discussion will rest on 
research by Klevberg and Tamnes, in particular. One of the challenges of this work has been 
that most documents are declassified only after 30 years, meaning that it has been at times 
difficult to retrieve relevant sources for the post-Cold War period. Archival sources are 
therefore prominent in the Cold War chapters of this thesis, while interviews and published 
primary sources feature more heavily in the post-Cold War chapters.  
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In using open and published sources it is increasingly important to consider what platform is 
providing the information, from online blogs on modern weapons systems and newspapers to 
forums that are essentially propaganda, posing as credible news agents. In between all this, 
the respective intelligence agencies, such as the US Navy’s Office of Naval Intelligence 
(ONI) and the Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS) both provide unclassified intelligence 
assessments. Such assessments have been valuable for confirming or rejecting, and assessing 
the reliability of information and trends that can be extrapolated from other open, especially 
online sources.  
For the historical chapters, US intelligence estimates have been widely used. These estimates 
oftentimes informed the NATO commands extensively both due to their quality and scope, 
but also due to the fact that key NATO commanders were and are American. Most of these 
intelligence estimates from the Cold War have been made publicly available over the past 
decade, leading to a succession of relevant documents that support the understanding of the 
general developments of the military dynamic in specific areas of the Alliance.  
Russian literature and sources could have given another dimension to the discussions on 
Russian strategy developments. However, as this author is not capable of reading Russian, it 
would have been too time and resource demanding to locate and translate the relevant 
material for this purpose. 
Probably the most comprehensive, modern study on specific requirements for airborne, long-
range ASW capabilities was published the summer of 2016 by NATO’s Joint Air Power 
Competence Centre (JAPCC).60 The study is highly descriptive and borrows analysis of 
future trends in geopolitical dynamics as well as weapons development from other sources. It 
does, however, give clear recommendations within NATO’s DOTMLPFI framework for 
future airborne ASW capabilities.61 The study describes the organizational set-up of NATO in 
the face of the Soviet submarine threat during the Cold War, and emphasizes the requirement 
to establish a similar organization today due to increased proliferation of modern submarines 
the world over. It is a case study of NATO airborne ASW capabilities, and points to several 
important factors within maritime airborne ISR, although essentially only focussing on one 
aspect of it, namely ASW. In itself, the study is also too specific on NATO as an organization 
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to provide actual, generic input to a general theorization of airborne ISR. The study does, 
however, provide important empirical support to general observations, such as the 
requirement of airborne ASW units to perform quick-responding, long-range missions over 
and close to the water. There is no discussion, however, as to how modern long-range ASW 
fits into an overarching ISR framework. 
Writings on the status and future of MPA can also be found in official studies and 
government discussions on the requirements associated with maritime surveillance and 
reconnaissance. Industry discussions on the requirements of MPA are naturally shaped by the 
fact that the author is coloured by the requirement to sell a product – few would be surprised 
to find that Boeing recommends Norway to have a full MPA capability (i.e. the P-8 Poseidon, 
which they produce) or that Northrop-Grumman suggests that the UK should acquire the 
MQ-4 Triton unmanned aerial system. Others have a more neutral voice, commenting on 
government decisions, white papers and reviews.62 
From government sources we can find transcripts of discussions in parliaments, such as the 
statements of Angus Robertson (MP) on the lack of UK maritime surveillance capabilities 
given in 2012. Obviously, parliament discussions aren’t the appropriate venue for discussing 
the theoretical framework of maritime airborne ISR, but the focus of such discussions and 
statements shows the aspects that are being emphasized at the political level.63  
 
1.4 Disposition 
This thesis chronologically builds towards the main discussion of the future role of ASW in 
airborne ISR in the High North in the final chapter. Chapter 2 establishes the historical 
backdrop to the maritime surveillance effort in the North Atlantic during the early Cold War. 
Chapter 3 is a case study of the NATO procurement program Atlantic, which started in 1957. 
Chapter 4 analyses the 1960s, when Norway was given new maritime aircraft to monitor 
Russian activity in the High North, but was not sufficiently capable to deliver intelligence 
from the subsurface domain. Chapter 5 examines the evolution of airborne anti-submarine 
warfare in the North Atlantic during the final decades of the Cold War. The USA, the UK and 
 
62 See for example James Bosbotinis, “The SDSR and the Future of British Airborne ISTAR,” DefenseIQ (blog), 
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42 
 
Norway all flew capable aircraft and cooperated to hold the Russian submarines at risk. In 
allowing us to chart and assess the ways in which geopolitical, strategic, operational, tactical 
as well as technological changes affected the effective execution of airborne ISR and ASW 
measures, these historical chapters enable us to identify and isolate some of the fundamental 
elements of airborne, maritime ISR. Chapter 6, meanwhile, focuses on the post-Cold War era, 
which saw a sharp downturn in Russian naval activity following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. This led to fundamental changes in how Western maritime patrol aircraft were utilized 
in operations and for peacetime surveillance. The chapter ends with a changed geopolitical 
situation and a renewed focus on the maritime domain and the subsurface threat. Together 
with literature on general airborne surveillance and reconnaissance, these historical chapters 
then provide the foundation for a novel theoretical framework for airborne ISR presented in 
chapter 7. The benefit of this framework is that it provides tools to properly discuss the 
requirements for surveillance and reconnaissance, and ASW in the North Atlantic, and how 
those requirements can be met. Finally, chapter 8 contains the main discussion on the role of 
ASW in airborne ISR in the High North. Here, the historical elements together with 
technological characteristics, in the context of the theoretical framework, provide the building 













2. The formative years: 1945-1960 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The history of submarines is closely intertwined with the history of the forces that have been 
tasked to neutralize them. There are many entities that must function well in concert with 
each other in order to “find, fix and finish” a submarine, and over the course of the Cold War 
one of the most prominent assets for conducting ASW were MPA. The ASW efforts in the 
Atlantic Ocean in the 20th century were termed the “Battles of the Atlantic”.64 The First battle 
aimed to secure allied civilian and military shipping during World War I. The Second battle 
involved the safeguarding of the sea lines of communication across the Atlantic from German 
U-boats during World War II. The Third battle was about holding at risk the Soviet 
submarines that posed a threat of an initial nuclear strike on the United States and Europe, 
and that aimed at assuring the Soviets a second-strike capability during the Cold War.  
The Northern Fleet on the Kola peninsula expanded significantly in the 1940s and 50s, and 
the role of Russian submarines grew in importance. In NATO, ASW technology was steadily 
advancing based on a momentum carried on from WWII. The fifteen years between the end 
of WWII and 1960 stand out as formative due to early evolution in nuclear capabilities, the 
foundation of NATO, the consequences of the Korean War to naval strategy on both sides of 
the Iron Curtain, and the general development in subsurface technology, both for the hunter 
and the hunted.  
The Norwegian government was in the first years after WWII reluctant to become too 
dependent on Great Power associations in either direction, but were approaching 1950 
increasingly engaged in strengthening the Atlantic connection.65 The single most central 
factor of Norwegian security politics became a reality in April 1949, when Norway became a 
founding member of NATO. The years following WWII saw the development of the 
Norwegian basing policy and the balancing act in the North: integration towards the West and 
thus deterrence towards the East, and screening towards the West through restricting Allied 
movements and presence on Norwegian soil and thus reassurance towards the East. 
 
64 Owen R. jr. Cote, “The Third Battle - Innovation in the U.S.Navy’s Silent War Struggle with Soviet 
Submarines,” Naval War College Newport Papers, no. 16 (2003): 2; James Foggo and Alanik Fritz, “The Fourth 
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65 Njølstad, Jens Chr. Hauge - Fullt Og Helt, 405–25; Klevberg, “Maritime Surveillance in the North: 333 
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In the 1940s, the lack of Norwegian capabilities to monitor the military developments in the 
Barents Sea and on the Kola peninsula became evident through American surveillance 
aircraft flying from Norwegian bases into the area of intelligence interest. From the mid-
1950s and onwards, Norwegian authorities enforced more explicit restrictions on Allied 
movements and presence in Norway, due to a raised awareness of the requirement for low 
tensions in the North. This political move would raise the focus on maritime surveillance in 
the High North. In the aftermath of WWII, the focus of the Norwegian government, 
particularly in the North, was on rebuilding the nation, rather than establishing and improving 
the ability to follow the military build-up on the Kola peninsula. A growing paradox became 
evident: an increase in Allied interest in the military developments in the High North and a 
decreasing Norwegian capability to monitor them. Maritime air operations in the High North 
would, starting in the 1950s, become a central factor in the bilateral relation between Norway 
and the United States. The obvious lack of Norwegian capabilities in all aspects of maritime 
air operations, led in the late 1950s to efforts to bring in new MPA to the Norwegian 
inventory.66 
This chapter provides an historical back-drop to the evolution of maritime airborne ISR in the 
North Atlantic. Not so much a discussion of the basic tenets of airborne ISR, it provides 
essential background for the more detailed discussion that follows in the coming chapters. 
The chapter shows the growing importance of submarines in the Soviet Union’s strategic 
posture, and it shows that the most common response in NATO to the submarine threat, to the 
Third battle of the Atlantic, was the establishment of a credible MPA force. 
 
2.2 The Northern Fleet build-up 
The build-up of the Soviet Northern Fleet on the Kola Peninsula really started after WWII. 
However, Stalin’s grandiose vision stemming from the 1930s of an ocean-going navy had to 
contend with the traditional Russian defensive focus, in addition to the obvious, harsh 
economic realities that followed the war. Plans to build aircraft carriers and battleships were 
therefore discarded in favour of submarines and heavy cruisers.67 After the Korean War, two 
fundamental factors stood out for the development of submarines for the Soviet Union. First, 
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the Korean War itself cemented the place of the US Navy’s aircraft carriers in the evolving 
nuclear strategy as a launch platform for nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union.68 The 
Soviets could no longer focus on defending their national and regional sea spaces: The threat 
had to be met at sea, long before the carriers came within striking distance of the Soviet 
mainland. This was a task for a robust and capable submarine service. Second, the death of 
Stalin in 1953 enabled a general review of Soviet strategy in general, and naval development 
specifically. The new head of the Navy, Admiral Gorshkov, emphasized the value of single 
units with strategic impact, in particular submarines, and oversaw a robust expansion of the 
submarine fleet in his first years as head of the navy.69  
Gorshkov’s massive submarine-building programme had the overall aim of disputing sea 
control with NATO navies.70 It was becoming increasingly clear for the Soviet Union that 
any contest of control of the Atlantic would be fought by the Northern Fleet, which had 
access to the only guaranteed year-round ice-free ports of the Russian Navy.71 Western 
intelligence also picked up a significant increase in the level of submarine training, and a 
general extension of peacetime patrol areas far beyond traditional Russian patrol areas close 
to their own coastal waters.72 
The Potsdam agreement after WWII had ensured that the Soviet Navy received several Axis 
submarines as a share of the war spoils, including several advanced German Type XXI 
submarines.73 After the reconstruction of war-damaged Soviet shipyards in the first five years 
following the war was completed, new submarine construction commenced. Several classes 
of diesel-electric propulsion were constructed in the 1950s. The benefits of nuclear over 
conventional propulsion, however, were recognized early: increased transit speed, range, and 
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unprecedented endurance. The Soviet Navy thus began developing a reactor for nuclear 
propulsion in 1953. The development of the November class submarine was given high 
political priority, and was rushed into production to such a degree that the prototype stage 
was bypassed altogether. This led to a leaky and unreliable propulsion system. Although the 
November only carried torpedoes, her commissioning in 1958 was a significant milestone. 
The submarine worked in tandem with the Foxtrot class in scouting far at sea.74 
In 1954, the US Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) assessed through his National 
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that the Soviets “almost certainly” would have a requirement for 
submarine-launched nuclear missiles for attacks on NATO. It was assessed as inevitable that 
nuclear missiles with an increasing range fired from submarines would pose a substantial 
threat by 1958.75 Both the US and the Soviet Union were already in possession of nuclear 
weapons, with the latter having detonated their first bomb in 1949. Pointing to this threat, the 
main advantage of submarine-launched missiles was the remote likelihood of interception of 
the launch platform. As a final recommendation, the NIE stated that the “primary defensive 
reliance would have to be placed on anti-submarine warfare.”76 The assessment was that the 
effectiveness of the Soviet submarine force would increase significantly.77 Initial 
investigations into the feasibility of placing ballistic missiles on Soviet submarines date back 
to the year of the first Soviet nuclear detonation in 1949. As missile and rocket technology 
matured, test firings were carried out on submarines that were converted and configured for 
the new mission.78 The Zulu V became the first Soviet SSBN in 1956. This was a major step 
forward for the submarine service, although the Zulus had to fire their SS-N-4 missiles (range 
300-350 nautical miles) from the surface. 79  
The construction of the first purpose-built strategic ballistic missile submarine, the Golf class, 
was initiated in 1958. With a diesel-electric propulsion and carrying three SS-N-4 missiles, 
the Golf had to traverse the Atlantic and surface fairly close to the US coastline in order to 
fire her missiles. This made her extremely vulnerable to adversary anti-submarine forces. The 
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Soviet Navy continued to develop a submarine that could launch her missiles from 
underneath the waterline, and at a greater distance.80 Meanwhile, the US Navy deployed the 
Polaris A-1 missile with the George Washington class submarine in 1960, capable of 
underwater launch and a range that was four times that of the Soviet SS-N-4. Underwater 
launch became a reality for the Soviets in the early 1960s, with retrofitted Golf class 
submarines with the D-4 system enabling underwater launch from a depth of 40-50 meters.81 
The nuclear-powered Hotel class was set in production a year after the Golf class, essentially 
constituting a Golf class with a nuclear reactor. The Hotel was also retrofitted to carry the D-
4 launch system, enabling it for underwater launch of the SS-N-4 missile.82. The Hotel still 
had to manoeuvre close to the US coastline.  
Experimentation with Soviet cruise missiles did not gain traction as early as it did in the 
USA, but was initiated nonetheless in the mid-1950s. The SS-N-3C Shaddock land-attack 
cruise missile had a range of 400 nm and was armed with a nuclear warhead. It was fitted on 
Whiskey class submarines in 1956-57.83 This was the precursor to the modern Russian 
submarines in the 2000s with significant cruise missile capabilities.  
In 1956, the Soviet Naval High Command determined that the submarine fleet was to begin 
long-range patrols, in order to establish a Soviet blue water presence across the globe.84 
Sporadic and experimental in nature, the missions seem to have been more for establishing an 
institutional foundation for later missions than for actual operational effect. Regular patrols 
did not take shape until ten years later. More common were missions along the European 
coastlines, interfleet transfers of submarines, and exercises in the Baltic and the North 
Atlantic.  
 
2.3 Western strategy and anti-submarine warfare 
A growing concern over the general Soviet naval expansion among NATO countries led to 
the establishment of the Atlantic Command under one Supreme Commander in 1952, 
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SACLANT.85 In the mid-1950s, the intelligence focus of the Americans and NATO started to 
include assessments of Soviet Northern Fleet expansion and operations in the North 
Atlantic.86 The Soviet Navy was assessed to have “the greatest submarine capability in the 
history of naval warfare”, and the primary capability was directed “against NATO sea 
communications.”87 This was also reflected in the NATO strategic concept MC 14/2 of 
October 1956. Although best known for outlining the overarching strategy of “Massive 
Retaliation”, the strategic concept detailed the importance of sea lines of communication, and 
the crucial role that the North Atlantic region would play for anti-submarine forces due to the 
expanding Soviet submarine force and the increasing importance of the Northern Fleet.88 
Emphasis was given to the importance of constituting a credible deterrent, as well as the 
“ability to carry out an instant atomic counteroffensive by all available means.”89 As NATO 
strategy progressed, there was an increasing requirement to monitor not only the development 
of adversary weapon systems, but also their method of delivery. The growing submarine 
threat prompted discussions in NATO on the Alliance’s ability to monitor and, if necessary, 
neutralize Soviet submarines. The Alliance’s assessments of its own measures to meet the 
threat highlighted a particular lack of maritime patrol aircraft.90 
As World War II ended and a great portion of ASW dedicated vessels were decommissioned, 
the Americans in particular had channelled resources into improving ASW technology to 
replace dwindling assets. Between 1943 and 1950, developments included improved ASW 
radars, sonars, weapons and tactics. In addition, more revolutionary technology was 
developed, such as passive acoustic arrays and an entirely new vessel, the ASW submarine.91  
It was recognized during WWII that significant numbers of aircraft were required for 
surveillance in the Atlantic, and that these aircraft could not work alone. During WWII, the 
German submarines were hunting Allied shipping vessels, the latter giving a clear indication 
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of where the enemy submarines would likely be operating. During the Cold War, the search 
for Soviet submarines required some sort of cueing in order for aircraft to track them down. 
This cueing would come in the shape of permanently stationed listening devices on the sea 
bed.92  
Passive acoustic technology had been under development during the 1940s, but it was the 
program initiated in 1950 by the US Navy’s Office of Naval Research (ONR) on the SOSUS 
that would change the ASW scene for decades to come. The new technology facilitated 
detecting hostile submarines passively at ranges unheard of until then. The low-frequency 
sound propagation phenomenon of convergence zones led to sound traveling deep down into 
the abyss, only to be bent upwards again towards the surface, leading to sensors being able to 
detect a submarine at approximately 30 nm. Up until the early 1950s, the best ranges 
experienced were around 10,000 yards, or approximately 5 nm. The new ASW submarines 
thus became a credible defensive asset in detecting approaching enemy submarines, and the 
network of SOSUS arrays on the sea bed was able to detect enemy submarines at even greater 
ranges. The post-war modus operandi of MPA searching for submarines was to focus on 
cueing from signals intelligence (SIGINT) platforms that had picked up submarine 
communications, then use the radar to vector in on snorkelling or surfaced submarines, and 
subsequently get in position for an attack with the use of homing torpedoes.93 Now, ASW 
submarines together with static, passive acoustic sensors of the SOSUS provided the MPA 
community with essential cueing for their much narrower search areas, enabling them to save 
fuel and resources, and arrive at a position closer to the target more rapidly than before. After 
WWII the development of passive sonobuoys had nearly stopped, but the success of the 
SOSUS system gave sonobuoy development a necessary push forward. Sonobuoys were 
developed based on SOSUS passive acoustic principles and improved onboard processing 
capabilities.  
Probably the most distinct feature of airborne ASW is the dropping of sonobuoys in order to 
search for frequencies emitted by the submarine.94 Submarines are mechanically driven, and 
emit sounds from their machinery in almost all circumstances. The sounds come from 
external units such as the propeller(s) and hydroplanes, or they come from internal equipment 
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such as electrical generators. The aircraft drops disposable sonobuoys into the water, which 
function as a floating microphone listening for sounds from the ocean. After dropping the 
buoys, several factors complicate matters. Sea-life, shipping-traffic, surface winds, and 
seismic activity are examples of what is referred to as ambient noise.95 One of the challenges 
is to distinguish between ambient noise and the frequencies emitted by the submarine. 
Submarine commanders, meanwhile, will try to “hide” the sounds of the submarine among 
these ambient frequencies. Oceanographic factors such as salinity, temperature and pressure 
impact how sound moves through the water. They differ according to time of day, proximity 
to lakes and fjords, littoral waters as opposed to the open ocean, seasonal changes to 
temperatures and seasonal changes to currents and winds.  
 
Figure 2-1. Acoustic sensors96 
If a sonobuoy is only able to listen for submarine frequencies and other sounds in the water, it 
is usually referred to as a passive bouy. Bouys that transmit a sonar sound around it function 
almost as an underwater radar that sends out an electronic signal in order to receive an echo 
of the emitted sound returned by the submarine. These buoys are referred to as active 
sonobuoys. With knowledge of the local water conditions, and the speed of sound through it, 
the distance and possibly the direction of the submarine from the buoy can be instantly 
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calculated, thereby accelerating target localization.97 The downside to an active “hit” like this 
is that the submarine will be warned that it has been detected. 
The continued development of sonobuoys meant that MPAs could fly to the last known 
position of the submarine, known as a datum, provided by the SOSUS system, and continue 
the passive search with the use of sonobuoys.  Acoustic techniques required high level skills 
by the operators, and it took a long time to gain proficiency in operating the equipment. 
Extensive experimentation was thus undertaken in the late 1950s in order to improve both 
equipment, operator techniques and integrated tactics with submarines and the SOSUS 
community.98 As a nuclear submarine, the November class was able to defeat traditional ASW 
tactics that were based on radar and active sonar (due to the speed of the nuclear submarine, 
the sonars of the surface ships were not able to stay focused on her position), but she was 
vulnerable to the new passive acoustic technology. The Soviets did not focus much on 
quieting measures for their submarines, which made Soviet nuclear submarine classes very 
much detectable by passive means. The process of quieting submarines was costly, took time 
and resources, and considerable investment in research. Quieting of emitted noise was also 
based on a significant attention to detail during the manufacturing process, something that 
worked against the usual Soviet rush to field new systems, as exemplified by the November 
class.99 The Soviets were more concerned about water resistance, which detracted from speed, 
than they were about noise from water flow and machinery. By the time Soviet nuclear 
submarines initiated their operations in the North Atlantic and the Pacific in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s, the Americans and their Allies had developed an extensive ASW network 
through a triad of ASW submarines, the SOSUS, and MPAs.100  
American P2V Neptune MPA operations were initiated in 1947. The aircraft was very 
advanced both in range and in sensor suite, but it was also costly to operate. The Neptune 
required extensive training to operate, and an elaborate ground support organization. In 1952, 
the first US Navy Neptune squadron deployed to Naval Air Station Keflavik on Iceland, in 
order to be closer to the operating areas of the growing Soviet submarine fleet.101 Tracking of 
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Russian submarines by ASW units from NATO nations in the North Atlantic was 
commonplace by the late 1950s. The first few years operating out of Keflavik required 
familiarization with the harsh weather environment in the North Atlantic, familiarization with 
new ASW equipment and perfecting ASW tactics.102 And American Neptune aircraft flew 
extensively in the North Atlantic, not only based on Iceland, but also periodically based in 
Norway.103 
After WWII, the United States recalled the lend-lease agreement on the B-17s and B-24s that 
formed the backbone of the Royal Air Force’s (RAF) Coastal Command inventory. This 
caused the RAF to order nearly thirty aircraft of a maritime version of the Avro Shackleton in 
1949. Although the first Shackletons arrived in 1951 and initiated operations and exercises on 
a small scale the year after, it would take several years before the fleet was operational. Thus, 
between 1952 and 1956, the British also flew Neptunes in the maritime patrol capacity. The 
Shackleton became sufficiently operational in 1956 for the remaining Neptunes to be returned 
to the USA.104 Through similar arrangements as the Americans, the British also flew out of 
Norwegian airfields in the 1950s to cover the expanding Soviet naval operations.105  
After WWII, the Norwegian maritime surveillance aircraft returned to Norway after serving 
under the British Coastal Command. The Catalina flying boats were utilized for everything 
but maritime surveillance and reconnaissance, such as postal flights and general 
transportation sorties, flights in support of fishery surveillance, and in support of clearing 
mines from WWII.106 Adding to this, the Catalinas were put on readiness for Search-And-
Rescue (SAR) tasks, which had the Norwegian maritime surveillance and reconnaissance 
community drift further away from their wartime tasks: early warning and anti-submarine 
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warfare operations. In a time of significant development of the Royal Norwegian Air Force, 
maritime air operations were throughout the 1940s put aside to the benefit of the fighter 
aircraft community.107  
After WWII, the ideas and functions that formed the basis for the allied fusion of operational 
intelligence (OPINTEL) sources perfected during the war were enhanced by new 
technology.108 In 1948, the Americans and the British had signed an agreement on 
intelligence sharing with specific regards to OPINTEL sharing of naval intelligence, building 
on broader Anglo-American intelligence sharing agreements.109 This sharing was crucial for a 
seamless integration of resources put into detecting and tracking Soviet submarines during 
the Cold War. NATO did not have any intelligence assets of its own, and was dependent on 
national intelligence efforts feeding into the Alliance’s operations and the planning of these. 
Arrangements for the bilateral sharing of intelligence functioned to the benefit of NATO in 
the sense that they raised the quality of the intelligence products. They were not, however, 
driven and organized by NATO per se.110   
When the nuclear-powered submarine USS Nautilus was commissioned in 1954, the speed 
and lack of requirement to surface for air provided an indication of how difficult it would be 
to track future enemy nuclear submarines. But it was also discovered that nuclear submarines 
were quite noisy, even when they were submerged, because of the reactor coolant pumps 
which operated continuously and the reduction gears which reduced the steam turbine shaft 
output revolutions.111 This knowledge led to the Western ASW posture of combining 
dedicated ASW submarines, MPAs and the SOSUS as the dominant tools in the search and 
tracking of adversary submarines. Thus, the US Navy Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) gave 
orders in 1960 to track every Soviet missile-carrying submarine that was operating within 
range of the United States.112 And in order to stay ahead of Soviet submarine developments, 
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NATO established an ASW Research Centre in 1959. The centre was proposed by 
SACLANT in order to streamline Alliance research and development for the advancement of 
ASW capabilities.113 Submarines and ASW were thus taking centre stage in day-to-day 
operations, in intelligence discussions, and doctrinal development early in the Cold War.  
 
2.4 The Norwegian balancing act – integration and screening  
There were few explicit national requirements in Norway for maritime surveillance in the 
High North in the late 1940s. NATO intelligence focused on a potential Soviet invasion of 
the European heartland on the continent.114 And with the lack of explicit tasking, the maritime 
airborne surveillance capability was organisationally, technologically, and with regards to 
competence and skills in free fall.115 The USA and the UK, however, were increasingly 
concerned about the Soviet build-up in the High North, and the lacking Norwegian 
surveillance efforts in the north prompted increasing surveillance activity by the Americans 
and the British in the late 1940s. The increased Allied activity in general shone a light on the 
Norwegian geopolitical and military-strategic placement. The Norwegian position in 
geopolitics has been a balancing act between integration towards the West and assurance 
towards the East. This duality produced a policy vis-à-vis allied partners of 
integration/deterrence and screening/reassurance. Norway would integrate with the West 
and NATO, in order to assure her own security, and NATO membership would constitute a 
deterrent effect in itself. But at the same time, Norway would screen her partners in the sense 
of limiting foreign activity and basing on Norwegian soil, thereby also reassuring the Soviets. 
Norway thus hoped to raise the threshold for any Soviet aggression through Western 
integration. At the same time, restrictions were placed on NATO presence and activity in 
order to maintain low tensions in the High North. The formal Norwegian basing policy was 
explicitly proclaimed in February 1949, where the government stated that Norway “will not 
open her bases to foreign powers on Norwegian territory as long as Norway is not subject to 
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attack or a threat thereof.”116 The intention of the policy was to keep foreign powers from 
permanently basing forces on Norwegian soil; exercises would thus be allowed. Only two 
months later, Norwegian foreign and security policy reached its most significant historical 
milestone when Norway signed the North Atlantic Treaty. Now, the friendly aircraft flying 
surveillance missions in the High North were alliance partners, and the Norwegian 
government saw the need to strengthen the restrictions it had put in place through the basing 
policy, as we shall see.  
It was not until the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, however, that the Norwegian 
government initiated its own regular surveillance missions in the High North. Russian 
involvement in the Korean War was by some suspected to be a distraction in order to tie up 
Western military resources in the Far East, and NATO closely monitored Russian movements 
elsewhere in order to notice the run-up to what could be the main event on the European 
continent.117 The newly initiated Norwegian surveillance missions aimed to monitor Soviet 
movements on and outside the Kola peninsula. But the squadron and the maritime air 
operations community had been marginalized due to prioritizing the Norwegian fighter 
aircraft capability, in addition to other national, organizational factors.118 The MPAs were 
old; there was a significant lack of personnel; and those that were available were poorly 
trained. The Catalinas had functioned in ASW operations during World War II mostly 
through visual sightings and torpedo attacks against surfaced submarines. Although the 
Norwegian Catalina aircraft contributed to surveillance also after WWII, the role of early 
warning had to be performed almost exclusively by American and British aircraft in the 
North Atlantic.119 In parallel to Norwegian operations up north, the British established routine 
monitoring of the Baltic Sea outlets, where the situation was not to be underestimated.120 In 
April 1950, Soviet Union fighter aircraft shot down a US Navy PBY4-2 Privateer maritime 
patrol aircraft over the Baltic.121 Two years later, a Soviet fighter aircraft shot down a 
Swedish SIGINT aircraft, killing everyone on board. Only days later, a Swedish Catalina 
flying boat searching for the missing aircraft was shot at by yet another Soviet fighter aircraft 
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and had to make an emergency landing.122 A defected Polish pilot later explained that the 
Soviet fighter pilots were under orders to shoot down any aircraft that did not obey orders to 
land, whether or not they had opened fire.123  
The level of Norwegian surveillance efforts, meanwhile, were deemed unacceptable both 
with regards to regularity and capabilities, and NATO proposed in 1951 to deploy two 
maritime surveillance squadrons to Norway in order to increase the surveillance capability in 
the North.124 The Norwegians rejected the proposal on the basis of the aforementioned basing 
policy.125 Norwegian authorities considered acquiring the advanced maritime patrol aircraft 
P2V Neptune for surveillance in the High North, but the Neptune demanded highly skilled 
and experienced personnel and was expensive to operate and maintain.126 The Norwegians 
were lacking in the former, and could not afford the latter. Surveillance missions thus 
continued with the outdated Catalinas. 
During the establishment of the command structure in 1951, Norway was placed under the 
command area for the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), and not SACLANT. 
The fact that Norway was under the geographical command of SACEUR underlines that the 
strategic emphasis of the Alliance was on defending against a Soviet thrust through mainland 
Europe. In the late 1950s, the North Atlantic and the Arctic had not yet received as much 
strategic planning attention, and was considered a part of the Northern Flank to the European 
mainland theatre of war. Only in the late 1960s would the naval threat from the Soviet 
Northern Fleet manifest itself to such a degree that the High North came to be considered a 
theatre of war in its own right.127 SACLANT had, however, been given the responsibility for 
allied reconnaissance in the Atlantic. And with military cooperation through the mechanisms 
of the Alliance came increased NATO activity in Norway: more exercises; more equipment 
flowing in to the country through the Mutual Defence Assistance Program (MDAP); and a 
general increase in foreign presence. The weak Norwegian contribution to maritime 
surveillance, in particular, led to an increase in Allied maritime surveillance activity in the 
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High North. The Allied desire to conduct surveillance missions out of Norwegian airfields 
towards the East, in combination with the Norwegian requirement for stability and 
predictability in the High North, led to bi- and tri-lateral arrangements for surveillance.   
In spite of scarce resources, the NIS were active and provided credible and sought-after 
services, particularly in the High North. This led to the NORUSA-agreement of 1954, where 
the Norwegians provided intelligence to the Americans and the latter provided equipment to 
the former in exchange.128 The agreement initially concerned communications intelligence 
(COMINT) but expanded to more fields of intelligence cooperation in the following years. 
This was the starting point for the close relationship between American and Norwegian 
intelligence agencies. By the end of the 1950s, the NIS had established itself as a reliable 
intelligence provider to the Norwegian government as well as to Allies. To an increasing 
degree, the NIS worked to keep Allies out of areas where it could handle the information 
gathering tasks by itself.129 
In 1955, the Americans requested the Norwegian government to operate their much more 
capable P2V Neptune out of bases in Northern Norway, since their home-base of Keflavik, 
Iceland, was too far away to give any meaningful time in the operations area up north. 
Among the requested airbases were Andøya, which then just recently had been built with 
funding through the NATO infrastructure program for several reasons.130 The Soviet build-up 
caused SACLANT to demand increased surveillance in the North, in general. Also, he 
required a dedicated base for conducting anti-submarine warfare in the North, and finally, he 
required a base for offensive strikes into the Soviet Union in the North.131 The Americans also 
saw, from a national perspective, that the requirements for information on Soviet activities 
north of the Kola peninsula had grown significantly. The Norwegians, however, still did not 
have the capacity to meet the requirements for early warning, updated targeting information, 
and an updated foundation for war plans for the High North.132 The arrangement that was 
sought was to fly American aircraft to Norway in order to familiarize the aircrews with bases 
and topography, as they would have to operate out of these bases in wartime.It was, however, 
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understood that the arrangement would meet general surveillance requirements for the 
Americans as well. The flights to and out of Norway would take place approximately every 
three weeks. The arrangement was approved by the Norwegian government in 1955, and was 
called Neptune Journey.133 This bilateral agreement was to become the cornerstone for 
American-Norwegian cooperation with regards to airborne maritime surveillance. Radio 
communication procedures improved significantly, as did flight safety and tactical procedures 
for flying in the High North.134  
Several NATO exercises in the North Atlantic in the early 1950s operated with a 24 degrees 
East longitude delineation as the easternmost restriction for naval vessels and aircraft, based 
on concerns about reactions from the Soviet Union to increased Western activity in the High 
North.135 The 24-degree restriction grew into an accepted standard for tasking foreign aircraft 
in Norway, but the final push for a formal restriction was the American request for a 
simplified authorization procedure for foreign air operations in Norway. The restriction was 
finally declared a national policy on 21 January 1959.136 The 24-degrees East restriction was 
thus established as the easternmost limitation for any surveillance carried out by allied 
partners flying out from Norwegian soil, including Neptune Journey flights.137 And 
Norwegian bases were not to be used by Allies conducting operations that involved 
overflights of Soviet territory. This mechanism was to become a practical example of the 
balancing act in Norwegian security policy between integration and screening.138 
Inadvertently, the Norwegian government made airborne maritime surveillance efforts into a 
primary agent for security policy in the High North.139  
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Figure 2-2. Delineation of geographical responsibility 
Where the Neptune Journey arrangement was meant to meet general requirements for 
surveillance, there was a growing requirement for specific coordination with regards to 
surveillance of specific Soviet exercises when they took place. The three most active nations 
in this regard were the USA, the UK, and Norway. Early in 1959, coordination culminated in 
a trilateral agreement Exercise Popeye. The orders divided the ocean areas that were mostly 
used by the Soviets for exercises into three parts: The Norwegians would be responsible for 
the Skagerrak basin along the coast up to 65-degrees North out to 60 nautical miles from the 
shore; the Norwegians and the Americans would share responsibility for the Norwegian Sea 
and the Barents Sea; and the British would be responsible for the Norwegian Sea below 65-
degrees North outside 60 nautical miles from the Norwegian shore.140 Exercise Popeye, 
together with Neptune Journey, provided the foundation for bi- and trilateral cooperation of 
surveillance missions in the High North throughout the Cold War. 
It was clear to everyone involved in monitoring the High North that the Norwegian Catalina 
aircraft were wholly inadequate for the task due to the lack of capable sensors onboard. By 
the end of the 1950s, the number of American Neptune flights increased from two to three a 
month to approximately eight missions a month covering the North Atlantic. In addition, the 
Americans flew RB-47 SIGINT surveillance aircraft over the Barents Sea, along the Soviet 
coast of the Kola peninsula and Novaya Zemlya. The RB-47 aircraft initially flew out of the 
 





















UK, but soon thereafter also Alaska and Greenland, in order to reach further into and along 
Soviet territory. The RB-47 were supported by tanker aircraft facilitating the long sorties.141 
Due to the poor Norwegian capabilities, early warning missions in the High North and in the 
Norwegian Sea were by the end of the 1950s in their entirety flown by British Shackleton and 
American Neptune aircraft.142 As for Norway and many other alliance partners, there was a 
dire need for a new aircraft to conduct airborne maritime ISR.  
 
2.5 Chapter conclusion 
The Norwegian balancing act in the High North led to formal policy, where no foreign power 
was allowed to permanently place troops, aircraft or equipment on Norwegian soil. And for 
air operations specifically, the 24-degree East restriction kept foreign surveillance aircraft 
from taking off from Norwegian bases and flying east of 24-degrees East. The intent of these 
restrictions was to maintain a predictable interaction and low tensions between NATO and 
the Soviet Union in the Northern Fleet’s backyard. As we shall see, this put pressure on the 
Norwegian government to acquire the appropriate tools to monitor Soviet naval movements 
and operations. In keeping track of the Soviet submarine threat, the West deployed an 
extensive array of ASW measures. The sea-bed deployed SOSUS low frequency arrays acted 
as cueing mechanisms for more flexible assets such as MPA, which were becoming an 
increasingly capable tool. Arrangements were in place for Allied temporary deployments to 
Norway in order to streamline the maritime airborne surveillance and reconnaissance effort.  
The fifteen years that followed WWII were formative for the two main arguments in this 
thesis, and the two lines of thought are closely intertwined. First, the strategic argument is 
underpinned by the growing importance of submarines with regards to the naval and nuclear 
threat from the Soviet Union. Second, technological aspects emerged to the fore through the 
innovative environment that existed in the aftermath of WWII. Research on acoustic 
technology had gained momentum during the war and was able to maintain traction in the 
years that followed. Based on experience from WWII and the technology development that 
took place after the war, the notion established itself in NATO of MPAs as the go-to platform 
for effective long-range ASW. MPAs were the natural solution to the strategic submarine 
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challenge, and this seems to have shaped the strategic-technological dynamics within ASW 




























3. A common NATO Maritime Patrol Aircraft                             
 
3.1 Introduction 
MPAs had been established during WWII as a key factor in combating enemy submarines, 
and procuring the required aircraft inventory for the Alliance was considered to be of crucial 
importance. By the mid-1950s, discussions on the Soviet submarine threat had been ongoing 
for some time, and the 1956 Annual Review confirmed that NATO capabilities were not 
robust enough to address the threat in case of war. The Alliance recognized that there was an 
“overall deficiency of maritime patrol aircraft” in NATO European countries, and most 
nations relied on the MDAP to “bridge the gap between NATO requirements and aircraft 
availabilities.”143  
In the 1950s, NATO conducted several major exercises in the North Atlantic and in Norway, 
as a part of the containments strategy towards the Soviet Union. These exercises further led to 
the explicit restrictions on Allied troops and aircraft in the northernmost parts of Norway, 
with the overarching political aim to maintain low tensions in the High North. 
Simultaneously there was a mounting pressure on Norwegian authorities to acquire the 
appropriate tools to conduct maritime surveillance on the Northern Flank. The organizational 
understanding for the requirement in the Armed Forces was lacking, however, as was the 
political will to prioritize surveillance on behalf of the Alliance. It was from a political 
standpoint more important to ensure stability in the North than to venture off with a new and 
expensive capability based on external pressure, and without an internal desire to build the 
capability up. The weapons assistance program from the US would be the releasing factor in 
this dynamic, as we shall see.  
The case study in this chapter allows us to identify the basic elements of the theoretical 
framework presented later in this thesis. It is an historical depiction of the fundamental 
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3.2 The NATO 1956 Annual Review  
Although there had been several reviews preceding it, the 1956 Annual Review of NATO’s 
force structure and capabilities relative to that of the Soviet Bloc painted a grim picture.144 
Among the shortfalls depicted, the only military capability that is specifically mentioned in 
the document’s main body is the large reductions and shortfalls in MPA, with no 
improvement in sight before 1959 or 1960.145 From a defence planning standpoint, the 
Alliance acknowledged the “insidious changes in Soviet tactics” together with a “growing 
awareness of the mounting costs of modern forces” for the Alliance members. The NATO 
leadership thus began to emphasize the requirement to handle defence challenges 
“collectively and with a sense of urgency.”146 It was underlined that the “problems of the 
development and production of modern weapons are far beyond the capacity of most NATO 
countries to resolve single-handed.”147 International cooperation should be explored at every 
opportunity for the development of modern military equipment. In November 1956, NATO 
military commanders recommended that the North Atlantic Council (NAC) consider 
international collaboration for MPA procurement.148 Building on the military comments, the 
report from the Defence Planning Committee on the 1956 Annual Review suggested that 
“common action might also be most helpful in overcoming the deficiencies in maritime patrol 
aircraft.”149  
 
3.3 Establishment of the Group of Experts 
The NAC recognized in December 1956 the need to replace the P2V Neptune MPA that were 
in service with several European nations, due to the age of the airframe and its sensors. Based 
on challenges related to logistics and operational cooperation for MPAs during WWII, there 
was a desire to seek a common aircraft type across the Alliance. If NATO was to operate in a 
unified manner, common solutions and standardized equipment would be necessary.150 Based 
on efforts within the field of general anti-submarine research, the French Delegation 
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proposed to establish a Group of Experts to study the feasibility of providing “suitable 
maritime patrol aircraft for the NATO forces.”151 It was widely accepted that it would be too 
costly for a single nation to develop and procure maritime surveillance aircraft in the 
relatively small quantities required.152 The proposal was agreed by the Defence Planning 
Committee on 5 March 1957.  
An aircraft with operational versatility, capable of operating in all conditions of weather, was 
in itself considered to be a complex system through its wide array of sensors and equipment. 
Based on experience from civilian manufacturing of aircraft, a lead time of approximately 10 
years was to be expected, an expectation later revised to 8 years.153 This lead time, together 
with the costs associated with research and development (R&D) of entirely new systems, led 
to discussions in the Group on whether it was feasible to initiate an entirely new project to 
meet operational requirements. An alternative could be a study of already existing aircraft 
covering the same roles, which might prove more productive and economical.154 The 
possibility to fulfil NATO operational and national requirements by procuring an aircraft 
already in production was indeed examined, but it was decided that no existing aircraft fully 
met the initially agreed upon operational requirements from August 1957.155 It is worth noting 
that at the time of these investigations the US Navy P-3 Orion program was underway, but 
had not yet been firmly established. However, the American requirements that led to the 
development of the P-3 Orion were considered to be in excess of European needs, and 
consequently “uneconomical for operation by European governments.”156 The decision was 
made in December 1958 to go ahead with a unique design, and the Group of Experts 
encouraged the initiation of design studies within the respective nations. 
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3.4 A question of range 
The starting point for the discussion on numbers of aircraft was a questionnaire that the 
nations had responded to in relation to the 1956 Annual Review.157 The questionnaire was 
specifically related to the Alliance’s force goals for 1957. The requirements for MPAs were 
as follows: 
Country Long Range Short Range 
Denmark 4 - 
France 60 - 
Germany - 10 
Italy 40 - 
Netherlands 8 8 
Norway 24 - 
Portugal 24 - 
United Kingdom 88 - 
Total 248 18 
Table 3-1. Initial requirements based on ARQ(56)158 
The explicit difference between long range and short range was not clear at the point of 
answering the questionnaire, although existing airframes provided a guide. Short range ASW 
aircraft of modern design were the French Alize, the British Fairey Gannet and Short 
Seamew, the American Tracker and the Italian P155-AS. The endurance of these aircraft 
varied between 4 and 9 hours, with the ability to cover between 750 nm and 1,400 nm, 
depending on the speed of the aircraft.159 In the context of short-range ASW, the use of 
helicopters operating from aircraft carriers and from the shore was being examined and there 
seemed to be a relatively wide choice of modern aircraft to fill this particular role. It was 
therefore suggested to defer the considerations of short-range aircraft pending the completion 
of the long-range ASW project.160 
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The available long-range maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft in the late 1950s were 
the Canadian Argus, the American Marlin, the American Neptune, and the British Shackleton. 
The endurance of these aircraft spanned from 13 hours to 19 hours, with a range between 
2,000 nm and 5,300 nm.161 Operational commanders were invited to provide specific 
operational requirements and specifications to the Group of Experts.162 Based on early 
discussions between the NATO commands there emerged a general NATO requirement for a 
medium range MPA.163 This was supported by neither Britain nor the USA, who both saw the 
emerging threat in the North Atlantic as requiring longer range for any NATO MPA.  
It seems clear that nations forwarded their views based on their own geographical situation. 
Britain was adamant that the MPA required significant range in order to cover their areas of 
responsibility in the Atlantic Ocean. Italy saw no need for any range on those scales, and 
advocated early on a shorter range for Mediterranean operations. The Soviet build-up in the 
North and increasing Soviet submarine activity in the Atlantic meant that any Alliance MPA 
would necessarily require more than the minimum range necessary for Mediterranean 
operations, in order to bring some credibility to meet the submarine threat elsewhere as 
well.164 This balancing act between national and Alliance requirements meant that the Group 
of Experts opted to focus on “medium range” requirements.  
In order to further distil the requirements for the nations, two different types of missions were 
foreseen. First, a type of mission where the MPA would fly 700 nm to an operating area, 
operate for three hours, and have a minimum of ten hours endurance at sea level. Second, a 
mission where the MPA would fly 1,000 nm and operate for four hours, with a minimum 
endurance of 14 hours at sea level.165 The discussion on range requirements included strong 
stands for both an “Atlantic type” (long-range) and a “Mediterranean or enclosed-water type” 
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(intermediate/short-range), with all delegations from an economic standpoint discarding the 













Figure 3-1. Ranges for a common MPA based on Iceland. 
In Mediterranean terms, these distances mean that an MPA based in Sicily would be able to 
operate just south of the Southern coast of Turkey for three hours in the first instance, and off 
the coast of Syria in the second. In North Atlantic terms, the missions proposed meant that an 
MPA based on Iceland would be able to operate off the Western coast of Norway in the first 
instance and outside the Northern coast of Norway in the second. The group settled, with the 
exception of Italy, on a “medium range aircraft.”167 The medium range was set to mean 8 
hours patrol at 600 nm, alternatively 4 hours patrol at 1,000 nm.168 
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3.5 Roles and missions 
It was emphasised initially that the sole mission for the aircraft would be ASW.169 Any 
additional missions that would include reconnaissance, mining and other types of warfare 
should only be performed to the extent that such missions could be executed with the ASW 
equipment and sensors that were already installed.170 However, in the proposed requirements 
forwarded on 11 October 1957 the role of the aircraft was slightly widened. The Group of 
Experts saw that it would be inefficient use of resources to send such capable aircraft 
hundreds and at times thousands of miles out to sea in order to perform one, sole mission 
(ASW).171 Additionally, the financial discussions demanded that “in the interests of economy, 
it should also have a transport capability.”172 However, the American delegation, which 
found itself in a fundamentally different situation with regards to their national economy than 
did the Europeans, did not agree to this added capability. The Americans, even after it 
became clear that they would not procure the aircraft, rejected the notion that an added role 
would be transportation. The American delegation would permit “no compromise of function 
of ASW to provide defensive and transport capabilities”, and the Americans took a strong 
stands as they provided significant funding for the project, regardless of US procurement.173 
In the final specifications of March 1958, the role of the NATO MPA would read:   
“The aircraft will be used for the detection, the localisation and the 
destruction of submarines, and for general maritime reconnaissance.”174  
However, the Europeans were able to squeeze in several secondary roles. Four were 
specifically mentioned: search-and-rescue; shadowing-and-attack (which in modern terms 
can be translated into Anti-Surface Warfare [ASuW]); minelaying; and finally, light 
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transport. The transport mission was meant to include a number of ground crew, a certain 
amount of ground equipment, and a spare engine, for what is termed self-deployment.175  
 
3.6 Operational characteristics and specifications 
High speed for the aircraft was recognized as important for “early development of a contact”, 
in other words to get to the position of the submarine and accumulate sufficient information 
on the target for an attack. The minimum cruising speed was set to 225 knots at sea level, and 
a cruising speed of “not less than 300 knots” in general.176 The aircraft was to have a service 
ceiling of at least 20,000 feet, and was to have good manoeuvrability at 5,000 feet at low 
speeds. Performance for take-off and landing also indirectly set the fundamental requirements 
for the weight of the aircraft.  
There were few discussions on the sensor suite of the NATO MPA. The required sensors 
were those of the standard suite of the time: underwater acoustic sensors; a good radar 
(primary detection method of the previous war); electronic emission sensors (referring to the 
electronic warfare that played such a key role during WWII); exhaust-sniffing equipment 
(searching for exhaust from submarines running their diesel engines on the surface); and a 
powerful search light for surface searches at night and in poor weather.177 All the sensors 
noted were representative of a fully equipped MPA in the late 1950s. A robust inventory of 
sonobuoys would take the NATO ASW aircraft into the nuclear age with regards to sensors, 
which now would have to search for submarines with nuclear propulsion that were 
submerged for extended periods of time. Both the USA and the Soviet Union had 
operationalized nuclear propulsion in submarines in 1958. A strict criterion was established 
when it came to weight and growth potential. The American delegation provided advice 
based on their own extensive aircraft production experience, stating a maximum weight 
limitation due to growth potential and general performance.178  
In addition, the disposable stores to be carried were torpedoes, depth charges, and air-to-
ground guided weapons. Pertaining to attack capabilities, the requirement was for the MPA to 
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be able to make two separate attacks using depth bombs or homing weapons, to include 
atomic weapons.179 The initial requirements developed on operational characteristics also 
stated that armaments, which in this context means self-protection, would not be necessary. 
However, the German representative to the group emphasized that the “particular 
circumstances in which the German Air Force would operate such aircraft” would pose 
specific requirements with regards to armament. The Baltic and the North Sea areas were 
“particularly vulnerable to shore based aircraft and it was obviously necessary to provide at 
least a minimum degree of armament as a protection against attack from hostile units.”180  In 
view of the shoot-downs of Western intelligence flights by Soviet fighter aircraft in the Baltic 
during the early 1950s, the German concerns were understood by all.181 The Germans 
recommended that the aircraft armament should include guided air-to-air missiles. In the end, 
missiles were not included. Instead, wiring would be in place for the respective nation to fit 
the aircraft with such weapons if deemed necessary.182 In all the documents detailing the 
Group of Experts’ efforts, the discussion on armaments seems almost anecdotal. Nations 
other than Germany showed less concern over armaments, presumably because operating far 
into the Atlantic or Mediterranean posed less of a direct threat to the aircraft than did 
missions in the Baltic.  
The Group of Experts also did not spend much time discussing the requirements for 
communications equipment. Satellite communications were years from achieving operational 
capability, and the use of data link was still a decade or so away from being operational. The 
first mention of requirements for communications capabilities occurred when proposing the 
initial, desired operational characteristics in August 1957. The Group of Experts emphasized 
that the aircraft normally will operate individually, “but provisions are required for 
communications and co-ordinating with surface, air, shore and submarine units. A desired 
feature is the ability to act as an inflight area co-ordinator at a scene of action.”183 Although 
not stated explicitly, this would require several tactical radios in the VHF and UHF range in 
order to coordinate efficiently between several assets simultaneously. It would also require at 
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least one long-range radio covering the HF range, in order to enable aircraft-to-shore 
communications when operating far out to sea. The ability to transmit detection data was also 
brought forward, although the Group did not elaborate on what type of transmission this was 
meant to be. The final operational requirements demanded that “the aircraft is to be fitted 
with radio equipment for communicating with ships, submarines and shore bases at long 
range.”184  
 
3.7 The final decision 
The letter to industry was sent out in March 1958, with a deadline for submissions of design 
proposals of 21 June 1958.185 After evaluating the 16 proposals received from industry across 
the Alliance, the working group unanimously decided on one design, namely the French 
Breguet 1150, later called Atlantic.186 One of the deciding factors was that the Breguet 1150 
offered more working space and room for expansion for future equipment.187 Other important 
factors were flexibility in weapons load and a high capacity for sonobuoy storage. 
As a next step, the national requirements for number of aircraft were further adjusted. As 
mentioned above, Britain, Canada, and the United States would not procure the NATO MPA. 
USA did, however, contribute funds to the development of the aircraft.188 In the final 
specification letter sent to the aircraft industry, the potential contractors had been asked to 
plan for the production of anything between 100 and 200 aircraft. And in order to ensure 
international cooperation, the production plans had to include “existing or proposed plans for 
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international co-operation with at least one firm in another country.”189 The final required 
numbers established by the Group of Experts would read:190 
Country Number Country Number 
Belgium 6 Italy 0 
Canada 0 Netherlands 20 
Denmark 0 Norway 6 
France 70 Portugal 12-24 
Germany 18 United Kingdom 0 
USA 0   
Table 3-2. Final requirements established by the Group of Experts 
For the maritime nation of Norway, the number six stands out as low. The number of six 
aircraft was a continuation of the number of Catalina aircraft, and the Norwegian Defense 












Year: 1958 1963 1958 1963 1958 1963 1958 1963 
Belgium -- -- -- -- 0 0 0 0 
Canada 28 40 -- -- -- -- 28 40 
Denmark 0 0 0 0 -- -- 0 0 
France 23 32 24 30 4 11 51 73 
Germany -- -- 0 24 -- -- 0 24 
Greece -- -- 0 0 -- -- 0 0 
Italy -- -- 18 27 -- -- 18 27 
Netherlands 0 0 -- -- 8 12 8 12 
Norway -- -- 9 9 -- -- 9 9 
Portugal 18 24 -- -- -- -- 18 24 
Turkey -- -- 0 0 -- -- 0 0 
U.K. 72 72 16 16 16 17 104 105 
U.S.A. 216 261 54 54 -- -- 270 315 
Table 3-3. The Minimum Essential Force Requirements, 1958-1963 (issued January 1958).192 
The SACLANT representative to the Group of Experts underlined that there was an urgent 
military requirement for this aircraft to become operational in quantity by 1964 in order to 
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meet the overall NATO operational requirements in MC-70.193 The force requirements for 
MPA laid out in MC 70 in early 1958 were as depicted in the figure above.194 In the end, 
France, (West) Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Portugal and Belgium actually procured the 
NATO-developed maritime patrol aircraft Atlantic.195 
 
3.8 The Norwegian decision to acquire Albatross MPA 
The Norwegian Catalina fleet was in dire need of replacement. In 1952, the Norwegian 
government through the MDAP process sought to procure American Albatross maritime 
patrol aircraft as a replacement, an amphibious aircraft with long endurance able to support a 
wide array of tasks.196 The Albatross was not, however, configured for ASW. Overhauled 
Catalinas were lent to Norway in 1952 as a temporary solution to the capability issues in the 
north while discussions continued for a long-term replacement. The S-2 Tracker was an early 
candidate for a replacement aircraft. It was small, but constructed specifically for ASW 
operations. It was made for flying off US aircraft carriers, and was able to both find and 
attack enemy submarines. Being based on a carrier, it was constructed with limited space in 
mind, and at 1.250 nm in range it had significantly shorter endurance than the Neptune (3.450 
nm) and other, larger aircraft. Regardless, it was made available for Norway through the 
MDAP.197 
British aircraft were considered, but neither the Short Seamew nor the Fairey Gannet met the 
overarching requirements for range, and they were too expensive compared to any MDAP 
solution. By 1955, the pressure was mounting from NATO operational entities as well as 
from the Americans for modernizing the Norwegian maritime air surveillance fleet. The 
ageing Catalinas were spending more time in the hangar being serviced than they were 
flying, in addition to not being equipped with the appropriate modern sensors required for 
maritime surveillance in the High North. The intelligence services that the Catalinas 
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provided were thus inadequate.198 This external pressure for increased military surveillance 
collided with the Norwegian perception of their maritime air assets as utility aircraft 
supporting a wide array of tasks, to include a heavy focus on maritime SAR. In a case of 
intra-service rivalry, the Navy argued for an aircraft with ASW capabilities, and the Air Force 
leadership argued against ASW (they thought ASW should be left to more capable and 
knowledgeable allies).199  
The Neptune aircraft was considered for its range, but it was assessed as much too 
complicated to operate for Norwegian air crews, and too demanding for Norwegian 
infrastructure, organization and logistics to handle. It was also important to the Norwegian 
Defense Staff to procure an aircraft that would not affect the resources required to run the 
fighter aircraft service. In an attempt to gather loose threads in the discussion between NATO 
and national requirements, the Air Force declared in 1956 that the main task for Norwegian 
maritime surveillance aircraft was “to conduct surveillance on the Norwegian coast and 
adjacent areas, and to early detect a seaborne invasion force.”200 The operational 
requirement with regards to range was thus set to 900 nm. The Tracker was unable to meet 
this requirement.201 The 900 nm requirement was established in parallel to the NATO MPA 
project and the establishment of the bi- and trilateral agreements for maritime airborne 
surveillance mentioned before.  
The common procurement project for a maritime patrol aircraft in NATO came at the perfect 
time, so it is worth commenting briefly on the Norwegian interaction with the project, or lack 
thereof. Norwegian delegations were present for the first meeting in April 1957 and took part 
in the discussion on how to move forward to establish a common requirement.202 But as 
discussions with the Americans progressed in the context of the MDAP where aircraft would 
be provided at no cost, Norwegian participation in the NATO project ended. The final 
meeting Norwegian delegates took part in was the meeting of 23 October 1957. At this 
meeting, the Norwegian delegates were unwilling to take part in the discussion on range 
requirements for the new aircraft, due to the “not yet established Allied and national 
operational requirements for Norwegian areas of interest.”203 This reflected both the chaotic 
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national process in Norway with leadership shying away from decision making, but also a 
noticeable lack of competence in the field. It should be noted that this was also the time that 
Norwegian authorities were in the discovering phases of their own “areas of interest” in the 
High North, and a Norwegian awakening to the emerging military threat on the Kola 
peninsula. 
The Norwegian exit from the NATO common MPA procurement program seems to rest on 
three factors. First, economic constraints meant that the replacement aircraft would have to 
come through the MDAP.204 Second, the 900 nm range requirement put forward by the 
Norwegian Air Force in 1956 meant that the final 700 nm requirement for what would 
become the NATO Atlantic MPA came up short. Finally, the situation with regards to 
strategy, ambition, and requirements for the Norwegian maritime air fleet was in the 1950s so 
chaotic, and the individual knowledge in maritime air matters so low, that any further 
participation in the project was likely futile.   
The northern command for NATO, the Commander Allied Forces North (COMAFNORTH), 
was in charge of all NATO forces operating in and out of the northernmost parts of the 
Alliance, and was subordinate to SACEUR. The headquarters, situated in Oslo, Norway, 
produced a report in December of 1957 that addressed the different requirements for 
maritime surveillance and early warning, and recommended the Albatross for Norway, which 
stood out as a compromise of range, sensors, and economy in maintenance.205 MDAP 
required that the aircraft would be American made. With an ambition to acquire an aircraft 
that would cost approximately the same to operate as the Catalinas did, the Albatross seemed 
to be a viable and sustainable choice for the Norwegian government. 
Further complications arose when the Americans rejected the notion of the Norwegians flying 
in the High North without an ASW capability; the Albatross was a surface surveillance 
aircraft. The requirement for ASW in the north was also emphasized by SACEUR himself in 
1958.206 After arguing the pros and cons for almost a year, the Norwegians decided to go back 
to the original proposal for the Tracker, in spite of the short range, because of the ASW 
capability. But, in the winter of 1960, the producer of the Albatross, Grumman, notified 
Norwegian authorities that they were able to modify the Albatross to include ASW 
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capabilities. This would give the Norwegians an ASW capable aircraft with significant range, 
more capable than the Tracker, however not as capable as the Neptune. The Norwegians 
changed their minds yet again, and decided to procure the Albatross, moderately modified for 
ASW.207  
 
3.9 Chapter conclusion 
The common NATO MPA procurement project facilitated four nations fulfilling their MPA 
force requirements to the Alliance. The NATO developed MPA was faster, had longer 
endurance, and better manoeuvrability than the P2V Neptune it was meant to replace. It also 
seems likely that the group development and procurement was the best way forward for the 
nations that resulted in procurement of the Atlantic from an acquisition standpoint. The 
NATO MPA project achieved what it set out to do; it facilitated several nations meeting their 
force requirements against a significant naval threat to the Alliance. Three big nations pulled 
out due to national projects of greater magnitude and technological scope, one small nation 
pulled out because of negotiations on a different aircraft within the MDAP framework, 
several nations never took part due to the lack of NATO force requirements, and the rest of 
the nations specifically mentioned in MC 70 ended up procuring the Atlantic at some point.  
The Alliance discussions in the late 1950s allow us to identify the basic tenets of airborne 
surveillance aircraft. These were: range, speed, altitude, sensors, communications, and 
armament (self-protection). Of these, the question of range was most extensively discussed. 
This is ultimately the factor that lays the foundation for where, how far away and for how 
long a maritime surveillance mission is capable of operating. Nations bordering the Atlantic 
demanded longer range than the nations bordering the Mediterranean. As we shall see in the 
coming chapters and the final discussion, range has historically been, and will in the future 
be, crucial to how an airborne surveillance asset can approach the hunt for adversary 
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4. Foundation for long-range ASW – 1961-69 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Although the Soviet approach to shipbuilding and naval strategy fluctuated somewhat in the 
decade and a half following WWII, the importance of submarines was, as a whole, on the 
rise. The 1960s would see a continued ambivalence as to the primary mission of Russian 
submarines. However, with missile technology increasingly taking centre stage in the arms 
race between the superpowers, submarines established themselves further as cornerstones of 
Soviet naval strategy. 
The shoot-down of the U-2 over the Soviet Union and the RB-47 over the Barents Sea in 
1960 caused the Norwegian government to panic. All maritime surveillance missions, 
Norwegian as well as Allied taking off from Norway, were forbidden for a month, in fear of 
more incidents. When the missions were yet again continued, they were conducted under 
stricter restrictions than earlier, that is to say that the appetite of the Norwegian government 
to approve Allied surveillance missions taking off from Norway into the Barents Sea was 
significantly reduced. The situation in the North made both the defence minister as well as 
the prime minister personally involved in the approval process for several of the surveillance 
missions.208 The reluctance on the part of the Norwegian government to allow allied activities 
to be conducted from Norwegian soil into the Barents Sea almost by accident made 
Norwegian surveillance and intelligence operations in the High North into a security policy 
commodity.209 This dynamic would take center stage when the defence ministers of the 
United States and Norway both personally negotiated the terms of the Norwegian 
procurement of the P-3 Orion, which became operational late in the decade. 
The decade in question also experienced shifts in Western and NATO strategy, resulting in a 
more defensive naval posture in the North Atlantic. Surface force operations were pulled 
further back, and an increasing reliance was put on barriers consisting of aircraft and seabed 
hydrophones. However, the posture of maritime airborne surveillance and reconnaissance 
units did not decline in tandem with the overall naval posture. In response to the expanding 
nature of Soviet submarine operations, the main nations handling maritime surveillance in the 
High North did so largely through the use of MPAs. And although the respective MPAs had 
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significant range, the sheer size of the patrol areas required close international cooperation. 
This requirement brought the Norwegian basing policy under increasing pressure in the 
1960s. At the same time, developments within the fields of sensors and communications 
improved search and tracking of submarines, and facilitated closer collaboration between 
different aircraft. 
 
4.2 Soviet naval strategy and submarine capabilities 
At the turn of the decade, Soviet Premier Krushchev was concerned that each service of the 
armed services were carving out independent strategic nuclear missions for themselves. This 
led to the organisation of all strategic ballistic missile capabilities under one entity, the 
Strategic Rocket Forces in late 1959.210 The strategic nuclear mission was thus removed from 
the submarine force and placed more or less exclusively on land. The Intercontinental 
Ballistic Missile (ICBM) was now the strategic weapon of choice, with the first Soviet 
Union’s and the world’s first ICBM becoming operational in January 1960.211 The shift 
toward ICBM created a void in the mission portfolio of Soviet submarines, but the Soviet 
Navy did not have to search for a new mission for long. The US Navy had in the years 
following the Korean War put into service new super-carriers of more than 60,000 tons. 
These could carry long-range nuclear bomber aircraft such as the A-3 Skywarrior with a 
range of 1,200 nm.212 The only effective weapon against the super-carriers was by the Soviets 
deemed to be the anti-ship stand-off cruise missile. And the only two credible weapon-
platforms for this missile were considered to be long-range bombers and submarines.213 The 
policy change therefore did not degrade the continued value of the submarine insofar as naval 
strategy was concerned. Naval exercises and submarine operations continued, as did missile 
development for submarines, although development of strategic ballistic missiles fired from 
submarines had been temporarily halted. 
The first nuclear-powered Echo class submarine was completed in 1960, carrying SS-N-3 
Shaddock land-attack cruise missiles.214 However, with the policy changes at hand the anti-
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carrier mission was to be pursued, leading to the construction of Echo II submarines with SS-
N-3A Shaddock anti-ship missiles becoming operational in 1962. Several of the Golf class 
SSBNs were converted into Golf II multi-role cruise missile submarine (SSGN) 
configurations carrying the new SS-N-5 Sark ballistic missile, and the Hotel class SSBNs 
were converted into Hotel II class SSGNs carrying the same missile.215 The SS-N-5 Sark had 
a range of 700 nm/1,300 km, and was the first Soviet ballistic missile that could be launched 
from a submerged position. It became operational in 1963, some three years after the 
American Polaris missile with similar launch capabilities.216 But the move to a new mission 
also brought technical and tactical challenges, the most prominent of which was targeting for 
the anti-ship missiles. Even with an intricate network of shore-based direction-finding radio 
stations, airborne sensors such as the Bear D long-range maritime reconnaissance and 
targeting aircraft, and designated targeting submarines such as the Whiskey Canvas Bag class, 
it still would be a challenge to efficiently target adversary carrier strike groups. It took 
between 20-30 minutes on the surface to prepare the launch of an SS-N-3A missile. This in 
itself made them vulnerable to detection by ASW forces, but in addition, in that time a carrier 
group sailing at 25 knots would have changed its position by at least 8 nm.217 Faster moving 
nuclear submarines and targeting sensors in space would aim to remedy such challenges. 
The speed and mobility required by submarines hunting fast-moving aircraft carriers was 
facilitated by nuclear reactors. New weapons systems such as the US Navy Polaris submarine 
pointed to “limited” nuclear wars as more plausible than a complete nuclear exchange.218 This 
complicated the Soviet policy decision to rely on land-based ICBM’s entirely for a nuclear 
exchange, and thoughts on operating strategic submarines carrying nuclear ballistic missiles 
re-emerged in the mid-1960s. The Cuban missile crisis had emphasized the requirement for 
improvements to the naval force.219 When Brezhnev took over from Krushchev as Soviet 
premier in 1964, Admiral Gorshkov could as the head of the Soviet Navy pursue his ambition 
of a nuclear role for his submarine force. Although the Soviet Naval High Command also 
wanted long-range patrols to be initiated as early as 1956, regular patrols by Soviet 
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submarines off the coast of the USA did not commence until 1966, likely due to the 
combination of the overarching focus given to land-based missiles (ICBM) and the still 
nascent strategic submarine capability.220  
In 1967, the new Yankee class SSBN became operational. The Yankee carried the new 
nuclear ballistic missile SS-N-6 Serb with an initial range of 1,300 nm/2,400 km, which was 
a significant improvement. The new SSBN was quieter, moved faster, and had immense 
firepower onboard with a significant range. The SSBNs had become truly strategic.221 The 
range of the SS-N-6 meant that although the Yankees had to cross the GIUK gap, they could 
fire their missile much further away from the US coastline. The Yankees patrolled in 
dedicated areas holding the US coast at risk starting in the summer of 1969.222 Up until then, 
Golf and Hotel class submarines had patrolled sporadically in the Atlantic. Patrol patterns 
would consist of one Yankee submarine north and one south of Bermuda, and Hotel and Golf 
submarines stationed east of Nova Scotia and west of the Azores. Later, this was increased to 
three Yankee class submarines on station in the Atlantic.223 Although improved, the range of 
the SS-N-6 was not sufficient to keep the Yankees out of American ASW defences. The 
Yankee/SS-N-6 combination was thus viewed as an interim solution, awaiting more capable 
systems that would facilitate strategic submarines operating closer to home-waters and still 
able to fire ballistic missiles at the US mainland. This would become reality with the Delta 
class carrying SS-N-8 missiles in 1973.  
The Charlie class SSGN also entered service in 1967. The Charlie was nuclear powered and 
carried the supersonic SS-N-7 Starbright anti-ship missile with a range of 30-35 nm. The 
missile could be fired from beneath the surface, forcing new methods of protecting American 
carrier groups. The result was ASW helicopters and ASW fixed-wing aircraft on carriers, in 
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addition to new passive acoustic sensors for the surface fleet.224 The silent, high-speed Los 
Angeles class attack submarine would clear the waters ahead of the force.225 The Charlie was, 
however, just as dependent on external targeting data as her predecessors, making her 
vulnerable to detection as she had to raise mast to receive updated targeting information.226 
The Soviets attempted to engage surveillance satellites in the role of cueing the Charlies 
instead of their MPA force, but technological challenges with the satellites kept the SSGN 
force dependent on target cueing by land-based aircraft.227 The Victor class carried anti-ship 
and anti-submarine torpedoes, as well as the SS-N-15 Starfish ASW missile.228 ASW missiles 
are fired from a torpedo tube that leaves the water and flies a distance in the air, before re-
entering the water and functioning like a torpedo, alternatively like a depth charge. The 
Victor was built to support strategic operations as an escort, working to hunt down enemy 
submarines and protecting the Yankee SSBN whilst on patrol.229   
 
4.3 Evolution of Western naval strategy 
After the Second Berlin Crisis in 1958, discussion on engagements short of total war led to 
the general threat of a massive retaliatory response to any hostile action losing its 
credibility.230 But changes to the overarching strategy of Massive Retaliation met with 
resistance, particularly in Europe, where much of the reasoning was that the threat of a 
massive American retaliatory response was the only language the expansionist communists in 
Moscow would understand.231 It was when the French opted out of the NATO military 
command structure in March 1966 that the door opened to a change in NATO’s overarching 
strategy. The strategy included improved intelligence and early warning, prompt coordinated 
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action in the period of warning time, increased readiness, flexibility, and other elements, and 
would be known as Flexible Response.232 
SACLANT initiated two studies in 1965, in order to raise awareness of the expanding Soviet 
fleet.233 NATO estimates indicated that approximately 134 submarines, some 80% of the 
Soviet total operational submarine inventory, would be used for rocket attacks against the US 
coastline, against the NATO Strike Fleet or against Western sea-lines of communications 
(SLOC) in a war. The task of keeping track of them and providing early warning was thus 
formidable.234 It was with the operationalization of the Yankee class that the NATO 
intelligence community really awoke to the threat.235 The nuclear powered strategic 
submarines operated with increasing speeds, with missiles with increasing range, and they 
were capable of underwater launch. SACLANT continued to warn about the expansionist 
Soviet Navy in early 1968.236 The expanded pattern of operations had removed the previous 
warning time that would be provided by the Soviets to NATO, as the former had been 
focussing on activities in home waters. Now, SACLANT warned, the Soviets were able to 
launch attacks with much less or no warning. Submarines in particular were able to deploy 
for extended periods of time without any supply or support, patrolling off the US coast with 
ballistic missiles.237 The SACLANT studies significantly influenced discussions held two 
years later on a renewed NATO maritime strategy. The Yankee class patrols brought about a 
fundamental shift in perception of the North Atlantic and the northern flank of NATO. The 
Russian Navy now posed a continuous threat to both the European and the American 
mainland. This prompted SACLANT to establish the Standing Naval Force Atlantic 
(STANAVFORLANT) in 1968, with Alliance nations rotating contributions of assets. Also, 
SACLANT pointed to a severe lack of NATO surveillance to monitor the expanding Soviet 
activities, and emphasized multinational measures and intelligence sharing between national 
commands and NATO Commanders.238 SACLANT’s efforts prompted NATO Secretary 
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General Manilio Brosio to call for further studies into the nature of the threat in the North 
Atlantic.239 The studies assessed that forces operating in the North Atlantic were necessary for 
a prolonged conflict, in order to meet the threat of maritime air forces seeking control of the 
ocean areas in the north. If Soviet forces also operated with submarines in support of their 
aircraft, the survivability of NATO aircraft carriers would decrease. SACLANT thus claimed 












Figure 4-1. Overview of longitudinal delineation of Norwegian restrictions towards allied aircraft. 
On 1 May 1960, a U-2 surveillance aircraft was shot down over the Soviet Union, with plans 
to land in Bodø, Norway. Not long thereafter, an American RB-47 reconnaissance aircraft 
flying from the UK was shot down over the Barents Sea. These incidents influenced the 
Norwegian Government’s decision to alter the existing restrictions on foreign aircraft flying 
from Norwegian soil. As tensions did not just rise over land, starting on 25 October 1960, 
Allied aircraft taking off from Norway were formally no longer permitted to fly beyond 24 
degrees East, even over international waters, without the explicit consent from the 
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Norwegian Government.241 However, due to delays in the delivery of the Albatross aircraft to 
the Norwegian Air Force in 1961, there was an increased requirement for support from allied 
partners to cover surveillance operations in the High North. This support fell under the 
aforementioned arrangements of Neptune Journey and Exercise Popeye. In addition to these 
two arrangements, yet another regime for tri-lateral cooperation between the USA, the UK, 
and Norway on airborne maritime surveillance came into being. Exercise Cold Road was 
established in 1961 to assure sufficient coverage in the High North in the transition from 
Catalina to the new Albatross for Norway.  
The Cold Road arrangement distinguished itself from the other two in that it represented a 
more systematic approach to the planning of surveillance missions, where a given number of 
flights were planned well in advance, whereas the other two arrangements functioned as a 
regime for approving allied surveillance flights. In the months between July 1960 and the 
winter of 1961, the Norwegian Catalinas were taken out of service, and the Cold Road 
arrangement was implemented. Even though the Cold Road regime underlined that the 24-
degree restriction remained in effect, the transition period came with relaxations. On several 
occasions, the British and Americans were allowed to operate to 26 degrees East, and at times 
even further east. Some Allied missions based in Norway were authorized to 30 degrees East, 
one even to 40 degrees East, but such missions were subject to high-level authorization.242 
When the Albatrosses were operational in Norway, the strict enforcement of the 24-degree 
restriction went back into place. Although not fully ASW capable, the Albatrosses provided 
important surveillance information from the High North. 
Norwegian authorities asked for British and American assistance in covering the High North 
with surveillance flights during the transition to Albatross aircraft, and it was the British that 
conducted most of those missions.243 British air crews flew from their bases in the UK to the 
North Atlantic and carried out their surveillance missions in the assigned areas, regularly 
stopping in Bodø in Northern Norway for the night. At times, selected members of the crew 
would visit the Norwegian Maritime Headquarters (MHQ) for discussions and information 
exchange.244 When the British were tasked by their own headquarters, they usually flew 
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further south than the Norwegians normally did. But when they operated out of Norwegian 
bases on Norwegian tasking orders, they tended to cover areas further north and east, 
although not further east than 24 degrees.245 The British could also be requested by 
headquarters in alliance nations to cover Russian naval activity further to the West between 
Norway and Iceland, sometimes with several aircraft simultaneously if the naval activity was 
of significant size and scope.246 
Yet another arrangement for international coordination and cooperation for aerial maritime 
surveillance was the Box Car agreement. This was put in place during the Norwegian 
upgrade to the Albatross in 1960-61 in order to structure the landing of allied surveillance 
aircraft on Norwegian and Danish airfields.247 The Box Car agreement was thus an agreement 
for surveillance in more southern areas of responsibility in the Atlantic, such as the 
Norwegian Sea and Skagerrak. It was supported significantly by the British for several years 
beyond the Norwegian transfer to Albatross aircraft and the new aircraft becoming fully 
operational in 1963. Operational records depict regular British sorties almost every month 
under the arrangement.248  
The British effort in support of Cold Road surveillance also increased in the years that 
followed. In the mid-1960s it became commonplace with routine expansion of the areas 
covered, especially Westwards. This meant that British aircraft could fly under the Cold Road 
arrangement first from the UK to Keflavik, Iceland, and then from Keflavik to Andøya or 
Bodø in Norway, before leaving Norway to return to the UK in a three-day operational 
roundtrip.249 At times the Shackleton crews were tasked for more than one mission out of 
Norway, which meant that they would transit to Norway while carrying out a mission, stay in 
Norway and typically perform a mission a day for several days, and then return to the UK on 
an operational transit.250 The number of British missions under the Cold Road arrangements 
decreased sharply in the fall of 1965, as the Norwegian Albatrosses were increasingly capable 
of covering their own, assigned areas.251  
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With the new aircraft came sensors that were a significant improvement to the Catalinas, 
although not by any means on par with the American Neptunes or Orions. The combination 
of the lack of ASW and ELINT capabilities in the Norwegian Albatrosses and the self-
imposed restrictions for Allied surveillance aircraft brought the Norwegian basing policy 
under pressure. However, Allies monitored and followed Russian exercises and international 
deployments, but the strategic, nuclear threat came from ICBMs on land after the SRF had 
been established. It wasn’t until 1967 and the Yankee patrols that the requirements for 
continuous ASW really set in in the North Atlantic. 
 
4.4 The evolution of NATO ASW and MPA capabilities 
In anticipation of quieter submarines, there was a steady improvement of Western ASW 
technology’s ability to detect Russian submarines in the 1960s. At the core of the modern 
ASW operations stood barrier operations, with SOSUS arrays on the sea bed providing 
cueing of approaching submarines to other platforms. The first arrays were placed out from 
Argentia not far from the US coastline, but the new technology now facilitated a more 
forward leaning approach to the search. In 1964, a SOSUS array was placed between 
Andøya, Bear Island and Svalbard, covering the entrance into the Atlantic for the Northern 
Fleet.252 The Norwegian BRIDGE system was a sea-bed system similar to SOSUS and the 
two worked in tandem, with BRIDGE contributing significantly to the search efforts.253 In 
1965 another SOSUS array was placed between Greenland, Iceland, and the UK, in the so-
called GIUK gap. SOSUS was a cornerstone in the search for and detection of Soviet 
submarines, but utilization of the acoustic data had to be handled so as not to disclose the 
SOSUS capabilities and whereabouts. The estimated position of the adversary submarine was 
revealed indirectly to the aircraft crew through other sources. Some intelligence officials even 
actively prohibited the use of SOSUS data by ASW aircraft, in fear of disclosing their 
acoustic capabilities to the Soviets.254  
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The US Navy introduced the P-3 Orion operationally in the summer of 1962. The aircraft had 
the most capable ASW suite available in addition to a new radar, but crucially the Orion had 
computers with an unprecedented processing capability for the onboard computers. The 
Orion hit the track running with significant involvement in the Cuban Missile crisis of 
October that year.255 The new MPA commenced operational sorties in the North Atlantic soon 
thereafter. With the P-3 Orion becoming operational, further integration of SOSUS with 
MPA assets provided a high level of awareness of Russian submarine movements. This 
removed the hunter-killer role of ASW dedicated aircraft carriers in the 1960s, and led to the 
removal of the ASW dedicated aircraft carriers altogether in the 1970s.256 
When the Yankee class initiated their strategic patrols, Western ASW forces had embraced a 
barrier approach in full. SOSUS was up and running, the integration with the MPA 
community was functioning, and forward deployed ASW optimized attack submarines were 
operating in trail of the great Soviet missile platforms. The ASW barrier strategy was the 
framework within which Alliance ASW forces in the North Atlantic operated. They detected 
and tracked Soviet strategic submarines more or less continuously as they initiated their 
patrols in the late 1960s off the US coast.257  
Towards the late 1960s, the Norwegians initiated negotiations with the Americans for 
procurement of the P-3 Orion. The developments of the 60s had emphasized the requirement 
for capable ASW aircraft in the North Atlantic, and the Norwegians were given a significant 
reduction in procurement costs from the Americans based on an explicit bilateral arrangement 
for sharing of intelligence gathered by the new aircraft.258 Norway finally had the right 
aircraft to conduct maritime airborne ISR in the High North, not just in terms of range, but 
also in terms of sensors and communications.  
The British Shackletons were by the late 1960s becoming outdated in most respects, and 
compared to the P-3 Orion, the Shackleton’s ASW performance was poor. However, the 
British were still capable of conducting ASW operations as they operated a relatively high 
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number of aircraft.259 At times the Shackletons operated in cooperation with the much faster 
Victor bomber aircraft which flew at high altitude and provided radar cover, with the 
Shackletons investigating contacts.260 In any case, the process to find a new maritime 
surveillance aircraft for the British was initiated in 1963.261 Close interaction with Allies also 
helped prepare the British air crews for the new equipment that was inbound with their new 
MPA, the Nimrod.262 The Royal Air Force took delivery of the first Nimrod in October 
1969.263 
Moreover, the early 1960s also witnessed the launch of the first reconnaissance satellites. The 
CORONA imagery intelligence (IMINT) satellite of August 1960 was predated by more than 
a month by the US Naval Research Laboratory’s ELINT satellite, the Galactic Radiation and 
Background (GRAB) in June 1960.264 Intended to map Soviet air defence radars that couldn’t 
be reached through long-range ELINT flights along the Soviet border, GRAB marked the 
dawn of what would become a crucial part of modern reconnaissance and surveillance: 
satellite systems. In time, ELINT satellites were to eventually provide between 80 and 90 
percent of surface vessel OPINTEL for the US Navy.265 Although more Western SIGINT 
satellites were launched in the 1960s they were mostly focussing on activities on the Soviet 
land mass, and not naval activities.266 And although communications satellites were 
operationalized in the 60s, they were in naval terms dedicated for supporting fleet flag ships 
and carriers.267 Satellites focussing on naval reconnaissance were to a larger extent fielded in 
the 1970s. 
All in all, the 1960s witnessed improvements for the MPA force with regards to computer 
and signal processing, signal integration and time compression, miniaturization of electronics 
and improvements in sonobuoy technology.268 The automation of sensor products started in 
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the 1960s, and is an important factor for airborne ISR assets in modern surveillance 
operations. Automated intelligence processing systems were introduced, as were (at the time) 
high-speed data links between aircraft, and between aircraft and headquarters.269 But most of 
the automated processing capability took place at processing facilities ashore. Experiences 
from supporting the war in Vietnam provided important lessons for the fusion of all source 
data for naval OPINTEL.270 It was in the late 1960s that the electronic intelligence (ELINT) 
specific maritime aircraft EP-3 Aries was developed, specializing in collecting electronic 
intelligence in the maritime domain.271 
 
4.5 The deployment of NATO MPA capabilities 
An increase in Soviet operational naval activities in the North Atlantic took place in the 
middle of the 1960s, leading to a significant increase in reporting on Soviet submarine 
activity by MPA aircrews.272 From the mid-1960s, moreover, American aircrews took part in 
intelligence gathering operations on the suspected air-submarine manoeuvre by Soviet forces 
against transiting US aircraft carriers.273 This could be seen as reaction to the fielding of 
tactical submarines with anti-carrier missiles in the Soviet Navy discussed above. The 
primary mission for MPAs was ASW and intelligence gathering against the Soviet submarine 
fleet.274 
During the Soviet naval exercise in the North Atlantic in August 1963, several Allies flew out 
of Norwegian bases to collectively cover the Russian activities. Shackleton aircraft took part 
in this surveillance activity, named Operation Bargold by the British. By this time the 
Norwegian Albatrosses were operational and flew together with the British and the 
Americans. Canadian aircraft took part as well, but these flew from bases outside Norway, as 
they were not a part of the Cold Road arrangement. Tasking was efficiently coordinated 
between the maritime headquarters (MHQ) in Bodø and the UK MHQ in Rosyth, and 
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intelligence reports were shared between the nations after the sorties. There were yet to be 
established rigid and strict procedures for this sharing of intelligence, and the information 
flowed relatively seamlessly between the participants.275  
Many within the ASW community emphasized that the primary search sensor in the hunt for 
submarines was still radar (in order to find surfaced submarines at periscope depth) and 
vision. But increasing activities with more capable submarines in the Northern Fleet initiated 
discussions both in Norway as well as in NATO on both ASW equipment and national 
competency levels on modern ASW. During Operation Bargold in 1963 the British and the 
Americans performed well with regards to detecting Russian submarines, but the Norwegian 
Albatrosses were unable to detect any submarines at all.276 They simply did not carry the 
appropriate ASW sensors to do the job required. However, with the increasing Soviet 
activities in the Barents Sea, which occurred to a high degree beyond the approved areas of 
Allied aircraft, the Norwegian Albatrosses were able to deliver much needed surveillance of 
Soviet surface activities. And even though the strongest feature of the Albatross aircraft was 
surface surveillance, the aircraft was at times capable of providing intelligence on submerged 
submarines as well. One such instance was the collection of acoustic details on the relatively 
new Echo II submarine in 1965. However, the Norwegian ASW shortfalls in the High North 
were deemed a critical problem to the Alliance in general, and the United States in 
particular.277 Operation Adjutant in the summer of 1964 was a follow-up of Bargold the 
previous year, and had the objective of shadowing the Northern Fleet as they exercised off 
the coast of Norway. The British aircrews were also to cooperate with a submarine barrier 
situated between Bear Island and the Norwegian coast. The Shackleton post-mission report 
was filled with sightings of Russian naval vessels that would normally not be seen further 
south.278 Coordinated surveillance operations took place again in 1965, through Operation 
Beresford. British authorities emphasized that “these exercises give us a unique opportunity 
to observe Soviet ships, submarines, and aircraft at work in this vital sea area, to assess their 
capabilities under operational conditions, and to judge their current state and development 
of their equipment and tactics.”279 The crews flew under national control, but coordination 
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between the respective national MHQ’s de-conflicted areas among themselves.280 The 
operational report claimed that the surveillance was a “marked success,” and that the “volume 
of intelligence gained in the operation is the greatest and most valuable since these 
operations were instituted.”281 
On an overarching level, the Norwegians, the Americans and the British came to an 
understanding for a tri-lateral coordination of anti-submarine intelligence collection in the 
Norwegian Sea with emphasis on the exploitation of the underwater sensor at Andøya. This 
specific coordination of intelligence had been established in 1965, and was termed Operation 
Canasta.282 More specifically, with the Norwegian acquisition of the P-3B Orion as a 
baseline, the NORCANUSUK Agreement between Norway, Canada, the USA and the UK 
was signed in 1969. The agreement delineated the responsibility to conduct maritime 
surveillance in the North Atlantic and the High North. Norway was to maintain surveillance 
of the “north-eastern waters.”283 The NORCANUSUK Agreement further supported that 
Norwegian aircraft were in charge of the High North east of 24 degrees East. In 1969, 
however, the British would yet again fill in the gap left in surveillance by the turnover in 
Norwegian capabilities, this time from the Albatross to the Orion. British aircrews deployed 
in August 1969 to Bodø for Operation Knockabout, the code for the deployment of Coastal 
Command units for shadowing of the Soviet fleet exercises.284 As the Soviet force moved 
south, British aircraft based in Scotland took over. As the force moved north-west, American 
aircraft based on Iceland took over.285 
The surveillance flights in the early 1960s were mostly coordinated in advance. British 
aircrews flying Shackletons out of Kinloss, Scotland, were tasked by the MHQ in Pitreavie, 
Rosyth, close to Edinburgh, Scotland. The Headquarters in Pitreavie also served as the 
NATO entity responsible for maritime air operations in the North Atlantic, as Commander 
Maritime Air Northern Sub-Area. First answering directly to Commander-in-Chief Eastern 
Atlantic Area (CINCEASTLANT) under SACLANT, maritime air operations came under 
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centralized control of the maritime headquarters in Northwood, London, in the early 1960s.286 
NATO did not control any assets in peacetime, but coordinated and wrote strategy, plans, 
doctrine, as well as directing exercises. These command and control entities played important 
roles in shaping the way the maritime air community interacted. Norwegian aircrews flying 
Albatrosses out of Andøya were tasked by the Maritime Air Operations Centre (MAOC) run 
by air force personnel, but situated at the Maritime Headquarters in Bodø.287 The American 
Neptunes were tasked by the Commander Iceland Sector ASW Group (CTG 84.1) based in 
Keflavik, who in his national chain-of-command answered to Commander Task Force (CTF) 
84, one of the sub-units of Commander Submarine Forces Atlantic in Norfolk, USA.288 The 
close interaction on national level between the Americans at Keflavik, the British in Rosyth 
and later Northwood, and the Norwegians in Bodø, was executed outside the formal NATO 
command structure. The bi- and trilateral interaction facilitated the coordination of maritime 
air operations in the North Atlantic required for maintaining an overview of the Soviet Navy 
long-range submarine patrols in the Atlantic. Allied aircraft were regularly tasked by the 
military authorities of another nation, especially British and American aircraft regularly 
flying out of Norwegian airfields.  
There is little evidence of in-flight coordination between aircraft of different nationalities in 
the early 1960s, coordination that did not seem to take shape before regular Soviet strategic 
patrols began in the mid- to late 1960s. And even after this, it was the position, course and 
speed of the target submarine that was shared in real-time, to the extent that information was 
available. The intelligence collection of more detailed nature was kept for national analysis.  
The North Atlantic ASW environment in the 60s was busy. Over the course of one month in 
March 1968, one US squadron at Keflavik flew 91 sorties for a total of 784 hours, providing 
continuous coverage with at least one aircraft over the target submarine for three weeks 
straight.289 Over the course of a deployment of five to six months to Keflavik in the late 60s it 
was common to be in contact with 15-20 submarines.290 As the Soviet Yankee patrols settled 
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into routine, the Keflavik squadrons worked in tandem with its Allies to cover the Soviet 
submarines emanating from the North.291 Similar to the British squadrons, the US Navy 
squadrons routinely deployed to allied countries such as Norway, the UK, Denmark, 
Germany and the Netherlands in order to support local efforts, to practice operating out of 
foreign airfields, and often times to get closer to the submarine operating areas.292 Whether 
the Americans based on Iceland at times flew beyond 24 degrees East based from their home-
base or not was not known by Norwegian authorities.293 American operational records do not 
reveal any particular reports that would indicate that they did.294 Norwegian authorities 
considered loosening the restrictions in the course of the 1960s, moving the restricted line 
from 24 to 27 degrees, but the Albatrosses managed to support intelligence gathering efforts 
sufficiently for the 24-degree restriction to remain in place.295 This indicates that the British 
and American surveillance operations further to the West and south were considered 
sufficient to execute the barrier strategy against the Soviet submarines.  
After the Soviet Sputnik launch it was of particular interest to follow Soviet missile 
development, and British Comet ELINT aircraft regularly deployed to Bodø and Andøya in 
order to fly missions in the Barents Sea, a capability the Albatrosses didn´t have. Approval 
for this was given through the Prime Minister’s Security Council. The Comets flew along the 
Kola coastline, then up north along the Novaya Zemlya coastline, before returning to Bodø.296 
After a pause from flying these missions in 1960 and 1961 due to the shoot-downs of the U-2 
and the RB-47 previously mentioned, the British flights resumed until 1967 when they were 
denied for the foreseeable future.297 The denial likely came as Norwegian intelligence 
capabilities were growing in assertiveness, credibility and general standing. Allied operations 
in the High North also included RC-135 Rivet Joint ELINT operations flown by the 
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4.6  Chapter conclusion 
In what can be termed a theme of general expansion both in inventory and operational 
mission portfolio, the strategy and posture of the Soviet Navy fluctuated somewhat in the 
1960s. But even if the Strategic Rocket Forces were established early in the decade, the 
submarines were given back their mission of strategic nuclear strike by the end of the decade, 
most evidently represented by the operationalization of the Yankee class in 1967. Both the 
anti-carrier submarines and missiles and the strategic nuclear submarines with their missiles 
were brought forward approaching the 1970s. In spite of fluctuations, the submarine force 
only strengthened its place in Soviet naval as well as grand strategy throughout the 1960s. 
And through the 1960s, the Allied approach to the Soviet submarine threat was to stay on top 
and keep track of Russian submarines on patrol, regardless of the overarching NATO 
strategy.  
The 1960s were also formative for airborne maritime ISR in many ways, particularly in the 
sense of tri-lateral partnering in the surveillance of Soviet naval operations. MPAs had by 
then been established as the weapon of choice to meet the submarine threat. Several of the 
fundamental tenets of airborne ISR can be identified in the dynamics for MPA development 
and operationalization in the 1960s. For communications, data link was introduced, 
facilitating more efficient communication and coordination between both tactical units as 
well as headquarters ashore. The poor ASW suite on the Albatrosses put Norwegian flight 
restrictions for foreign aircraft operating from Norwegian soil under pressure. A combination 
of the flight restrictions and the poor ASW capabilities of the Albatross seems to ultimately 
have secured the Orion deal for the Norwegians in the late 1960s.  
The question of range for MPA is subsumed in the overarching dynamics altogether. In order 
to get more time on station in areas with the most activity, American and British aircraft 
sought to operate from Norwegian airfields in the north. This was the basis for the bi- and 
trilateral coordination between these three nations, as manifested through the respective 
coordination arrangements: Neptune Journey, Exercise Popeye, Cold Road, Box Car, and the 
NORCANUSUK Agreement. However, had range not been a factor, the UK and US aircraft 
could easily have operated from their home bases without being restricted by Norwegian 









As the 1970s began, the SSBNs had taken centre stage in the strategic nuclear stalemate 
between the USA and the USSR, and the Russian Yankee class was conducting more or less 
continuous patrols in the Atlantic. The Yankees were, however, somewhat of an interim 
solution to the Soviet Union’s geography-ASW conundrum. In order to avoid Western ASW 
defences as a whole, an even more capable platform/missile combination was required. This 
came through the Delta class SSBN/SS-N-8 missile in 1972. This also shifted the strategic 
posture of the Soviet Navy, and the emergence of what in the West was perceived as a 
“bastion strategy” was first heavily debated, and then taken as a foundation for Russian naval 
posture and strategy entering the 1980s. The Soviet bastion approach put the submarines front 
and centre in assuring their Second-Strike capability, as well as protecting waters close to 
vital home-bases in the High North. 
From 1970 and onwards the Norwegian threat assessments to an increasing degree focussed 
on the military build-up on the Kola peninsula. Although the strategic nuclear submarines 
based on Kola did not pose a direct threat to Norwegian soil, they certainly posed a threat to 
the United States and NATO as a whole. Also, the land and air forces on Kola were focussed 
on seizing land territory in the northern parts of Norway for two reasons. First, achieving 
control of Northern Norway would deny the Allies staging bases for air attacks on the Soviet 
Union. Second, controlling air bases in Northern and Mid-Norway would provide Soviet air 
forces further reach in their quest for air supremacy in the Northern Atlantic.299 Through the 
Soviet Union establishment of the bastion defense in in the mid-1970s, the North Atlantic and 
the Barents Sea, the value of Norwegian bases increased even more. Norwegian air bases 
would in case of a Soviet land-grab become an integrated part of the land-based infrastructure 
that supported Soviet air operations in denying Allied access through the GIUK gap and 
freedom of manoeuvre in the North Atlantic.300  
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Through the 1970s and 80s, Norwegian authorities were therefore engaged in a policy of 
invitation towards Allied partners. Through actively inviting Allied partners to Norway and 
northern waters for presence, exercises and training, Norwegian authorities ensured Allied 
engagement in the High North.301 This policy of invitation ensured further Norwegian 
integration with the Western bloc. However, through upholding the basing policy and self-
imposed restrictions, Norway also was able to demonstrate an ability to develop independent 
security policies, within the framework of the NATO membership.302 
The 1970s were characterized by negotiations and a somewhat tumultuous relationship on the 
political level with the Soviet Union in the High North. The decade saw the establishment of 
vast exclusive economic zones for many coastal states, which led to peaceful agreements 
between some nations and fierceful disputes between others. The vast ocean areas in the 
North and their known and potential natural resources had to be handled with care by 
Norwegian authorities in dialogue with the Russians.303   
The forward leaning Maritime Strategy of the US Navy and CONMAROPS of NATO, 
however, caused challenges for the Norwegian government. Norway and the High North 
increased their strategic importance, but this made the balancing act in security policy a 
challenge. The focus of the Government was on ensuring the credibility and commitment of 
American and NATO reinforcements through allowing Allied activities to a certain extent, 
but also maintaining low tensions in the North. A part of the Maritime Strategy was to hold 
Russian submarines at risk before they left home waters, but the Norwegian government 
pointed towards such operations as destabilizing. At the same time, it was important to make 
sure Allied navies were part of the continuous presence in the maritime domain in the High 
North.304 
The more forward leaning maritime strategy for the US Navy and NATO led to an increase to 
naval exercises in the Norwegian Sea. The MPA forces of the respective nations maintained 
their pace of high intensity surveillance of Russian activities, even when that surveillance 
required following the Russians closer to their homebases. The established 24-degree East 
restriction would, more than ever, manifest the High North as an area for intelligence 
gathering more or less exclusively by Norwegian surveillance aircraft. Alliance MPAs were 
 
301 Tamnes, Oljealder, 1965-1995, 6:68. 
302 Børresen, Gjeseth, and Tamnes, Norsk Forsvarshistorie - Allianseforsvar i Endring, 1970-2000, 67. 
303 Tamnes, Oljealder, 1965-1995, 6:249–55. 
304 Børresen, Gjeseth, and Tamnes, Norsk Forsvarshistorie - Allianseforsvar i Endring, 1970-2000, 114. 
97 
 
well set up with capable sensors, communications, and efficient use of range. Towards the 
end of the 80s, however, these MPAs sensors would be put significantly under pressure.   
 
5.2 Soviet naval strategy and submarine capabilities 
From the early 1970s the Soviet strategic submarines would once again play a key role in the 
defence of the Soviet Union. Other units, from attack submarines to surface vessels, were 
dedicated to the task of defending those strategic submarines. The idea of the SSBNs 
providing an assured second-strike capability after a potential pre-emptive counterforce strike 
by their adversaries was by then embraced in full by the Soviets. However, the Russian 
strategic submarines had to pass through extensive NATO ASW barriers. Starting in the late 
1960s, John Walker of the US Navy submarine service began spying for the Soviet Union, 
revealing just how vulnerable the Russian SSBNs were to NATO ASW defences.305 It 
became clear to the Soviets that the strategic situation was unacceptable. In order to avoid 
Western forces, the range of the next submarine launched strategic missile would have to be 
more than three times the range of the SS-N-6 fitted on the Yankee. A range of 4,000 nm or 
more would enable the Russian strategic submarines to remain north of NATO ASW forces 
in the Atlantic and still constitute a threat to NATO.  
Entering the 1970s, the main focus of Western ASW efforts was to track Soviet strategic 
submarines on patrol. The Yankee class was the main threat, but Western ASW technology 
was ahead of Soviet silencing efforts, and the Yankee class was detectable both by SOSUS 
and by MPA, albeit they had to work in tandem. In addition to being detectable by Western 
acoustic systems, the Yankees were sailing on what became somewhat of a regular patrol 
pattern. This led to a predictability that the bastion defence would later remove. When the 
revolutionary SS-N-8 missile was developed, it was simply too large for any existing 
submarine, and its use by submarines demanded the construction of a larger vessel than the 
Yankee. As the Soviets did not want to disturb ongoing submarine production, they developed 
the new Delta class as a modified version of the Yankee.306 The Delta I class SSBN initially 
carried twelve SS-N-8 missiles with a range of 4,300 nm/7,800 km, and the first submarine 
 
305 James Bamford, “The Walker Espionage Case,” United States Naval Institute Proceedings 112, no. 5 (May 
1986): 2; Cote, “The Third Battle - Innovation in the U.S.Navy’s Silent War Struggle with Soviet Submarines,” 
73. 
306 This becomes clear when comparing the Soviet project numeration of the two classes, where the Yankee class 
was given Project 667A, and the Delta class Project 667B. For more on the development of these classes, see for 
example Podvig, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, 240–43. 
98 
 
was completed in 1972. The Delta/SS-N-8 combination had thus more than three times the 
range of the Yankee/SS-N-6 combination. The Delta II carried sixteen instead of twelve 
missiles, and the Delta III carried the new SS-N-18, with a range of 3,600 nm/6,500km and 
4,400 nm/8,000km, with multiple and single warhead configuration, respectively.307 The SS-
N-18 was the first operational Soviet SLBM with multiple, independently targeted re-entry 
vehicles (MIRV). The Delta carrying the SS-N-8 thereby facilitated a retreat from offensive 
forward deployments by the Yankee class. 
 
Figure 5-1. Mid-1960s – 1970. Golf SSB/Hotel SSGN patrol areas.308 
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Figure 5-2. 1970s – mid-1980s. Yankee SSBN patrol areas.  
 
 





Figure 5-4. Late 1980s. Yankee SSBN/Delta II/III SSBN patrol areas.  
 
 
Figure 5-5. Late 1980s/1990s. Delta IV/Typhoon SSBN patrol areas. Strategic Bastion.  
By the early 1980s, most analysts had concluded that Soviet naval strategy was indeed 
focussed on withholding strategic submarines in local waters under the protection of attack 
submarines, the surface fleet, and maritime air units, in a bastion. This shift in Soviet naval 
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posture was to become the strategic foundation for the emerging Maritime Strategy of the 
USA.309 The Delta class submarines both facilitated and solidified the bastion concept of the 
Soviet Union’s approach to naval strategy. From having to leave home-waters and traverse 
ASW infested waters all the way to the US coastline, and patrol whilst constantly being held 
at risk by adversary forces, the assured second-strike assets of the Russians could now 
operate within the defensive perimeters of national forces. The improved ranges of the 
missiles even facilitated the SSBNs firing their weapons whilst in their home ports. The 
strategic submarines were in the 1970s and 1980s gradually retracted from patrolling off the 
coast of the USA, and to an increasing extent sent out on patrol in what is now consistently 
termed the bastion.  
In the early 1970s, new submarines focussed on bastion-related tasks were developed. The 
Tango class brought with it a return to diesel-electric propulsion, which was deemed ideal for 
defensive operations in the bastions. From 1973 the Charlie II carried the SS-N-15 as well as 
the SS-N-9 Siren, an anti-ship missile with a 60 nm range. But NATO ASW development, 
particularly the S-3 Viking carrier-based ASW aircraft and the Los Angeles attack submarine, 
quickly made the Charlie II obsolete. The Oscar class, did not take over until 1982, and will 
be discussed further below.  However, there were developments for Soviet attack submarines 
as well. In the early 1970s the Alfa and the Papa classes were set to sea. Very fast and deep-
diving, they surprised the West with their capabilities. Production was shut down after only a 
few units, however, due to high cost.310 In 1972 the Victor II entered service, a more capable 
version of its predecessor. The Victor II accommodated the SS-N-15 Starfish, which could 
carry a nuclear charged depth bomb a little more than 20 nm. Analysts believe that the SS-N-
15 armament was indicative of an anti-SSBN mission.311  
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Figure 5-6. The Bastion, with principled placement of Soviet submarine forces 
The Soviet Union also finally initiated programs to silence their submarines, and by the end 
of the decade their efforts bore fruit. The Victor III became operational in the late 1970s with 
capabilities directed towards forward deployed adversary attack submarines. She was thus an 
important feature of the bastion defence in the North. The Russian silencing efforts continued 
with a helping hand from the Walker spy ring. The stolen information showed the Soviet 
Union just how vulnerable their submarines were to Western ASW systems, and likely gave 
impetus to silencing efforts into the early 1980s.312 The Victor III class was to surprise NATO 
navies with her quietness – she proved very hard to find. The Victor III class was armed with 
65 wake-homing torpedoes, and the conventional successor to the SS-N-15, the SS-N-16 
Stallion ASW missile.313 
The nuclear-powered vessels were too large and too few in numbers to take over patrols close 
to shore, and a new conventionally powered submarine was required. The first unit of the 
Kilo class was completed in 1982. Only carrying torpedoes, the class was relatively simplistic 
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and carried basic technology, and was soon marked for export. The Kilo class would become 
one of the most common diesel-electric submarines in the world.  
As the last Charlie II was completed in 1982, the first Oscar class submarine was set to sea. 
The Oscar was much larger than any of the previous anti-carrier submarines, and her 
displacement surpassed that of the Delta class SSBNs. The Charlie’s missiles had a relatively 
short range, necessitating the submarine to get close to her targets, which had a significant 
effect on American carrier battle group tactics and defences. This in turn led to the Soviets 
increasing the range of their anti-ship missiles in order to defeat the improved ASW defences 
of their adversary. The new main armament of the Oscar was the SS-N-19 Shipwreck, with a 
300 nm range and a submerged launch capability. The range of the missiles of the Oscar 
integrated her into the surface and air forces in a way that her predecessors were not, and thus 
re-established the Soviet combined arms approach to anti-carrier operations.314 Through the 
Oscar, it is clear that the Soviet Navy maintained capable anti-carrier elements as a part of its 
overall naval strategy. 
The Typhoon class became operational in 1983, and is the largest submarine ever constructed. 
The Typhoon carried the record large SS-N-20 Sturgeon which was the first SLBM to be 
driven by solid-fuel propulsion (range 4,400 nm/8,300 km). The SS-N-20 carried six to nine 
MIRVs, with a significant increase in accuracy compared to its predecessors. The Typhoon 
was designed for calmly patrolling her Arctic home waters whilst being protected by other 
assets, thereby constituting an assured second strike capability.315 The Soviets also continued 
the production of the Delta series. The Delta IV was much less costly to produce than the 
Typhoon, and carried the SS-N-23 Skiff with a range of 4,400 nm/8,300 km with four MIRV 
warheads.316 She became operational in 1988.317 The Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT 
I) agreement of 1972 limited the number of missiles in the inventory allowed and thus 
indirectly the number of firing platforms permitted. This made further large-scale production 
of SSBNs unnecessary. It was thus a matter of replacing old SSBNs with newer and more 
capable ones. The 1970s trend of operationalizing cruise missiles was also a result of arms 
agreements, which gave incentives to turn long-range, land-based weapons into shorter range 
sea-based ones. This was also the reason for several Yankee class SSBNs being converted 
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into SSGNs carrying SS-N-21 and SS-NX-24 cruise missiles, in order not to go past the 
SLBM ceiling of the SALT I agreement.318 
 
Figure 5-7. Soviet Navy force deployments during the exercise SUMMEREX 1985. The naval exercise 
SUMMEREX in 1985 was the largest and most complex execersise conducted by the Soviet Navy during the Cold 
War. The Russians established five submarine barriers in order to meet the simulated NATO threat from the south-
west. The objective of the exercise was to establish control of the Norwegian Sea earløy in the conflict in order to 
defend the strategic assets in the Barents Sea and the Kola peninsula.319 
 
The bastion operating concepts demanded a large number of capable attack boats for forward 
deployment for attacking lines of communication, in addition to providing a robust defence of 
the bastions. The mid-1980s saw the emergence of two such attack submarines, namely the 
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Sierra and the Akula classes in 1984 and 1985, respectively. The Akula was markedly quieter 
than its predecessors, and the new submarine classes were a manifestation of the Soviet 
quieting efforts that had started to materialize in the early 1980s.320 Internal improvements to 
submarine construction had taken the Soviets a long way by the late 70s, but the silencing 
efforts were almost definitely taken even further by the acquisition of advanced milling 
machinery and software for very silent, multi-bladed propeller production in 1983/84.321 
Owen Cote has described the entry of the Victor III, the Sierra and the Akula onto the 
operational scene as the end of the Western “ASW Happy Time.”322 The Sierra and the Akula 
were armed with the SS-N-21 Sampson submarine launched cruise missile (SLCM), among 
other weapons. The Sampson land-attack cruise missile, the Soviet equivalent to the US 
Navy’s Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (T-LAM), has a range of between 900 and 1,100 nm. 
When NATO in 1983 deployed various land-based cruise missiles and intermediate-range 
nuclear ballistic missiles at various European bases, the Soviet Union gave an “Analogous 
Response” deploying submarines to the US coastline, including Akula class attack 
submarines carrying the nuclear capable SS-N-21.323 Patrolling off the coast of the United 
States, a missile engagement would provide little to no warning of attack. The new 
submarines posed an entirely new threat to Western ASW forces that had been spoilt with 
noisy Yankee class SSBNs patrolling in somewhat predictable patterns in the Atlantic. Said 
one member of the ASW force about the Akula deployment; “the entire Navy had to deploy in 
order to find and maintain contact on one submarine.”324 As shall be seen, this combination 
of quiet submarines with capable land-attack missiles marks the starting point of today’s 
Russian submarine threat. 
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5.3 Evolution of Western naval strategy 
Increased Soviet naval activity took place in the Norwegian Sea, and the Northern Fleet 
showed its prowess during large blue water exercises in 1968 and 1970 in the North Atlantic. 
The Northern Flank of NATO was increasingly being viewed as a crucial element of any 
overarching campaign by the Alliance. However, budgetary restrictions amongst all Allies 
resulted in specific warfare areas being downplayed in strategic plans, such as strengthening 
the flanks, maritime surveillance, and anti-submarine warfare.325 An increasing awareness 
was thus not necessarily followed through by commitment in strategic plans. The 1970s did, 
however, see an increase in Allied exercises in the North Atlantic. Exercises included ASW 
and forced landings in Norway, marking a more forward leaning approach to the North 
Atlantic at least during exercises, if not in explicit strategy. Although downplayed in strategic 
plans, new ASW systems and technology gave a certain optimism in the Alliance ability to 
defeat the Soviet submarine threat. But in spite of this technology optimism, the 1970s, 
together with the previous decade, marked a low-point in Allied presence in the North 
Atlantic. In the realm of anti-submarine warfare, the decade saw a number of changes. 
American ASW aircraft carriers were phased out during the Vietnam war, and focus was 
given to submarines, SOSUS and MPA.326 US strategic nuclear forces that for the past decade 
had been represented by aircraft carriers were now represented by submerged submarines, 
and the overall presence in the north eroded.  
The emerging bastion approach of the Soviets occurred in the context of détente and 
negotiations between the United States and Soviet Union on reducing their respective nuclear 
stockpiles in 1969. In 1972, SALT I was signed, in which a ceiling was set on a maximum 
allowed number of launch platforms for strategic ballistic missiles, to include strategic 
submarines.327 Phasing out the Yankees gave way for more of the modern Delta submarines, 
thus staying below the maximum level of submarine missile launchers in accordance with 
SALT I.328 
Entering the 1970s, the maritime surveillance of Soviet submarine movements and surface 
exercises carried on, but few initiatives were taken on a strategic level to ensure the defence 
of the Atlantic sea lines of communication. The traditional approach of taking the initiative 
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had to make way for a more defensive way of thinking.329 With regards to technology, cruise 
missiles saw a renaissance in the 1970s on both sides of the Iron Curtain, and the American 
submarine-launched Tomahawk missiles is a prime example of this. Cruise missiles have 
shorter ranges than their ballistic brethren, and the submarines therefore had to get closer to 
their targets in order to fire their load. Thus, the seeds of a more forward leaning maritime 
strategy could be seen in the West through cruise missile development.330 And as Soviet 
capabilities and posture changed in the late 1970s, a change in NATO strategic reasoning 
occurred. Soviet submarines operated to an increasing degree in the North Atlantic and the 
Barents Sea, which lead to an increased focus on forward operations in NATO. NATO 
commenced a reconsideration of the Alliance’s maritime concept, work that culminated in the 
NATO Concept of Maritime Operations (CONMAROPS) in 1982.331 Similar work was 
initiated in the USA, where forward operations and force projection were key elements. The 
Soviet bastion strategy in many ways invited a more forward leaning West, and the revised 
Soviet posture of the mid-70s was a key ingredient to the emerging strategic concepts of the 
West in the 80s. With the emergence of the Soviet bastion approach came a renaissance in 
NATO interest in the High North, and the bastion concept became the basis for strategic 
naval thinking in the West. The US Navy conducted a comprehensive review of maritime 
strategy, eventually leading to the signing of the Maritime Strategy in 1984. The most 
important elements of this strategy were maritime superiority and forward power 
projection.332 Part of the Soviet forward defence in the High North was their use of maritime 
bomber aircraft such as the Tu-16 Badger and the Tu-22 Backfire. Combined with new and 
quiet submarines commissioned in the 1980s, and a relative decline in the effectiveness of 
Western fixed undersea listening installations, the Russians had a significantly increased 
ability for sea denial in the North Atlantic. In addition, the barrier defence was no longer 
deemed adequate by SACLANT, who pointed out shortfalls in forces to tackle threats to the 
Northern Flank and simultaneously assure the safe passage of Western reinforcements across 
the Atlantic. The answer to the shortfalls would be, according to SACLANT, forward 
operations.333 The concept of forwarding aircraft carriers into Norwegian fjords was 
revitalized from the 1950s.334 Naval forward operations were first tested during exercise 
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Mainbrace in 1952 and were again practiced during Ocean Safari in 1985 and Team Work in 
1988. The American had in the early 1980s initiated forward operations with submarines, 
which where higly classified.335 Such operations were and integrated and important part of the 
Maritime Strategy, and led to strategic, principalled discussions on forward neutralization of 
the Soviet submarine force, so-called “strategic ASW”. When the Norwegian Labour Party 
came back into power in 1986, minister of defense Holst stated that such strategic forward 
operations constituted a destabilizing element of the challenging balancing act to maintain 
low ensions in the north. He said that the operationalization of the US Maritime Strategy 
might escalate tensions, and further lead to permanent presence of allied maritime offensive 
units.336 At the same time it was important to the Norwegian government to have regular 
presence in Norway and surrounding areas, in order to demonstrate a credible reinforcement 
mechanism for times of war. The Maritime Strategy thus put further pressure on the 
demanding security policy balancing act in the High North.  
The most formative agreement for surveillance in the North Atlantic for the remainder of the 
Cold War was the GIN Clear agreement of 1969, the successor of the Box Car agreement.337 
In essence, the focus of the arrangement was to maintain overview of Soviet naval 
movements in the Greenland, Iceland, Norway (GIN) gap. GIN Clear was based on bilateral 
agreements, and was aimed at limiting foreign surveillance aircraft taking off from 
Norwegian soil in monitoring of Soviet naval deployments. From mid-1970, the agreement 
expanded to include Denmark, the USA, the UK, Canada, West Germany, and the 
Netherlands. However, the Norwegian government showed a restrictive attitude towards 
increasing the number of countries involved in surveillance in the High North and kept a 
restrictive line in foreign use of airfields. West Germany and the Netherlands, for example, 
were not approved to fly in the High North.338 The reason for this was a politically 
conservative attitude towards operating German aircraft, in particular, in what was envisaged 
as a low-tension area by the Norwegians. It was also an ambition of Norway not to involve 
more parties than necessary in intelligence sharing and coordination. British squadrons, 
however, flew many missions under the GIN Clear cooperation agreement in 1970. A notably 
large number of GIN Clear missions were executed during the first six months of 1970, 
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followed by more evenly spaced missions on the planning schedule. Having used Bodø in the 
1960s as host base, Nimrod crews in the 1970s almost exclusively utilized Andøya as the 
Norwegian hosting base. The change likely took place because of the improvement in 
operational support at Andøya following the conversion from the Norwegian Albatross to the 
Orion. After the establishment of the GIN Clear agreement, Allied interest in flying from 
Norwegian airfields went into a decline. After the geographical delineation of areas in the 
North Atlantic through the NORCANUSUK agreement, both the British based in Scotland 
and the Americans based on Iceland were able to reach their dedicated patrol areas to the 
South and West. which were further West and South of the Norwegian areas. Also, the 
intelligence gathered in the Norwegian areas to the north and east of Norway were of such 
quality that additional surveillance operations were considered to be superfluous.339 The GIN 
Clear arrangement remained in effect throughout the Cold War. 
Norwegian procurement of the Orion included a formal agreement to share intelligence with 
the Americans. Further building on the general intelligence sharing agreement between 
Norway and the USA from 1954, the specific sharing of ELINT data took form through the 
NORUSA II agreement of 1970.340 Intelligence sharing was based on the increasingly close 
relationship between the two countries and explicitly stated in the Orion procurement 
agreement. It was important for Norway to contribute to Western defence cooperation in 
general and NATO specifically. Also, Norwegian intelligence contributed to low tensions as 
the West would relate to facts as opposed to speculation. Norwegian surveillance precluded 
potentially provocative Allied operations in the same area. Also, intelligence from the North 
showed the exposed nature of the Northern Flank of NATO. And finally, technical 
information provided an improved basis for decision making by Western authorities.341 
Intelligence products that came out of Orion operations in the High North were initially of a 
technical character, but subsequently took on an increasingly important role in Norwegian 
security politics.342   
The increased capabilities of the Norwegian Orions shifted the focus of Western surveillance 
in the North Atlantic from technological matters (areas apportioned based on sensor suite) to 
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geographical questions (areas apportioned based on geographical proximity).343 Even with 
lacking ASW capabilities, the Norwegian authorities had been restrictive with regards to the 
24-degree East limitation, with the exception of specific periods when a new type of aircraft 
was introduced. The strict geographical delineation of responsibility after the introduction of 
the Orion for the Norwegians was facilitated by the fact that all three main nations 
conducting surveillance in the High North were equally ASW capable. The aforementioned 
NORCANUSUK agreement is a clear sign of a common understanding of common 
capabilities, particularly with respect to ASW.344 In 1979, the Royal Norwegian Air Force 
formalized the requirements for maritime surveillance and reconnaissance. Norwegian MPAs 
had for decades been operating based on intelligence requirements and not on a cognizant 
framework for operations. This led to requirements for improved capabilities on board the 
Orions, materializing in the Chief of Defence Directive for Maritime Patrol Aircraft 
Operations in 1982. The directive formalized surface and subsurface surveillance and 
reconnaissance as the primary task of Norwegian MPA, followed by support to civilian 
national entities, ensuring national jurisdiction, and support to Search and Rescue as follow-
on tasks.345  
Although the 24-degree East restriction had been declared in early 1959, it had not been 
formalized in publicly available documentation. From having been a restriction enforced by 
the operational headquarters and written only in operational directives, the Ministry of 
Defense finally stated the 24-degree East restriction in writing in 1980 through a review of 
the plans for Allied reinforcement.346  
 
5.4 The evolution of NATO ASW and MPA capabilities 
The 1970s saw a prevailing optimism as to the American ability to maintain and even 
increase the technological lead over the Russians.347 Crucially for the MPA force, the 
improved computer processing enabled improved ability to distinguish between ambient 
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noise and sounds emitted from a submarine in real-time. The P-3B Orion was introduced into 
Norwegian service in 1969, and the internal ASW system now included the Delayed Time 
Compression (DELTIC) system that together with the new JEZEBEL acoustic processor 
allowed the operator to monitor 16 channels of acoustic data simultaneously. Overall, the 
new aircraft was able to fuse information from the radar and acoustic sensors into a single 
tactical picture. The new processors improved the accuracy of the information collected, and 
thus facilitated more time for tactical problems as opposed to mathematical issues.348   
The SOSUS continued to provide essential cueing to the MPA community in the 1970s. 
Initial contact on approaching Soviet submarines was usually gained by fixed systems on the 
ocean seabed. For cases in which contact was lost on a submarine by “other sources”, an 
extensive search and localization effort had to be initiated by the respective MPA fleets.349 
The Norwegians P-3 Orion procurement included state-of-the-art analysis and processing 
tools for acoustic intelligence.350 These systems were co-located with the analysis centre for 
the sea bed systems at Andøya, similar to the American arrangement at Keflavik, Iceland. 
Such co-location of processing systems facilitated a close relationship between the fixed 
array and MPA communities. Moreover, the previously mentioned BRIDGE system was 
expanded, to include cables in the Barents Sea. The cables were laid in 1974 and were aimed 
at detecting Russian submarines at as early a stage into their deployment as possible; they 
functioned as an integrated part of the SOSUS.351  
After the British conversion from Shackleton to the MR1 Nimrod in 1970-71, the aircrews 
also enjoyed a significant leap forward in technology and capabilities. Combined with 
knowledge and experience, the new aircraft performed very well. The noise from the Nimrod 
jets was also harder to distinguish by a submerged submarine close to the surface than the 
noise from the turboprop Orion aircraft.352  
In mid-1970, the Americans deployed their new P-3C Orion model to Keflavik. The P-3C 
brought with it the latest ASW technology available, including new computers, and improved 
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navigation equipment and sensor functionalities. The capacity of the acoustic system’s active 
elements was four times that of the previous aircraft.353 The US Navy further transitioned to 
the P-3C Orion Update II in early 1979, which among other things for the first time enabled it 
to carry the AGM-84A Harpoon missile aimed at Soviet surveillance trawlers in case of 
war.354 US Orions also operated as airborne Harpoon missile platforms in support of the 
Iranian hostage crisis.355 The British Nimrods initially had the AIM-9X Sidewinder air-to-air 
missile installed in the early 80s, and were carrying these missiles during the Falklands war. 
The Nimrods were thus prepared for an increased threat environment as they entered the 90s. 
In parallel with the P-3 Orion upgrades, the Harpoon ASuW missile was installed on the 
Nimrods as well.356 The Norwegians did not have missiles installed on their aircraft. 
The US Navy upgrade to the P-3C Orion Update II in 1979 came with further improved 
avionics and weapons systems. A new sensor was an infrared detection system, which could 
identify targets regardless of weather and daylight, albeit only on the surface.357 The new 
ASW designated radar AN/APS-137 became operational and was first utilized in the North 
Atlantic in 1986.358 The early 1980s saw an increase in utilization and coordination of data 
link for ASW operations, enabling the passing of basic target information back and forth on a 
tactical network.359 Further, the P-3C Orion Update III deployed for the first time to Keflavik 
in May 1990. The new onboard processor doubled once again the number of passive buoys an 
operator could monitor simultaneously to 32. The processor provided a four-fold gain in 
isolating sounds from submarines compared to ocean ambient noise.360 Towards the end of 
the 1980s, there was a further increase in the exercising of Harpoon missile strike missions 
and the use of the APS-137 imaging radar.361 The new radars also facilitated the use of P-3 
Orions in providing targeting information for Tomahawk cruise missile strikes by 
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submarines.362 However, towards the end of the 1980s there was a clear tendency of utilizing 
MPA to an increasing degree in joint operations, combining the MPA sensor and targeting 
suite with other assets’ weapons capabilities.  
Entering the 1980s, analyses by the Norwegian Air Force indicated that the aircraft would 
have to be replaced not long after 1986. Norwegian authorities were increasingly worried 
about the naval situation that was developing in the High North. Soviet exercises conducted 
just off the Norwegian coast in the early and mid-1980s demonstrated a capacity to project 
power in a manner reminiscent of a blue water navy, and this was being noticed at the highest 
political levels on both sides of the Atlantic. Thus, in 1986 the Norwegian government signed 
the Maritime Surveillance Agreement with the USA.363 This was a similar arrangement to that 
of the procurement of the P-3B Orion, and this time the procurement consisted of four P-3C 
Orion Update III. What was new about this agreement was that the Norwegian government 
had to bear more of the cost than before. The degree of formalization of the intelligence 
sharing between the two nations was also new. The agreement from 1969 was founded more 
on a tacit understanding between the nations, but this time the requirement for sharing was 
explicit.364 It is reasonable to believe that this was due to the increased value of naval 
intelligence from the Barents Sea due to the fact that an increasing amount of strategic patrols 
by missile submarines by the 1980s were conducted east of the 24-degree delineation. The 
four P-3C Orion UIII were delivered to Norway between December 1989 and June 1990. 
This was the same type of aircraft that the US Navy deployed to Keflavik in 1990.  
In the 1970s, there was a notable increase in the use of surface towed array sonar systems 
(SURTASS). The SURTASS consisted of surface ships that towed a long line array 
(approximately 8,000 feet long) that functioned in a similar way as the SOSUS arrays. 
Through satellite communication and links the SURTASS ships connected with the SOSUS 
system, and together with the shore processing systems comprised the Integrated Undersea 
Surveillance System (IUSS).365 By the mid-1980s the Western fixed arrays’ ability to detect 
and track Soviet submarines had declined significantly as the Soviet submarines became 
quieter. This led the deployment of the Fixed Distributed System (FDS) in 1985. The FDS is 
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a large-area, distributed field of acoustic arrays. They are upwards looking and only capable 
of detecting submarines in their immediate vicinity, but this new method and system was 
necessitated by the low emission of sound from the new submarines.366 
The use of satellites for surveillance and reconnaissance has by some been termed a 
“revolution in intelligence.”367 The first imaging and ELINT satellites of the 1960s were 
operationally proven by the 1970s. A satellite that could detect navigational radars and other 
emissions from ships was thought to complement the operational picture. The White Cloud 
passive ELINT satellite was launched in 1971.368 White Cloud became the satellite workhorse 
for maritime surveillance for the US Navy during the Cold War, and constituted the initial 
constellation of the Naval Ocean Surveillance System (NOSS). The system was upgraded 
continuously during the Cold War, and up until the present. In addition, a series of IR 
satellites were put in geostationary orbit in order to detect the firing of Soviet Union ballistic 
missiles, called the Defence Support Program (DSP). In the early 80s, the DSP was tested to 
support general detection of missile and aircraft flight trajectories for early warning and self-
protection for naval vessels as well.369  
Efforts further started in the mid-1970s in the USA to develop a Synthetic Aperture Radar 
(SAR) satellite for maritime surveillance, however, fully functional radar satellites for 
maritime surveillance did not become operational until after the Cold War.370 The new 
Charlie II submarines were deployed along with the first Soviet ocean surveillance satellites, 
where the latter were meant to provide targeting to the former. However, the Russian 
surveillance satellites never achieved their promise, and the submarines had to rely on Soviet 
MPAs for targeting.371 Due to increasingly quiet Soviet submarines, the mid-70s also saw 
significant interest in finding non-acoustic means of finding submarines, and attempts were 
undertaken to detect thermal wakes, internal waves, electric currents, bioluminescence, and 
surface activity from a passing submerged submarine.372 None of the capabilities were 
integrated into operational satellites, however. Approaching the end of the 1970s, imaging 
satellites were having a significant impact on naval operations, particularly in performing 
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surveillance of adversary ports, naval bases and shipyards. Satellites could fly with impunity 
directly over areas of vital naval interest, including inland targets, supporting strategic 
intelligence.373 However, photographic satellites are incapable of looking through weather 
and clouds, and this led to efforts to develop high-resolution radar satellites such as the 
Lacrosse launched in 1988. Lacrosse reportedly provided a resolution of approximately 1 
foot, and worked in tandem with optical imaging satellites during the Gulf War in 1991.374 
However, satellites were still only able to perform surveillance on the surface.  
Towards the end of the 1980s American MPAs had satellite communication (SATCOM) 
equipment installed. SATCOM enabled aircraft to perform immediate, reliable, over-the-
horizon, two-way secure tactical communications. Among other tasks, SATCOM was 
utilized for Harpoon missile strikes and more detailed coordination of submarine prosecution 
with shore and surface facilities.375 Through the SATCOM capability, tactical operations and 
on-station flexibility were greatly enhanced.  
Satellite technology was starting to play an important role in maritime surveillance 
operations. These satellites, however, were geostationary, leading to poor and at times no 
coverage in the Arctic. This will be elaborated upon in the final chapter. 
 
5.5 The deployment of NATO MPA capabilities 
When the Yankee class SSBNs initiated their regular patrols off the coast of the USA, the 
NATO airborne ASW community was ready for them. As the Soviet strategic submarines left 
port on the Kola peninsula they were followed first by the Norwegian Orions from Andøya, 
entering the North Atlantic. Further south the Soviet submarine contact was handed over to 
American Orions from Keflavik and British Nimrods from Kinloss. Then the Yankees 
continued their course further south and passed through the GIUK gap. Here the submarines 
in transit were tracked by the Americans, the British, the Dutch flying out of Iceland, and the 
Canadians who did the same. As the Soviet submarines entered their patrol boxes south of 
Bermuda, they were tracked continuously by aircraft from Naval Air Station Bermuda and 
Naval Air Field Lajes, Azores.376 Although not formalized, the handovers were facilitated by 
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experience, NATO procedures, and close and daily interaction between the tasking agencies 











Figure 5-8. International cooperation to follow Soviet SSBNs on strategic patrol. 
The Northern Fleet operations and exercises shaped the days of MPA crews during the Cold 
War.377 British operational records show regular entries of “contact gained immediately”, 
“Russian Type 2 Nuclear Possub”, and “contact held for the remainder of the sortie and was 
handed to the relieving aircraft at Off-Task.”378 The aircrews launched in carefully planned 
succession with a combined aim of tracking the target and gathering as much updated 
acoustic intelligence as possible. This intelligence was then processed at home base.379 The 
squadron would send out aircrews to try to hold the target for as long as she was within 
reasonable reach of home base, and then hand it off to the next squadron or nation to pick up 
the tracking.380 Close cooperation with Allied MPA crews continued into the 70s, and were 
usually well coordinated and problem free. At times, however, miscommunication could lead 
to two nations quarrelling over who should track the Russian submarine.381 Operational 
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missions included both tracking of transiting strategic submarines, but also monitoring of 
general Soviet naval activities in order to chart tactics and manoeuvres. The largest Soviet 
Naval exercises and routine activity took place in the North Norwegian sea, and in the ocean 
areas north of Norway. Although also given other areas to cover, when it comes to 
documenting Soviet naval activity the Allied aircrews benefitted by far the most by flying in 
the High North. At the turn of the decade the high operational tempo of the Soviets and the 
corresponding surveillance efforts by NATO MPAs had become routine. It was 
commonplace for American squadrons to report more than 40 different submarines during a 
deployment of four to six months to Keflavik.382 MPA operations also included surface 
surveillance, which entailed following Soviet intelligence ships, monitoring the Soviet fishing 
fleet, and keeping track of Soviet Navy surface groups. Soviet surface forces were usually 
escorted by several submarines, at times more than eight submarines in the same formation.383  
The modus operandi of the deployed American MPA squadrons stood out in comparison to 
other, allied nations way of operating. The aircrews were away from their families for 
approximately six months at a time, standing available for flying missions more or less 
throughout the day, throughout the deployment. Their ability to surge squadron assets and fly 
non-stop over extended periods of time to track Soviet submarines meant that single Yankee 
class submarines could be followed by the Keflavik squadrons for up to a week or more at a 
time.384 The squadrons that regularly deployed to Keflavik amassed a significant amount of 
flight hours during the Cold War. They regularly amassed more than 700 hours a month 
throughout a deployment, which at times was quadruple the flight hours they put in whilst at 
home in the USA.385 One squadron reported approximately 80,000 hours over ten and a half 
years.386 This averages out to around 630 hours a month for more than a decade 
consecutively, which is telling of the demands the Cold War put on the aircrews that worked 
on the front line. Numbers would routinely pass 900 to 1,000 hours a month during 
particularly busy periods.387 Operational records from the deployments in the late 1970s show 
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that the squadrons would encounter almost every type of Russian submarine, with aircrews 
prosecuting two and sometimes three submarines simultaneously.388 This underlines the fact 
that the North Atlantic not only was a necessary transit area for their SSBNs, but also a 
crucial exercise area for the remainder of the fleet, not only in the 1960s-70s, but also into the 
1980s.  
There was no decline in intensity of ASW operations towards the end of the Cold War.389 
This indicates that the bastion defence had not fully settled by the end of the 1980s, and that 
several patrols south of the bastion were still taking place. During an exercise in 1987, five 
Victor III class submarines were prosecuted simultaneously.390 By the Americans alone, 82 
sorties and 800 flight hours were flown over thirteen days of continuous prosecution against 
the five Soviet submarines, generating a total of 230 hours of submarine acoustic contact. The 
Keflavik deployment between November 1988 and May 1989 flew 744 sorties locating 17 
Soviet submarines in six months.391 This equals almost four sorties every day, which in 
practical terms means that there were aircraft belonging to the detachment airborne almost 
continuously throughout the deployment. 
The Americans conducted reconnaissance in the High North with other aircraft types than 
MPA as well. Between 1977 and 1989, American SR-71 Blackbirds flew regular missions 
into the Barents Sea, usually supported by KC-135Q air-to-air refuelling aircraft based in the 
UK.392 These aircraft flew close to both Russia and Norway, at one point violating Norwegian 
airspace.393 However, the Blackbirds provided invaluable radar intelligence on military 
activity and bases on the Kola peninsula, intelligence collection that would eventually be 
taken over by satellites.394 In operationalizing the Maritime Strategy the US Navy initiated 
regular clandestine submarine operations in the Barents Sea.395 From the mid-1980s, the 
Royal Navy supported the Americans with submarine operations of their own in the High 
North. The British were integrated in the forward strategy, aiming at destroying the Soviet 
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fleet early in a conflict.396 As these were clandestine operations they were not openly debated 
or confronted by the Soviet Union. The operations were opposed in policy terms by the 
Norwegian government, as discussed, but there was no mechanism for denying such 
operations neither by the Norwegians nor by the Russians. They became an integraeted part 
of the silent cold war in the abyss.    
British Nimrod crews were sent to both Norway and Iceland to conduct surveillance and 
tracking of Russian submarines. Regardless of originating base and nationality of the MPA, 
the aircrews received orders from the nation they took off from, and updates on targets and 
areas to cover by the headquarters with the most current information. The coordination for 
such a multi-national effort was executed by the lead nation at any given time, which was the 
nation in whichever sector the target was located. That nation carried the weight of the 
operation and offered openings or gaps in coverage in terms of flying time to other nations.397  
For example, the Canadians deployed at times forward to Iceland to get an early feel for the 
target, before they picked up the submarine as it approached the Western Atlantic.398  
The British MPA community also spent a significant amount of time working in the High 
North.399 When Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands in April 1982, an urgent operational 
requirement for an air-to-air refuelling (AAR) capability for the Nimrod arose.400 The new 
AAR capability facilitated missions into areas without having to secure foreign landing 
approval for refuelling mid-operation.401 A range of missions were thereafter conducted north 
of Norway. Their reports reveal that British crews were also exposed to a significantly higher 
level of Soviet activity in the High North as compared to further south in the Atlantic.402 The 
AAR capability thus paid off in the North Atlantic as well as in support of the Falklands 
campaign. The Orions never had an AAR capability. The Norwegians were geographically 
close enough to Soviet operations for AAR requirement not to be a factor. US Navy 
squadrons on their side deployed to one location, such as Keflavik or Bermuda, and then sent 
detachments to other locations, such as the Azores, in order to fill gaps in coverage.403 The 
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Americans thus met lack of range through deploying assets further out, or by operating 
collaborating assets in the areas of interest. 
At least one Norwegian Orion surveillance mission was executed every single day for the 
remainder of the Cold War. The area covered was fairly constant throughout the time period, 











Figure 5-9. Eastern and southern limitation for airborne surveillance in the Barents Sea 
 
From the mid-70s until the end of the Cold War the Norwegians ventured further east than 40 
degrees once a week. When the navigational equipment onboard the P-3B Orion was 
upgraded in 1980, headquarters authorized to move the southern limitation of the operations 
areas further south than before, down to 15 nautical miles from land (three miles outside the 
international 12 nautical mile sovereign border).404 
The Orion-era for Norwegian MPA was characterized by the mere localization of their 
operations area. The localization of the primary surveillance area for the Norwegians meant 
that the amount of Russian activity that the Norwegian operators witnessed during their daily 
operations was second to none in the Alliance. It was commonplace during the 1980s for a 
Norwegian MPA to track and follow several different submarines during a single sortie.405 
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One Norwegian tactical coordinator operating at the Norwegian MPA squadron in the 1980s 
reports that he once recorded fourteen different submarines in a single mission.406 The 
combination of the level of equipment of the Orion aircraft, together with the proficiency that 
came with operating in such a “target rich environment”, led to an unsurpassed overview of 
Soviet submarine activity in the High North. The NIS assessed in 1970 that it had awareness 
of the whereabouts and activities of 90% of the nuclear propelled submarines at any given 
time, and 100% of the Yankee class in particular.407 This number presumably declined as the 
new and silent submarines such as the Akula and the Delta IV came online. The intelligence 
collected was used by the NIS in support of providing a decision-making baseline for military 
and political leadership, and as a continuation of this, it was used for trading information, 
materiel, and access to partners’ systems.408 
Operational records show a different modus operandi by the MPA fleets when tracking attack 
submarines compared to tracking strategic missile submarines. For example, prosecution of  
Charlie and Victor class submarines were “short, ‘go for the throat’ prosecutions”, in which 
the MPA would spend as little time as possible attaining attack criteria and performing a 
simulated attack.409 In following the nuclear strategic submarines, the MPA would take a 
more defensive, hold-at-risk approach in which the target would be tracked without revealing 
the aircraft’s presence. 
Widespread international cooperation took place within the MPA community. Interaction 
happened daily in operational flying, regularly during NATO exercises, and many times in 
the form of visits to each other’s homebases. There were at times cases where coverage was 
not deemed adequate by other nations or there was some particular interest in a given target. 
In such cases the Keflavik squadron would send a detachment to fly for a specified period of 
time from an allied country.410 The US Navy at Keflavik regularly hosted aircrews from 
Canada, Norway, the Netherlands and the UK in return.411 In tracking a Hotel class SSBN in 
1973, for example, cooperation between US, Dutch and Canadian aircrews all flying out of 
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Keflavik produced 90% contact time over 23 sorties that stretched five days and 1,300 nm of 
submarine transit.412 Sorties were coordinated with those air operations centres that could 
have a mutual interest in a target or area.413 As one former MPA air wing commander put it: 
“It was just friendly cooperation.”414 This multi-national coordination, conducted by national 
command & control elements under national command, in essence functioned as the basis for 
NATO MPA command & control in crisis or times of war. These arrangements continued 
throughout the 1980s.  
 
5.6 Chapter conclusion 
Going into the 1970s, the Russians continued their strategic patrols with the Yankee class that 
were initiated towards the end of the 60s. The posture of the Soviet Navy was forward 
leaning and assertive, but the Yankee class was somewhat of an interim solution to the 
challenge posed by Western ASW forces. When the Delta/SS-N-8 combination came online 
for the Northern Fleet in the mid-1970s, it facilitated a retreat to the bastion in the High 
North. Fewer and fewer strategic patrols took place south in the Atlantic, and the Russian 
fleet entered a period of a retracted posture that was to last for several decades. 
Through all this, even as satellite technology facilitated increasing levels of intelligence 
gathering from space, MPAs were the weapon of choice for sustaining knowledge on and 
pressure over Russian submarines as they exercised and patrolled. The Northern Fleet 
conducted several large-scale exercises in the North Atlantic, and continued several patrols 
with both surface vessels and submarines even after the bastion approach was introduced. 
The cooperation between American, British and Norwegian MPAs in the North Atlantic 
continued until the end of the Cold War. As we have seen, Russian engineers were able to 
quieten their submarines through research and Western technology. This put NATO ASW 
sensors, including those of MPA, significantly under pressure in the 80s. The improvement to 
computer processing power kept modern MPAs somewhat able to follow the emerging 
submarines. However, the significant quieting progress of Russian submarine technology 
gave a sense of NATO ASW force being “saved by the bell” with the collapse for the Soviet 
Union.  
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The initial decade covered in this chapter entailed a significant degree of predictability by the 
Russian submarines. Although far out to sea, the transit routes of the Yankee class were 
known to Western MPA. This meant that the range of the aircraft was used efficiently. It was 
with the silencing of the new attack submarines in the 80s and their non-predictable 



































6. Post-Cold War and Change in ISR Focus – 1991-2015 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The collapse of the Soviet Union halted much of the submarine production and threw Russia 
into political and economic turmoil. The US ONI has estimated that fully three quarters to 
five sixths of the Soviet-era naval inventory was scrapped, including vessels that were fully 
operational but deemed too costly to maintain.415 The steady decline of the Russian fleet in 
the 1990s fuelled predictions that the Russian navy of the future would be capable of no more 
than basic coastal defence.416 The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNI) of the early 1990s 
between Russia and the United States further resulted in a series of reciprocal pledges to 
substantially reduce both the American and the Russian nuclear arsenals.417 
The collapse of the Soviet Union effectively removed the one, obvious security threat to 
NATO. The 1990s was thus characterized by a fledging understanding of threats, which led 
to several warfare specialties losing their explicit mission. A prime example of this was 
NATO’s MPA fleet. With Russian submarine patrols in the 1990s at times ebbing to just a 
handful per year, many nations started using submarine hunting aircraft in support of the land 
battle. MPAs carry several sensors that can be put to extensive use outside the realm of 
hunting submarines. This, however, further devolved ASW competency in the Alliance.  
In political terms for Norway, the 1990s in the High North were characterized by significant 
efforts to mold the political dynamics in the Barents region into formal, practical arenas for 
international cooperation. Early on, this manifested itself into bilateral science programs, 
arrangements for maritime search-and-rescue, and cooperation on safely dismantling the 
many nuclear reactors on the Kola peninsula. Bilateral fishery surveillance and resource 
management were further developed. The political drive to establish formal arrangements for 
political cooperation was sought to put the strengthen the framework within which both low 
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tensions could be maintanined, and natural resources could be explored and managed.418 In 
many ways, these soft power moves coindided neatly with the decreasing military strategic 
focus on the High North due to the diminishing activity levels. Within NATO, however, 
Norway remained one of the most active advocates for a continued focus on collective 
defense as the overarching strategic concept increasingly turned towards a reduced command 
structure and the ability to condict expeditionary warfare.419 
Entering the new century, Norway finally restructured its armed forces from a counter-
invasion force to a structure tuned for expeditionary warfare, like most other allies. The 
terrorist attack on the United States in 2001 further drove organisational changes within the 
Alliance. Norway took active part in these changes for two main reasons: first, because the 
threat from Russia had decreased and therefore took up less space in Norwegian strategic 
thinking, and second, because there was an imminent requirement to secure a continued 
American engagement in the defense of Europe.420  
Strategic thinking in the first decade of the new millennium was by shaped by the conflicts in 
the Middle East. Towards 2006 and 2007, however, there had been a resurgence in Russian 
activities in the North Atlantic, and very harsh rhetoric from the Russian political leadership, 
exemplified by Vladimir Putin’s speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2007. Norway 
then sought to refocus the Alliance’s attention towards challenges closer to home. There was 
a growing concern regarding NATO’s actual capability to defend its own territory, after years 
of focussing on expeditionary warfare. This led to the Norwegian initiative in 2008 to “raise 
NATO’s profile”. This initiative would be the starting point for the Alliance’s return to its 
roots with regards to defending its members. In the strategic concept released two yers later, 
several elements from the initiative were incorporated, as we shall see.  
By the 2010s, however, the Russians had begun to acquire new submarine capabilities, 
resulting in increased levels of naval activity and a resumption of inter-state rivalry. This 
forced the strategic focus back towards prospects of peer-to-peer conflicts, leading to a 
renewed focus on MPA and ASW as a whole.  
This chapter portrays the final historical element of the intersection between the development 
of Russian submarines and the utilization of the Western MPA fleet in meeting that threat. 
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We shall see that in the mid-2010s, the USA, the UK and Norway had all decided once more 
to move ahead with a capable MPA force.  
 
6.2 The 1990s – Russian Decline and Western Strategic Ambivalence 
In general, the economic situation simply demanded evolving the Russian Navy into a leaner 
force. At the same time, the military and political leadership did not disregard the possibility 
of war, even after the collapse of the Soviet Union. These overarching strategic trends seem 
to have provided the foundation for renewed work on the bastion concept in the mid-1990s.421 
The Northern Fleet had throughout the Cold War established itself as the main strategic hub 
for Russian naval operations. The Russian leadership also explicitly stated that there was a 
requirement to “concentrate Russia’s sparse forces and means in a limited number of 
directions”, thus providing safer grounds for President Yeltsin to announce the establishment 
of the Northern Strategic Bastion in August 1998.422 The main function of the bastion would 
be firstly, to provide a credible nuclear deterrent in the North, and secondly, to constitute an 
“independent naval force able to secure Russia’s naval interests on the world oceans.”423 
This was likely meant as much for an internal Russian audience as for an external 
international one. The Northern Strategic Bastion was a political instrument: the mission of 
the Northern Fleet was to secure Russian military and economic interests in the Arctic and on 
the world oceans.424 The concept only really gained traction and credibility in the 2000s, 
however, after the initiation of an expensive Russian weapons programs under President 
Putin. 
In the cut-backs and triage that took place, an implicit policy of emphasizing quality over 
quantity and multi-role over single mission vessels permeated the Russian Navy. It was in 
this context that the keel of a new, nuclear multi-role nuclear submarine was laid in 1993, that 
of the Severodvinsk class.425 The new multi-role submarine was meant to take over for the 
Sierra and Akula attack submarines and the Oscar cruise missile submarines. Three years 
later, in 1996, the keel was laid for a new SSBN to replace the Deltas and Typhoon, namely 
the Dolgorukiy class. But successive failures in the development of the associated SS-N-32 
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Bulava SLBM caused the development of the submarine to take more than a decade and a 
half.426 The Typhoons were decommissioned in the late 1990s due to cost of production, 
maintenance, and the absence of a mid-life update regime.427  
The operational tempo of the Russian SSBN fleet declined significantly in the 1990s. There 
were 37 patrols in 1991, and there were only seven in 1999.428 The plight of the Russian 
economy, as well as the complete breakdown of established logistics, led to fuel shortages, 
forcing the cancellation of high-profile foreign deployments for the Russian Navy mid-
decade, with only few exceptions.429 The 1990s would thus be characterized by a significant 
drop in operational activity, vast fleet decommissioning, and a stumbling and agonizingly 
slow construction of only two, distinct, new submarines. 
Within NATO, the years following the downfall of the Soviet Union were characterized by a 
desire to realize the peace dividend. Significant cut-backs in force numbers were enacted by 
most nations. As early as 1991, NATO issued a new strategic concept. The concept 
emphasized that the “threat of a simultaneous, full-scale attack” had effectively been 
removed, and that in contrast to the predominant threat of the past the Alliance now had to 
prepare to meet threats that were “multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional.”430 In naval 
terms, the focus on Russian submarine deployments more or less evaporated in parallel with 
the decline in Russian submarine activity.431 NATO’s new naval mission was “to ensure sea 
control in order to safeguard the Allies’ sea lines of communication, to support land and 
amphibious operations, and to protect the deployment of the Alliance’s sea-based 
deterrent.”432 Still maintaining a foot in deterrence operations and the mission to protect 
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SLOCs, we see an early turn towards support to Joint operations, with collaboration with air 
and land forces. 
Conceptual developments in the 1990s emphasised naval support to land operations and joint 
operations in the littorals, and downgraded anti-submarine warfare and anti-air warfare at 
sea.433 The stress was further placed on power projection, strategic nuclear deterrence, and a 
credible forward presence. With an increasing requirement for close joint coordination, ideas 
for interconnectedness provided the foundation for “network centric warfare.”434 In NATO 
the focus turned to understanding the new threat environment and manoeuvring towards 
Alliance expansion without increasing tensions with Russia. Russia had joined the North 
Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1991, and NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program 
three years later. Developments in the maritime domain were thus not a high priority within 
the Alliance, as such.435 
NATO’s large command & control structure of the Cold War was slowly but surely 
downsized to a fraction of its former size.436 As the Russian Navy’s operational activity in the 
Atlantic diminished, more focus was given to the Mediterranean, where Russian activity 
continued into the 1990s. A common interest in following Russian vessels in the 
Mediterranean led in 1994 to the establishment of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
organization based in Naples, called Commander Maritime Air Naples (CMAN). CMAN 
performed the overall coordination of national MPA missions in the Mediterranean. The 
national Maritime Air Control Authorities (MACA) would coordinate their missions through 
CMAN, but were ultimately in charge of their own assets during the respective missions. 
When NATO commenced its lone Article 5 operation, Operation Active Endeavour (OAE) in 
2001 in the Mediterranean following the 9/11 attacks on the USA, the CMAN construct 
constituted the backbone for coordination of MPA missions in that operation. Nations that 
deployed their MPA to Sicily, for example, and nations that flew in so-called direct support 
of the operation, were under command & control of CMAN for the (OAE) mission. The 
MACA construct did not apply outside the Mediterranean, however. In the North Atlantic, 
command & control coordination between the Americans at Keflavik, the British at Kinloss, 
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and the Norwegians at Andøya continued to be characterized by “friendly cooperation”, and 
based on the modus operandi for surveillance coordination established during the Cold 
War.437  
In the mid-90s, concerns were raised in Norwegian political circles regarding the validity of 
the self-imposed restrictions in Norwegian security policy. Among other activities in 1988, 
the substantial NATO Exercise, Teamwork 88 had raised concerns surrounding the possibility 
of Allied vessels capable of carrying nuclear weapons making port calls in Norway without 
explicitly confirming the absence of such weapons to the Norwegian government.438 The 
long-standing Norwegian basing policy forbade any storage of nuclear weapons in Norway 
during peacetime, and large exercises created uncertainties in this regard. There was a 
recognized requirement to review the restrictions in the context of the new security 
environment.439 The Norwegian government conducted an internal review of the self-imposed 
restrictions and national basing policy in 1995. This led to a few changes, such as the term 
“self-imposed restrictions” in several instances being replaced by the more flexible term 
“political guidelines.”440 The new description was more in line with both the dialogue 
between Norwegian and Russian authorities in the North that had been initiated after the Cold 
War, as well as the overarching thaw in the relationship between NATO and Russia. Instead 
of mentioning only “allied units”, the guidelines would henceforth cite “foreign units”, in 
order also to take into account countries operating under the new PfP construct.441 It was also 
important for Norwegian authorities not to restrict Allied activities, but rather stimulate allied 
activity within the framework of low tensions in the North. Before 1995, very few 
dispensations were given from the 24-degree restriction. After 1995, the Norwegian Ministry 
of Defence (MoD) could authorize Allied flights east of 24 degrees East. The objective of the 
guidelines was always to facilitate Allied activity and presence in combination with 
maintaining low tensions in the North.442 Norway had always been dependent on allied 
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activity as a part of her deterrence posture, but it was essential to put restrictions on this 
activity.443 In the new security environment, emphasis was even given to conducting joint 
Search and Rescue exercises with Russian units, to facilitate coordination and low tension in 
the High North.  
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, high-end Russian technology became available to 
whatever nation could afford it. Western strategists raised concerns over nations such as 
Libya, China, Iran and Algeria acquiring relatively capable, small, conventional diesel-
electric submarines, which would pose a credible threat in the littorals.444 The regular 
Keflavik Tactical Exercise (KEFTACEX) in the 1990s became an important event to practice 
this scenario. NATO MPAs were challenged against NATO conventional submarines. One 
important lesson that came out of the exercises of the 1990s was that upon detection of a 
small, conventional submarine the air crew had to prepare for attack immediately. The open-
ocean approach established during the Cold War of detection, localization, and tracking 
before settling into attack mode was no longer applicable when prosecuting a submarine in 
the littorals.445 The demanding acoustic environment with much ambient noise against the 
very quiet electric propulsion of the submarines required a quick attack while the chance was 
there – it might not come back. 
With the diminishing operational tempo of Russian submarines, there was a fear in the MPA 
community that lower priority would be given to ASW training and maintaining ASW 
capabilities and knowledge within the Alliance.446 This concern was justified. Missions 
increasingly entailed surveillance of smuggling, exercising joint and combined operations, 
littoral surface surveillance, and research and development. NATO tactics and procedures for 
ASW were still adjusted for Cold War strategic patrols of Russian SSBNs, as opposed to 
smaller submarines posing a threat closer to shore.447 Regular NATO exercises compensated 
for some of the reduction in adversary activities, although the exercises to an increasing 
degree focused on anti-surface engagements as opposed to anti-subsurface operations.448 A 
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lack of training opportunities was less prominent for the Norwegian aircrews that continued 
to cover the Barents Sea on a regular basis. After all, even with a severely reduced 
operational and exercise tempo, the Russians continued to execute missions, albeit of a local 
geographical nature. The downturn in operational activity on the part of the Russians had 
somewhat less of an impact on submarine exposure for the average Norwegian operator.449   
Over the years, the improvements made to the capabilities of MPA mostly involved existing 
sensors, such as improved capacity and memory of the central computers, more processing 
capacity for acoustic processors, and better navigational systems. Some improvement 
programs initiated in the late 1980s met with fiscal constraints in the 1990s, and together with 
schedule delays and cost overruns, several upgrade programs were cancelled.450 It seemed 
difficult to justify spending money on airborne ASW when the perception was that the threat 
had evaporated. In line with the new security environment and strategic development, the US 
Navy instead initiated the Anti-Surface Warfare Improvement Program (AIP) in 1994. The 
AIP upgrade included radar upgrades to both Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar (ISAR) and 
Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) capabilities, improved Electronic Support Measures (ESM), 
and the Advanced Imaging Multi-Spectral Sensor (AIMS) with a capable Electro-
Optical/Infra-Red (EO/IR) camera. The AIP aircraft were also equipped with the AGM-85E 
Stand-off Land Attack Missile (SLAM) and the AGM-65D/F Maverick missile. The upgraded 
aircraft were given a SATCOM capability and a communications suite that facilitated closer 
integration with the joint force. A limited number of AIP aircraft also had the Tactical 
Common Data Link (TCDL), which enabled real-time streaming of sensors from the aircraft 
to other units.451 In the mid-1990s, a few selected US Navy P-3 Orions were also updated 
through the new Command, Control, Computers and Communications for ASW (C4 for 
ASW) programme. This included tactical data link through the Link-16, and satellite 
connectivity through an encrypted INMARSAT connection.452 These innovations reflect 
efforts to achieve greater integration of MPA with other warfare assets and domains. The US 
Navy initiated studies in the 1990s to find a replacement for the aging P-3C Orion, and the 
decision was made in 2004 to replace the latter with the P-8 Poseidon, a modified and 
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militarized Boeing 737 jet aircraft.453 A UK MoD study in the early 1990s similarly evaluated 
options to replace the Nimrod MR2 that in essence mirrored the alternatives of the 
Americans, including a P-3 option.454 The decision was made in 1996 to build the Nimrod 
MR4 as a continuation of the MR2, with significant upgrades to the entire aircraft, including 
the airframe and the sensor suite.455  
The Norwegian P-3C Orion fleet was also upgraded at the end of the 1990s through the 
Upgrade Improvement Program (UIP), largely mirroring the American AIP suite. The 
mission for the Norwegian Orions was thus still to monitor the Russian Northern Fleet and its 
submarines in the High North. The Norwegian Orions were therefore not upgraded with the 
aforementioned TCDL system. Nor were the Norwegian aircraft upgraded to carry missiles. 
The Norwegian P-3 Orion UIP included several Norwegian specific solutions and sensors, 
such as a dedicated ESM/ELINT station.456 The US Navy has flown the P-3 Orion for ASW 
and acoustic intelligence (ACINT) missions, and the EP-3 Aries for SIGINT collection. The 
Norwegians only had one type of operational MPA, and the Norwegian UIPs could thus be 
seen as a hybrid between the American P-3 Orion and the EP-3 Aries. The UIP model 
included a significant upgrade to the radar, the ESM suite, the computer processing 
capability, GPS installation, improved self-protection systems and SATCOM.457 The tailored 
Norwegian stations and the consequent low volume of spare parts for the sensors led to costly 
and time-consuming upgrades of a very customized aircraft in the 2000s. Throughout the 
entire period since the UIP upgrade, the Norwegian MPA community has struggled to get a 
hold of spare parts. The discussion of replacing the Orions began in earnest in the late 2000s, 
but would take six years to come to a conclusion.458 
It was not until the 1990s that unmanned aircraft technology matured to the point that capable 
systems could be controlled from the other side of the world, and be integrated with 
conventional land or maritime forces. And Operation Desert Storm in 1991 raised new 
requirements for ISR. Several targets were attacked simultaneously in a systematic fashion, 
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with targets “linked” through their relative importance to the Iraqi regime and 
infrastructure.459 This demanded almost instant information on target updates and attack 
results, so-called Battle Damage Assessment (BDA). Satellite imagery was neither responsive 
nor flexible enough. This opened the door for what is termed “organic assets” to conduct 
intelligence gathering, such as the Pioneer unmanned aircraft.460 Based on these operations, 
combined with historical strategic airborne intelligence gathering, the concept for a long-
endurance unmanned aircraft was born in the early 1990s. This idea would eventually lead to 
the Global Hawk drone flying with the US Air Force today, and the Alliance Ground 
Surveillance (AGS) system about to become operational for NATO.461 
Satellite operations had been prohibitive for most nations in a least two aspects: cost and the 
level of technology required. The 1990s were characterized by the proliferation and further 
miniaturization of satellite technology, and an abrupt decrease in cost associated with 
developmental breakthroughs. Globalization created a global market for satellite services, 
which in turn facilitated a market for launch services. A combination of these factors have led 
to what is today termed “New Space.”462 “Old Space” was the realm of the few nations that 
could afford the immense investments required to send big, heavy satellites into orbit. “New 
Space” is for all nations, commercial companies, universities and anyone that sees benefit or 
profit in satellite services. New Space has facilitated new possibilities in the realm of 
maritime surveillance, as we shall see. 
Fewer Russian submarine deployments led to fewer intelligence collection opportunities for 
NATO surveillance aircraft. It did not take long until MPA squadrons were explicitly tasked 
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to perform duties that diverged from wartime MPA roles, such as postal drops in remote 
locations and ice edge reconnaissance.463 Mission areas into the mid-1990s turned more 
towards NATO ASW exercises with an emphasis on quiet diesel-electric submarines and 
surface surveillance, training with national forces such as transiting aircraft carrier battle 
groups, long-range navigation training and ice reconnaissance.464  
US squadrons that had deployed to Iceland increasingly sent detachments to the 
Mediterranean.465 The British had always paid attention to the Baltic with regards to maritime 
surveillance, and this effort continued into the 1990s with operational missions flown out of 
Nordholz, Germany.466 MPAs that flew daily to maintain awareness of the whereabouts of the 
Soviet Navy during the Cold War were, utilized in operations that did not entail ASW at 
all.467 American Orions and British Nimrods took part in operations Desert Shield and Desert 
Storm during the first Gulf War in 1991, as well as in the NATO embargo operation in the 
Adriatic Operation Sharp Guard during the war on Serbia in 1992.468 Balkan engagements 
culminated in the controversial Operation Allied Force in the spring of 1999, which saw an 
MPA fire land-attack missiles in a live operation for the first time.469 The Balkan and Adriatic 
operations served as catalysts for increased utilization of MPA in an over-land role.470 
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6.3 The 2000s – Russian ambitions and Western expeditionary warfare 
When Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000 he halted the decline of the Navy, and later 
reversed it.471 He continued cooperation with NATO at the same time as he channelled more 
funds towards restructuring of and investments in the military. The new president saw the 
need for an explicit naval strategy. That same year he promulgated a new National Security 
Concept and a new naval doctrine. The naval doctrine emphasized the “qualitative renewal” 
of the forces, and old systems would be replaced by new ones in the coming decades.472 With 
the Russian economy taking a slight upturn at the time of issue, the naval doctrine demanded 
the renewal of outdated submarines and surface vessels, development of multi-role, ship-
based as well as land-based aircraft, increased readiness, improved command & control 
systems, the reduction of diversity in systems and improved standardization of weapons 
systems production.473 The doctrine also emphasized the requirement for information systems 
and smart weapons. Critics underlined, however, that the doctrine attempted to “preserve at 
least the appearance of a navy worthy of a superpower, even at the cost of sacrificing quality 
and safety.”474 The doctrine was seemingly aimed at pleasing hawks in the Kremlin, without 
having any obvious impact on NATO strategy. 
In 2007-2008 there was a pivot towards what can be termed a Cold War mentality in the 
military and political leadership in Russia. This became evident both through rhetoric and 
military posture. One example is Vladimir Putin’s speech at the Munich Security Conference 
in 2007, where he attacked the “architecture of global security”, the United States’ “disdain 
for basic principles of international law”, and accused NATO of moving in on Russian 
borders from the West.475 The new military posture was manifested not only through 
possessing the largest stockpile of nuclear weapons in the world and showing an increased 
interest in them, but also through an increase in exercises and test missile launches.476 In late 
2007/early 2008, the Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft carier led a two-month task force 
deployment from the Baretns Sea to the Mediterranean. The goal of the deployment was “to 
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ensure naval presence in tactically important regions of the world oceans.”477 And to 
underline the renewed importance of strategic assets. Oil revenues had facilitated a 150% 
increase in spending for the strategic nuclear forces since the early 2000s.478 But with the 
immense backlog in maintenance of aging vessels, what can be termed overambitious 
political goals at the beginning of the century were still not met by matching levels of 
funding.479 This negatively impacted modernization efforts.  
The Georgian war in 2008 would show Russian leadership the state-of-affairs in the Russian 
military: poor ability to mobilize, inflexible leadership, poorly trained conscripts and lack of 
synchronization of units.480 The deficiencies led to expedited modernization programs for 
new equipment, readiness and command & control.481 Russian land forces began executing 
snap exercises regularly, in order to improve readiness.482 Russia had also initiated work to 
modernize existing strategic nuclear weapons, the finalization of which would become 
permissible only after the START Treaty expired in 2009. As a consequence, the aging Delta 
IV class was fitted with the new SS-N-23 Sineva strategic missile. In September 2008, the 
Russian Navy finally conducted a successful test-firing of a SS-N-32 Bulava missile, 
indicating that the operationalization of the new Dolgorukiy class SSBN was approaching. 
This test-firing was, however, followed by several failed firings, further delaying the 
program. In mid-2009, a Delta IV class SSBN test-launched two SS-N-23 Sineva missiles 
from a position close to the North Pole. According to Russian sources, the Delta IV was 
escorted and protected by a task force of several nuclear-powered attack submarines.483  
In 2009, Russia also published her new national Arctic strategy. The most important aspects 
of the strategy were exploitation of natural resources, securing Russia’s borders, and 
strengthening international cooperation in the region. Russia has maintained significant 
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cooperation with Norway with regards to common regulations of fish stocks in the 
Norwegian and the Barents Sea, which extends back to the height of the Cold War. The 
financial setback of 2008 did not affect the implementation of the strategy to any mentionable 
degree.484 There seemed, however, to be a lack of a distinguishable mission for the Russian 
Navy.485  
The financial crisis of 2008 put a brake on the force modernization program.486 However, 
facilitated by an improved fiscal foundation by 2010, the Russians published a new military 
strategy that year. Significant weapons programs were initiated aiming for an overhaul of 
70% of the prioritized units of the armed forces by 2020. The new National Security Strategy 
aimed to clarify Russia’s nuclear weapons employment policy, and how Russian forces 
would be utilized in a modern, complex, and nuanced threat environment.487  
The Dolgorukiy class SSBN was finally accepted by the navy in January of 2013 after more 
than a decade and a half in development, production and testing.488 The issues delaying 
particularly the SS-N-32 Bulava (range 4,600 nm/8,500 km) missiles’ acceptance onto the 
vessel was said to be associated with technical malfunctions and quality control issues in final 
assembly.489 The first Dolgorukiy class commenced its first operational patrol in the fall of 
2014.490 
The modernization of the non-strategic nuclear capability seems, however, to be centred 
around the introduction of the Severodvinsk class SSGN. The Severodvinsk class multi-
purpose submarine also took 17 years to complete.491 The mission of the Severodvinsk is 
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ASW, ASuW, and land-attack missions. The first Severodvinsk class submarine was finally 
declared combat-ready in early 2016. Although not quite at quiet as her American 
counterparts, the new Russian SSGN is considered to be the least detectable of the vessels in 
the Russian Navy order of battle.492 An important feature with non-strategic nuclear forces, 
however, is that they are able to carry both nuclear and conventional missiles. Important 
aspects of this are both intentional and unintentional signalling and posture.493 This ambiguity 
can lead to strategic uncertainty on the part of the adversary. A significant area of emphasis 
for Russia is to make herself less unilaterally dependent on nuclear weapons for regional and 
global deterrence. Focus is therefore given to developing conventional precision-guided, 
long-range weapons, in addition to the ability to utilize and exploit all the state’s elements of 
power in a crisis situation.494 The development of the nuclear capable Kalibr family of 
missiles that can be placed on nuclear as well as conventional attack submarines, stand out as 
a centre-point for Russian doctrinal development. 
By the year 2000 nearly two thirds of the Russian SSBN fleet had been withdrawn from 
service. The Russian Navy was able to maintain one SSBN on strategic patrol in the Arctic 
and one in the Pacific, although there were periods lasting up to three months at a time where 
there were no patrols at all due to safety concerns.495 These were well justified. In August 
2000 the Oscar class SSGN Kursk sank in the Barents Sea, prompting a further decrease in 
operational tempo on Russian submarines.496 In 2001, the Russian Navy conducted one 
strategic submarine patrol; and in 2002 it conducted none.497 Russian submarine activity 
would eventually start to recover, and in 2005 the Russian Navy conducted five strategic 
patrols. Several of those were concurrent, meaning that Russia in the 2000s did not have a 
continuous operational sea-based strategic deterrent. However, by 2009 the patrol tempo of 
Russian strategic submarines had risen to nine patrols per year. But the amount of patrols 
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would once again drop in the following years.498 In 2007, Russia’s attack and cruise missile 
submarines increased their patrols to seven patrols, an increase from four patrols the previous 
year. These submarines had averaged roughly 12 patrols a year during the 1990s.499  
NATO issued a revised strategic concept concurrent with the war against Serbia in 1999.500 
This revision emphasised mobile and flexible forces with endurance to operate in 
expeditionary operations. Specific tasks for the different services were downplayed, and 
emphasis was given to joint operations.501 Cooperation between NATO and Russia continued 
through the NATO-Russian Founding Act of 1997, and deepened further in 2002 with the 
establishment of the NATO-Russia Council. By then, Russian submarine patrols in the 
Atlantic had been more or less discontinued.502 NATO’s relationship to Russia had morphed 
into an explicit political framework for security cooperation. It seems evident that changes to 
threats and threat perceptions induce changes to strategic thinking. The revised Russian 
strategy of the early 2000s was not backed by new equipment or expanded operations. The 
9/11 attacks in 2001 on the USA were therefore the primary factor shaping the focus of the 
strategic discussions of NATO.503 The Alliance continued to focus on expeditionary warfare 
while making changes to its command structure, which among other things led to the 
disestablishment in 2003 of SACLANT in Norfolk, VA, USA.504 This removed the sole 
headquarters that maintained a primary focus and responsibility on the Atlantic, with an 
emphasis on the Russian Northern Fleet. SACLANT had the peacetime responsibility for 
contingency plans, force requirements, exercises, and strategic and doctrinal development in 
the Atlantic area. The removal of SACLANT from the NATO Command Structure seems to 
have played a part in the atrophy of ASW skills within the Alliance in the decade that 
followed. In what was likely a combination of faith in emerging technology, a focus on the 
Middle East, and the lack of Russian operational submarine deployments, the Americans 
closed down Keflavik as a naval air base in 2006. American ASW command & control was 
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pulled back to the East coast for the Atlantic. The British continued to fly out of Kinloss in 
Scotland, with command & control situated in Northwood, London. 
The 9/11 attacks on the USA in 2001 for the first time led to a member nation calling for 
Alliance members’ support through NATO’s Article 5.505 The ensuing operation, Operation 
Active Endeavour (OAE), was launched in late 2001, and was a maritime anti-terror 
operation, with the tasks of tracking and controlling ships in the Mediterranean.506 MPAs 
were used extensively in OAE. In addition to US squadrons from Keflavik, the 
Mediterranean NATO nations routinely supported the operation. So did, for the first time, the 
Norwegian P-3 Orion squadron, as it deployed to Sicily to support as well.  
An overwhelming focus on the Middle East in the mid-2000s had led to a sentiment in 
Norwegian security policy circles of reduced focus on the maritime domain, particularly in 
the High North. Norway did not deploy Orions to the Middle East, but sent them to the 
Mediterranean in support of OAE in 2005 and 2006. In September 2008, the Norwegian 
Minister of Defence presented at an informal ministerial meeting in London a paper on 
raising NATO’s profile in the member states. The initiative sought a better balance between 
out-of-area operations with in-area activities, and emphasized the importance of revitalizing 
collective defence and deterrence. In Norwegian terms, this meant an increased NATO focus 
on the North Atlantic.507 After the paper had been presented, NATO initiated work to 
strengthen the links between the NATO Command Structure and the military establishments 
in the member nations. Progress, however, was slow, as was the implementation of changes 
in NATO activities. A key difference from the Cold War was the wide array of threat 
perceptions within the Alliance, as opposed to the one, common threat in the past that 
provided a focus for all Alliance members. 
However, even with a more forward-leaning Russia (the Munich speech, the Georgia war), 
there were other pressing challenges elsewhere. By 2009, NATO had initiated Operation 
Allied Protector off the Horn of Africa at the request of the UN, in order to counter piracy 
and armed robbery at sea.508 MPAs, including Norwegian units, were extensively utilized in 
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order to build a pattern-of-life both ashore and at sea.509 Later in 2009, however, NATO 
declared that “developments in the High North have generated increased international 
attention.”510 Concurrently, sporadic reports emerged of Russian submarines patrolling the 
East coast of the United States.511 A recognition of a requirement for a renewed focus on anti-
submarine warfare thus started to gain traction within the Alliance starting in 2010.512 This, 
however, was never reflected through changes in long-term investment among the Alliance 
members.513  
In 2010, NATO also revised its strategic concept.514 The concept built further on force 
flexibility and international stabilization efforts, but incorporated more aspects of defending 
Alliance territory than the previous one.515 Important to Norwegian security politics, the 
strategic concepts incorporated several elements from the Norwegian initiative from 2008. 
Among these were an increased focus on situational awareness and early warning, a closer 
linkage between national headquarters and the NATO Command Structure, improved 
readiness times for NATO forces, and the execution of more regular and relevant 
exercises.516 All of these elements were emphasised to an increasing degree in the Alliance in 
the coming decade. The Norwegian initiative and active engagement with other Alliance 
members on such issues were not the only factors that played into the restructuring of NATO 
in the 2010s, but they certainly seem to have played a significant role. In 2011 the Alliance 
Maritime Strategy was issued, with a combined emphasis on expeditionary warfare at 
distance, and security operations closer to home. 517 Further changes to the NATO Command 
Structure were initiated in 2010-2012.518 The two maritime commands in Naples, Italy, and 
Northwood, UK, were consolidated into one, single maritime command at Northwood, 
namely the Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM). Up until then, Naples had been in 
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charge of the Mediterranean and surrounding areas to the south and east, such as the Indian 
Ocean and counter-piracy operations. Northwood were in charge of the English Channel, the 
Baltic, and the Atlantic, to a larger extent focussing on exercises. Now, Northwood was in 
charge of all things maritime, with only one office in charge of coordinating maritime air 
affairs, that of Commander Maritime Air NATO (COMMARAIRNATO). Building on the 
MACA construct from the Mediterranean, COMMARAIRNATO had to adjust to a smaller 
command structure in addition to an increased geographical area of responsibility. 
COMMARAIRNATO’s focus areas stretched from north of Norway, to the Baltic, the 
Mediterranean, and all the way down to the Indian Ocean. Described in detail in MARCOM’s 
classified document Alliance Maritime Governance from 2016, COMMARAIRNATO sought 
to exercise his command & control through a distributed network of national MACAs and 
other national command and control constructs, named the “Maritime Air Network.”519 The 
NATO command structure did not have any dedicated ASW forces nor a mandate to 
coordinate them in peacetime outside of exercises. ASW in peacetime had always been 
coordinated by the respective national headquarters, although interaction and coordination 
between these headquarters certainly continued. 
The PNI from 1991 together with the START I Treaty had prevented Russia and the United 
States from placing tactical nuclear submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) on attack 
submarines.520 START I expired in December 2009, and in early 2011, the two nations ratified 
the New START Treaty, in which both countries committed to further reduction in deployed 
strategic nuclear weapons, as well as an improved inspection regime.521 The latter was also 
specifically emphasized in NATO’s Strategic Concept the previous year.522 NATO also 
pointed to the disparity between the Russian and Western non-strategic nuclear weapon 
stockpile and their deployment close to NATO countries’ borders. More importantly for this 
thesis, however, the New START Treaty of 2010 did not put any limitations on placing 
SLCMs on attack submarines. The treaty solely focusses on capping the deployed strategic 
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warheads allowed on long-range delivery vehicles.523 As a result, the Russian SLCM 
capability has now risen to be one of the main naval threats towards US and European 
targets.   
After 9/11, NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan drove force requirements, budgets, and 
consumed the general attention of the Alliance.524 A wide array of troops and weapons 
systems were deployed to the Middle East, and MPAs were no exception. The counter-
insurgency operations were intelligence demanding and intelligence driven, and the 
requirement for airborne intelligence assets were more or less insatiable throughout. This 
high demand for ISR services were a root cause of the explosion in utilization of unmanned 
ISR platforms in the 2000s.525 And as MPAs were increasingly being deployed for over-land 
missions, they were tasked to operate in a fundamentally different surface-to-air threat 
environment. This demanded a new approach to missile defence and self-protection. The new 
threat environment led to the installation of improved self-protection systems.526 The 
migration to over-land missions in the 1990s and the 2000s seems to have been facilitated by 
a symbiosis between operational demands and the MPA community adapting to a new threat 
environment. The aircraft was increasingly being tasked to fly over-land missions because 
they already carried the sensors that could support those missions. The dangerous element of 
such flexibility towards the mission portfolio is that knowledge and competence for niche 
missions and capabilities are perishable and will atrophy. This, critics claim, is what has 
happened to the NATO ASW capability in general, and to the NATO airborne long-range 
ASW capability, specifically.527  
In spite of a decreasing strategic focus on adversary submarines at the turn of the century, the 
United States Office of Naval Research (ONR) initiated work on developing Multistatic 
Active Coherent (MAC) technology for airborne assets in the early 2000s.528 In order to meet 
the challenge of increasingly quiet adversary submarines, so-called multistatic systems have 
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been developed that enable a search for a submerged target under difficult acoustic 
conditions. Monostatic acoustic systems consist of one active buoy that sends out a sound and 
searches for a return. Bistatic systems consist of two platforms, for example two ships or two 
separate buoys, where one platform is the active one and the other is the passive.529  
 
 
Figure 6-1. Monostatic and bistatic systems. 530 
Multistatic systems have several passive platforms or buoys, and often more than one active 
or explosive buoy. The system will note the timing of the transmitted sounds, and then record 
the returns on all the passive sensors. This will give the computer the opportunity to 
triangulate the position of the enemy submarine. These are capable systems, but they have 
their limitations. The multistatic systems are active and reveal the presence of the ASW force. 
Multistatic systems are also not as efficient in littoral waters, due to false and confusing 
returns from other elements than submarines. Also, fresh water, differences in temperature, 
turbulence and currents in the littorals will create layers in the water, which complicate all 
types of acoustic searches, no matter how efficient they are.531 But with further development 
of both buoys and processing systems, MAC systems are expected to have a significant 
impact on modern ASW in the near future. 
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Figure 6-2. Multistatic systems.532 
The technology will be a welcome addition to any ASW asset whenever the use of active 
buoys is required. MAC technology has been further refined and developed, and will be 
installed on the P-8 Poseidon.533 The US Navy decision to procure the P-8 Poseidon MPA is 
a significant leap forward in terms of sensors capacities, such as the radar, the EO/IR and the 
ESM system.534 The acoustic suite brings a significant improvement to the processing 
capacity, and the tactical computer provides a full tactical picture of the battlespace the 
aircraft is operating in for every crew station. This is crucial for, among other things, the 
MAC concept just discussed. With regards to communications, the P-8 is set up with 
SATCOM, UHF, VHF, HF and Link-16.535 The Link-16 provides a near instantaneous 
sharing of data with other elements for the forces that are connected to the network.  
In the mid-2000s, the US Navy underlined the requirement for airborne wide-area, ocean 
surveillance, in order to monitor ship traffic and military naval movements worldwide. The 
concept was termed Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS), and set the requirement for 
a capability that could provide persistent coverage in any weather, and be able to investigate 
targets in a manner that other strategic assets, such as satellites, could not. As a supplement to 
MPAs, unmanned technology was pursued. In 2008, the US Navy moved ahead with a 
derivative of the Global Hawk drone. The aircraft was modified to carry a maritime radar 
with 360-degree coverage, electro-optic camera providing full-motion video and an 
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Automatic Identification System (AIS) receiver. It was constructed for long-range surface 
surveillance, but was not capable of conducting underwater search. Additionally, the drone 
had its wings and fuselage strengthened in order to enable descent to lower altitudes, which 
would entail both more turbulence and icing conditions compared to the high-altitude 
operations of the Global Hawk.536 The drone was given the interim name BAMS-
Demonstrator, BAMS-D. One BAMS-D aircraft deployed to the Arabian Gulf in support of 
naval operations there, and proved its relevance to naval commanders through updating 
emerging threats and targets over the horizon.537 Satellites and organic assets to the naval 
force were unable to provide similar services with corresponding speeds and update intervals.  
As a continuation of the New Space movement of the 1990s, space-based maritime 
surveillance also continued to grow in the 2000s. Although not able to penetrate below water, 
space-based sensors provide a crucial element of the total picture when compiling maritime 
situational awareness. The NOSS constitutes the US Navy’s main space-based ELINT 
capability and provides an emission based, global maritime surface picture.538 The DSP from 
the 1970s was replaced with the Space-Based IR System (SBIRS), which is still operating in 
support of air and missile defence.539 Other systems for SIGINT have been derived from the 
satellites launched in the 1970s, and as naval vessels for the most part are underway, the most 
prominent surveillance tool from space is based on SIGINT.540 The most obvious 
downgrading factor of electro-optical systems is that of cloud coverage disturbing the line-of-
sight between the satellite and the target. Radar imaging systems penetrate clouds, and do not 
have this problem. A prominent radar imaging satellite system launched by the United States 
in 2010 is the TOPAZ, which will likely be replaced by a new generation of surveillance 
satellites in the near future.541 The targets of surveillance, however, have for the most part 
been static infrastructure and sites of activity on land and close to the shore. Ports, shipyards 
and docks are obviously important elements of maritime surveillance, but they are not the 
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primary subject of surveillance when fleets or submarines are at sea. The more adaptive and 
flexible asset for surveillance and reconnaissance of submarines is still, however, the MPA in 
its primary role. 
 
6.4 The 2010s – Annexation of Crimea and renewed tensions 
In March 2014 Russia illegally annexed the Crimean peninsula of Ukraine, which changed 
NATO-Russia relations for the foreseeable future.”542 The Russians revised their national 
strategy in December 2014. It is defensive in nature; NATO is still portrayed as the most 
pressing threat to Russia’s existence, and calculated ambiguity is a prominent feature of the 
document.543 The strategy did, however, take into account new fiscal constraints that arose 
both from external sanctions due to the situation in Ukraine and from internal economic 
turmoil and slow growth.544 Even before the sanctions imposed in response to the Crimean 
annexation, the decline in oil prices had complicated the Russian military’s ambitious 
modernisation plans.545 And even in times of economic growth under Putin, the significant 
funds allocated to the Navy were simply not enough to recover from the massive naval 
decline of the 1990s. There remained significant backlogs of maintenance, training, and 
dismantlement tasks.546 In 2015, a new Russian maritime doctrine was released, to be in 
effect through 2020. The document focussed on a variety of issues, of which naval activities 
were but one fraction of the national portfolio of tasks and interests, such as exploitation of 
natural resources, climatological issues, and fisheries science. The national maritime doctrine 
in fact tells us little about the role of the Navy.547 In order to gain an understanding of that 
role, particularly in relation to the Northern Fleet, one instead needs to keep track of Russian 
exercises and weapons testing in the High North. And this is where the requirement for a 
renewed MPA fleet comes into play.  
After the Russian Crimean annexation, the Alliance initiated the NATO Readiness Action 
Plan, which included increased readiness of the NATO Response Force, and the initiation of 
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a range of Immediate Assurance Measures. These consisted of an increased presence and 
forward posture, including “maritime patrol aircraft flights along our eastern borders.”548 
Through the Alliance Maritime Strategy, the importance of the maritime domain was 
referenced as growing in relevance both geopolitically and economically.549    
In 2016 the NATO Alliance reiterated its dismay with Russian aggression and posture, with 
particular emphasis on Ukraine and Crimea.550 NATO enhanced its posture and presence 
along the Eastern periphery and cancelled all civilian and military cooperation with Russia, 
whilst remaining open for dialogue. The maritime domain was given enhanced attention, and 
NATO recognized both the Baltic and the Black Sea as challenging regions requiring close 
cooperation and support, and increased situational awareness. The North Atlantic was 
described in terms recognizable from the Cold War years: 
“…the Alliance will be ready to deter and defend against any potential threats, 
including against sea lines of communication and maritime approaches of NATO 
territory. In this context, we will further strengthen our maritime posture and 
comprehensive situational awareness.”551 
But in introducing the term “strategic anticipation” (as opposed to “indications and 
warnings”), the importance of overall enhanced situational awareness is underlined, 
“particularly in the east, the south, and in the North Atlantic. Our ability to understand, 
track, and ultimately, anticipate, the actions of potential adversaries through Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and comprehensive intelligence 
arrangements is increasingly important.”552   
A set of questions from the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee forwarded to the 
Norwegian MoD in 2016 included two on the military guidelines on foreign military activity 
in Norway. The MoD emphasised in its response that the restrictions have played a 
fundamental part in Norwegian security policy since the 1950s, manifesting a key tool in the 
balancing act between deterrence and assurance towards Russia. The explicit response was 
that 
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“All Allied flying missions over Finnmark with foreign military aircraft 
further East than 24 degrees East, with the exception of transport and 
passenger aircraft, shall be approved by the Ministry of Defence. There is an 
absolute limitation in place for foreign military aircraft, with the exception of 
transport and passenger aircraft, to fly east of 28 degrees East.”553 
This was a reaffirmation of past restrictions. In its effort to stimulate Allied activities in the 
North Atlantic, it will be interesting to follow the Norwegian Government’s approach to the 
24-degree restriction in the future. Possibly a more important question is, however, how the 
Norwegian government will handle foreign assets operating in the Barents Sea that has 
launched from bases outside of Norwegian territory. Unmanned, long-endurance aircraft, for 
example, can easily launch from abroad and operate in the Barents Sea for extended periods 
of time.554  
The Commander of MARCOM pointed in 2017 to increased Russian activities, he 
emphasized that NATO was attempting to reverse the general atrophy in ASW competency, 
among other things by prioritizing ASW exercises.555 By the following year, it was 
recognized at the strategic level of NATO that there was a requirement for an increased focus 
on ASW, a notion gaining traction with many nations, not least the USA, the UK and 
Norway.556 The “collective maritime warfighting skills in key areas” were to be reinvigorated, 
with emphasis on “anti-submarine warfare, amphibious operations, and protection of sea 
lines of communications.”557 In the summer of 2018, NATO announced several changes to its 
command structure. The most noteworthy of which in the context of the North Atlantic was 
the establishment of a Joint Force Command in Norfolk, USA, to “focus on protecting the 
transatlantic lines of communication.”558 The requirement for a refocussing on ASW included 
an acknowledgement that ASW is a “combined arms” endeavour, requiring multiple forces 
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working closely in an integrated manner. The MPA cannot go it alone, neither can the ASW 
frigate, nor the lone submarine. It will thus not be sufficient to procure one or two new ASW 
assets – a systemic approach is required to handle modern ASW challenges.559  
In the UK, the MR4 development program was costly and fell significantly behind schedule. 
In addition, a Nimrod MR2 deployed to Afghanistan crashed in 2009, claiming the lives of 11 
crewmembers. The ensuing accident investigation pointed to significant systemic faults in 
many areas from procurement to aircraft maintenance. Combined with the significant cost-
overruns of the MR4 program, the review seems to have played a prominent role in the 
cancelling of the Nimrod program in the Strategic Defense and Security Review (SDSR) of 
2010. The primary reason for the MR4 cancellation was economic. However, the MoD 
officially regretted the decision. The hastened decision to scrap the Nimrod on economic 
grounds was quickly undermined by the clear strategic requirement for maritime surveillance 
a long-range ASW capability. The MoD therefore established the “Seedcorn Initiative” in 
2011, which consisted of Royal Air Force personnel being sent to allied air forces to operate 
maritime surveillance aircraft in order to maintain and develop surveillance and anti-
submarine warfare skills. It would also shorten the time required to regenerate an airborne 
ASW organization in spite of several years of lacking this capability.560 In what is likely the 
most humiliating occurrence in the history of British maritime air operations, the UK had to 
call on France and Canada for support in 2015 in the search for a Russian submarine 
operating off the Scottish coast, close to Faslane, the home port of the British strategic 
nuclear submarines.561 The new SDSR in 2015 assessed that Great Britain could no longer 
live without an airborne maritime ISR capability. The decision was presented to procure nine 
P-8 Poseidon, with the goal of flying them operationally by 2019.562  
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In the 2010s, uncertainties arose in Norway as to whether the Orions should continue to go 
through costly upgrades, or be replaced by a new aircraft such as the P-8 Poseidon. The 
comprehensive review of the force structure in 2014 and 2015 led to the Chief of Defence 
(CHOD) White Paper in 2015, which recommended the discontinuation of the P-3 Orion fleet 
after its operational lifetime, and proposed its replacement by medium altitude/long 
endurance (MALE) unmanned aircraft.563 By design, the CHOD white paper was a 
recommendation to the Norwegian MoD. However, because of the processes of the long-term 
plan development at the strategic level in the Norwegian Defence Staff, political 
considerations concerning security policy were not adequately incorporated in the CHOD’s 
formal advice to the Minister of Defence. The main emphasis was rather put on long-term 
economic sustainability. Thus, when the proposal to phase out the P-3 Orions was made in 
2015, it was made without adequate security policy considerations.564  
One of the Norwegian Armed Forces’ primary tasks is to conduct intelligence operations, 
conduct resource and traffic management in areas under Norwegian jurisdiction, and claim 
sovereignty by showing presence in areas of national interest.565 The fact that it might take 
some time before Allied support can arrive in Norway only emphasizes the importance of 
early warning, or strategic anticipation.566 When the Norwegian government discusses 
national contributions to the Alliance, the surveillance effort in the High North is regularly 
brought forward as one of the most important NATO contributions.567 In addition, the notion 
that intelligence represents political capital has increasingly gained traction also in the 
civilian community in Norway.568 With the Government’s explicit ambition to prioritize the 
High North and the nation’s maritime areas and resources, political traction was gained to 
maintain the P-3s and to consider a replacement, as opposed to the military advice from the 
CHOD to replace them with drones. Airborne drones are not capable of conducting 
underwater search for submarines, although they are expected to achieve this in the near 
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future. This means that replacing the Norwegian MPAs with drones would remove the 
national long-range airborne ASW capability, a capability recognized as being of strategic 
importance to Norway. The ensuing Long-Term Planning (LTP) process at the Norwegian 
MoD in the spring of 2016 thus overturned the P-3 proposal: Norway would instead replace 
the P-3 Orions with a new fleet of P-8 Poseidons.569 The official explanation underlined that 
the maritime domain and the High North have always been fundamental to Norwegian 
security politics.570 Norwegian and adjacent maritime areas are seven times the size of the 
Norwegian land mass, and the distances are vast. “These areas have regained their military-
strategic importance, and there are no indications on this changing in the near future. The 
new security policy situation requires improved situational awareness in our areas of 
interest.”571 The Norwegian Government also pointed to the international dimension in their 
justification for procuring the P-8. As NATO is increasingly focussing on the maritime 
domain, maritime patrol aircraft have become a sought-after resource. As a nation with 
significant maritime interests, it is of fundamental importance that Norway contributes to 
“ensuring freedom of navigation on the high seas, particularly for the transatlantic sea lines 
of communication, which are fundamental to allied safety and security.”572 Finally, it is 
emphasized that the “combination of a new security policy realm and new generations of 
submarines entail that modern sensors and systems for surveillance are paramount.”573 The 
Norwegian MoD deemed the deliveries from the MPA fleet too important to cut. It was thus a 
political decision to override the advice of the CHOD.574 The LTP for the Norwegian Armed 
Forces was published in the spring of 2016, and additionally included the decision to shut 
down Andøya airbase and move the MPA fleet to Evenes airbase.575   
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In monitoring Russian testing and development activities from the air, Norway depends on 
her MPAs. However, according to reports in the media, the Norwegian MPA capability is 
somewhat limping into the future as of 2020. Sensors upgrades and airframe improvements 
have been discontinued due to the incoming new aircraft, causing challenges to maintain 
experienced personnel.576 The latter seems to be partly due to the decision in the current LTP 
to close down Andøya airbase and establish the new P-8 capability at Evenes airbase.577 
These challenges have been acknowledged by the MoD, and the focus is to get the P-8 
operational as soon as possible after 2023.578 
After a few years of operational experimentation, testing and evaluation in the US Navy, the 
large unmanned aircraft BAMS-D was given the name Triton, and the technical designation 
MQ-4. The US Navy decided that the Triton would complement the Poseidon as a part of the 
overarching BAMS approach mentioned earlier. From focussing on expeditionary warfare on 
land in the 2000s, the US Navy were in the 2010s returning to a holistic approach to maritime 
airborne surveillance. In addition to manned and unmanned systems, space-based 
surveillance has increasingly become an integrated part of maritime surveillance. Through 
New Space there are now several capable commercial surveillance services available, such as 
Airbus, Planet, or Digital Globe. These provide imagery with resolution down to a few 
centimetres, with obvious intelligence value.579 They are for the most, however, focussed over 
land and near shore, and have limited value in the search for submarines. The New Space 
environment facilitated Norway launching her own satellite for maritime surveillance in 
2012; a micro-satellite that carries an AIS receiver.580 New Space, as we shall see, has also 
facilitated the planned broadband communications satellite that Norway will launch in 2023. 
 
576 See for example Kjetil Stormark, “Bare ETT Operativt Overvåkningsfly,” Aldrimer.No, October 29, 2016, 
https://www.aldrimer.no/norge-har-bare-ett-operativt-overvakingsfly/. 
577 Andreas Budalen and Beth Pettersen, “Orion-Flyene Er På Vingene Igjen,” NRK (Online), November 8, 
2016, https://www.nrk.no/nordland/orion-flyene-er-pa-vingene-igjen-1.13216832. Although also located in the 
High North, Evenes is too far from Andøya for anyone to engage in a daily commute. The move therefore 
means that the personnel has to move, or lose their workplace 
578 Stortinget, “Skriftlig Spørsmål Fra Willfred Nordlund (Sp) Til Forsvarsministeren,” Pub. L. No. 15:607 
(2018-2019) (2019); Tony Sivertsen, “Må Forvente Noe Lavere Flyaktivitet,” Vestrålen Online (VOL), January 
5, 2019, https://www.vol.no/pluss/2019/01/05/%E2%80%93-M%C3%A5-forvente-noe-lavere-fly-aktivitet-
18189636.ece. 
579 Richelson, The US Intelligence Community, 195. See digitalglobe.com, planet.com and intelligence-
airbusds.com for examples. 
580 In accordance with International Maritime Organization (IMO) regulations, it is mandatory for all civilian 
ships with a tonnage surpassing 300 tons (and all passenger ships irrespective of size) to emit AIS signals that 
states the ship’s name, course, speed, destination, and other details. A satellite is able to pick up these signals, 
and create an overview of maritime traffic.  
154 
 
6.5 Chapter conclusion 
The post-Cold War era was characterized by a Russia initially attempting to establish herself 
in a new geopolitical setting, then pursuing renewed ambitions both militarily and 
geopolitically, massing the economic means to support those ambitions, and then initiating 
several military campaigns to underscore the Russian comeback on the geopolitical scene. 
NATO, meanwhile, struggled to find a common area of focus, and the fluctuating strategic 
focus in the 1990s did not settle until the campaigns in the Middle East began after 9/11 in 
2001. Those land-centric campaigns were executed to the detriment of the maritime theatre of 
operations.  
MPAs were increasingly used to support the over-land battle in the late 90s, and even more 
so in the 2000s. In the cases where MPAs were utilized in the maritime domain, it was to 
conduct surface surveillance, mostly of civilian movements. This led to a general atrophy in 
the perishable ASW competency within NATO, and marginalized ASW in the MPA mission 
portfolio. The significant increase in the use of unmanned aircraft and satellite services have 
fed into the insatiable requirement for ISR services in counter-insurgency warfare.  
This seems to have masked some of the new requirements for modern airborne ASW. New 
technology has been operationalized that might challenge the assumption of MPAs being the 
sole answer to handling the new submarines in the north. Satellites and unmanned aircraft 
seem to have an important role to play in the future. For the time being, however, these new 
services remain inadequate in the search for submerged submarines. 
However, the modern Russian submarine threat poses challenges to the traditional MPA 
approach. The adversary submarines are now much quieter, they move unpredictably, and 
they require intra-theatre connectivity and understanding on the part of the hunter. The 








7. A theoretical framework for airborne ISR 
 
7.1 Introduction 
There doesn’t seem to exist a general theoretical framework for airborne ISR. Volumes of 
literature have been written about specific aircraft and specific operations, and many of those 
efforts have been mentioned. Hardly any of them, however, attempt to establish a generic 
theoretical framework that is specific for airborne ISR. This chapter is the start of an effort to 
fill that gap.  
An obvious starting point for crafting such a framework is provided by military intelligence 
doctrine on one hand, and by relevant literature from the field of military intelligence studies 
on the other. On military intelligence doctrine, the most significant publication to date is Joint 
Publication (JP) 2-0 on “Joint Intelligence” issued by the US Department of Defence in 
2013.581 In 2015, the US Air Force further refined intelligence in the air domain into an annex 
to its core doctrine, Annex 2-0, “Global Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance.”582 
Both documents describe the intelligence cycle and how it applies to operations and planning 
in great detail. They are comprehensive and all-encompassing, but they are descriptive in 
nature. Other than describing the ISR processes as a foundation for intelligence collection in 
the air domain, they do not provide any theoretical approach to surveillance and 
reconnaissance through the utilization of aerial platforms, per se. Air intelligence doctrine 
outlines principles for the intelligence process within the air force, but does not project these 
into a framework in which a principled discussion on the elements of airborne ISR can take 
place.583 
Second, there is Group Captain Geoffrey Oxlee’s “Aerospace Reconnaissance” published in 
1997.584 Oxlee gives an outstanding description of how airborne reconnaissance forces 
operate, with a brief historical introduction, followed by individual chapters that discuss in 
depth the different aspects of sensors, reconnaissance aircraft, and the analysis process. Oxlee 
 
581 Joint Publication (JP) 2-0, “Joint Intelligence” (United States Department of Defense, October 22, 2013). 
582 Annex 2-0, “Global Integrated Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Operations” (US Air Force, 
January 29, 2015). 
583 The Norwegian Armed Forces does not have an intelligence doctrine that is releasable to the public 
(unclassified). For British general doctrine on intelligence support to operations, see UK MoD, “Joint Doctrine 
Publication 2-00 - Understanding and Intelligence Support to Operations” (UK Ministry of Defense, 2011); UK 
MoD, “Joint Doctrine Publication 0-30: UK Air and Space Operations” (UK Ministry of Defense, July 2013), 3-
6 - 3-10. 
584 Geoffrey Oxlee, Aerospace Reconnaissance (London: Brassey’s, 1997). 
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does not, however, provide a generic approach for a principled discussion on aerial ISR as a 
system. Also, it doesn’t discuss ASW or ISR related to underwater warfare at all. Oxlee’s 
book is specific and descriptive, in that the author goes into detail on sensor parameters, 
different airframe configurations, and a thorough processing of sensor data that is based on 
post-flight analysis. Nothing is mentioned on the levels of maturity of sensor products, or 
how the intelligence products are disseminated to the force. Oxlee’s book is a great 
introduction to aerial reconnaissance, particularly details of post-flight imagery analysis, in 
an analytical environment with all the tools required at the analyst’s disposal – a setting in 
which the author has a long and distinguished professional background. The place of airborne 
ISR within the joint battle space, however, is not discussed, leaving the reader with a detailed 
description of important elements of airborne ISR, but not a theoretical understanding 
required to discuss it on a generic level.  
This chapter first turns to contemporary discussions on ISR and the place of ISR in warfare. 
It then moves on to discuss what we might term as the basic building blocks and tiers of 
airborne ISR, drawing on historical studies on the development of airborne and space-based 
surveillance and reconnaissance. Fundamental to this discussion is the history of maritime 
ISR and ASW that has been illustrated in the previous chapters. In studying the historical 
evolution of maritime airborne ISR and ASW in the High North, a region of significant 
geopolitical importance to NATO and one whose environment and location pose clear 
challenges, it has become possible to identify the key building blocks that constitute the basic 
tier of the theoretical framework. The chapter then moves on to briefly discuss the different 
sensors that are commonly associated with airborne ISR. They constitute the second tier of 
the theoretical framework. Then, the processing and delivery of the sensor products are 
discussed, constituting the third and final tier of the theoretical framework. The discussion 
then turns to armed reconnaissance, and how airborne ISR fits into targeting. Finally, the 
theoretical framework is discussed in the context of anti-submarine warfare, which is the 
focal point of this thesis. 
 
7.2 Trends in discussions on airborne ISR 
After the Cold War, warfare became limited in time, scope and space, and armed forces were 
forced to think joint. Expeditionary warfare in the 1990s (Gulf War I, Somalia, Balkans) were 
indications of a new type of warfare, and with the shift to counterinsurgency warfare, 
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intelligence stepped up as more of a core tenet of modern warfare as opposed to the more 
classic interpretation of intelligence as having an auxiliary, supporting role. This is where 
“ISR” grew into its own, and became an integrated part of the “network-centric warfare” 
movement. “ISR” as a term came into daily usage in the mid-1990s, after first being coined 
by the United States Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Owens, pointing to 
ISR as a vital component of modern warfare, implemented through the concept of net-centric 
warfare.585 A network-centric approach to warfare is essentially the military embodiment of 
information age concepts. It is the linkage of computers, communications, sensors and 
military units in order to improve efficiency and effectiveness of military operations.586 Or as 
John Ferris puts it, it is “the idea that armed forces will adopt flat structures, working in nets 
on the internet, with soldiers at the sharp end able to turn data processing systems at home 
into staffs through ‘reachback’, real time, immediate and thorough inter-communication.”587 
In short, it is about gathering, interpreting, disseminating, and acting upon information in the 
battlefield – faster than your opponent. The tenets of netcentric warfare thus facilitate a 
networked force in order to improve information sharing, which in turn will enhance the 
quality of information and shared situational awareness, which will enable collaboration, self-
synchronization, sustainability and speed of command, which finally will increase mission 
effectiveness.588 The most prominent critique of an exaggerated emphasis on netcentric 
warfare is the focus on technology that usually encompasses such an emphasis. Critical 
voices in the early and mid-2000s pointed to important elements of command and warfare in 
general being eroded in favour of an emphasis on quantitative measurements (number of 
targets hit, numbers of areas covered through surveillance etc.), and what some commentators 
have termed the “fetishisation of speed and tacticisasion of strategy.”589 Netcentric warfare is 
not the topic of discussion for this thesis, however, any discussion of modern ISR should take 
into account developments of modern armed forces as a whole, in order to make the gathered 
intelligence products actionable to the rest of the joint force. 
 
585 See Deptula and Brown, “A House Divided - The Indivisibility of Intelligence, Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance.” 
586 Clay Wilson, “Network Centric Warfare: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress” (Washington, 
D.C.: Congressional Research Service, June 2, 2004), CRS-2. 
587 John Ferris, “Netcentric Warfare, C4ISR, and Information Operations: Towards a Revolution in Military 
Intelligence?,” Intelligence and National Security 19, no. 2 (2004): 199–225, 199. 
588 John Luddy, “The Challenge and Promise of Network-Centric Warfare” (Arlington, VA: Lexington Institute, 
February 2005), 3. 
589 See for example Ferris, “Netcentric Warfare, C4ISR, and Information Operations: Towards a Revolution in 
Military Intelligence?”, 201. 
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Military developments in the new millennium have been characterized and shaped by 
Western military engagements in the Middle East. The focus has largely been on Counter-
Insurgency (COIN) operations, with a significant decline in focus on other warfare areas, 
such as ASW, especially when compared to the Cold War.590 Discussions over the past 
decade highlight a concern with how ISR fits into new modes of warfare and have been 
subject to many articles. It was underlined that ISR must be approached as a “synergistic 
whole”, and how ISR provides battlespace awareness and further decision superiority when 
utilized and integrated properly.591 There were warnings a few years into the Middle Eastern 
campaigns that the ISR community was heading in the wrong direction.592 The focus seemed 
to be exclusively on real-time, tactical processing of sensor data, which, the argument went, 
was eroding the analysts’ ability to conduct long-range predictive analysis.593 John Ferris 
commented that “‘computers’ have eaten qualities once assigned to ‘command’ while 
‘intelligence’ has diminished, as an idea connoting ‘to think’ slips into one meaning ‘to 
sense’.”594 One important element from the discussions is that ISR is all about delivering 
effect: The decision maker, at the various levels, must be informed with actionable 
intelligence in order to facilitate effect in operations. The emphasis within ISR efforts must 
be on qualitative effects, and not a quantitative focus on the number of areas and targets 
surveyed.595 The balance between focus on actions and focus on effects, an overarching, 
strategic, joint approach to the development of ISR, intelligence sharing between services and 
nations, and the role of leaders’ sound direction and guidance for ISR operations are all key 
factors to proper integration of ISR into warfare.596 
 
590 John O. Birkeland, “The Potential of LIDAR as an Anti-Submarine Warfare Sensor” (M.Phil (R), War 
Studies, University of Glasgow, 2009), 54-55; William Perkins, “Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare - 
A Forecast for Maritime Air ASW in the Future Operational Environment” (Joint Air Power Competence Centre 
(JAPCC), June 2016), 45-46. 
591 Deptula and Brown, “A House Divided - The Indivisibility of Intelligence, Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance.” 
592 For discussions on the intersection between COIN and intelligence, see for example Dan Zeytoonian et al., 
“Intelligence Design: COIN Operations and Intelligence Collection and Analysis,” Military Review, October 
2006. 
593 Daniel P. Shibilski, “Future of Air Force Intelligence,” United States Naval Institute Proceedings 132, no. 2 
(February 2006). 
594 Ferris, “Netcentric Warfare, C4ISR, and Information Operations: Towards a Revolution in Military 
Intelligence?,” 204. 
595 See also Jaylan M. Haley, “An Evolution in Intelligence Doctrine - The Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance Mission Type Order,” Air & Space Power Journal 26, no. 5 (Fall 2012). 
596 Examples of articles discussing these factors in modern ISR support to operations are A. Denis Clift, 
“Intelligence in the Internet Era - From Semaphore to Predator,” Studies in Intelligence 47, no. 3 (2003); 
William B. Danskine, “Aggressive ISR in the War on Terrorism - Breaking the COld War Paradigm,” Air & 
Space Power Journal 19, no. 2 (Summer 2005); John Kriendler, “NATO Intelligence and Early Warning” 
(Swindon, England: Conflict Studies Research Centre, Defense Academy of the United Kingdom, March 2006); 
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Another prominent factor for discussion in the 2000s with regards to ISR was the efficient 
tasking and utilization of ISR assets. The insatiable desire for more information and 
expectations of ISR support by any ground commander executing any mission, combined 
with a constant shortage of ISR assets to service all requests meant that the question of 
efficient tasking took centre stage in discussions within the intelligence community. A central 
challenge pertains to integrating ISR assets into the Air Tasking Order (ATO), a 72 hour 
tasking cycle revolving around attack aircraft and targeting.597 Some claim that the ATO 
process is outdated, static and built around assumptions and dynamics from the Cold War; it 
is based on symmetry in warfare, pre-planned targeting, and peer-to-peer warfighting.598 One 
must move away from the quantitative placement of assets towards targets, to a qualitative 
focus on the commander’s intent – the underlying purpose of the operation must be at the 
forefront of the execution of any operation.599 This is based on the relatively high level of 
authorization required for the use of lethal force in aerial targeting. One idea to remedy this is 
to embed “ISR Tactical Controllers” with ground units for optimal utilization to the 
supported entity.600 This would provide an important “translation” of terminology between 
the ground unit and the air unit, and likely improve the use of specific assets in support of 
specific units on specific missions, much like the forward air controller vis-a-vis Close Air 
Support (CAS).601 
 
Jeff S. Hinrichs, “Education in Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance beyond the ‘Green Door,’” Air & 
Space Power Journal 22, no. 2 (Summer 2008); Deptula and Brown, “A House Divided - The Indivisibility of 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance”; Deptula and Fransisco, “Air Force ISR Operations - Hunting 
versus Gathering”; Dagvin R.M. Anderson, “A Holistic Approach to Intelligence, Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance,” Air & Space Power Journal 25, no. 4 (Winter 2011); Haley, “An Evolution in Intelligence 
Doctrine - The Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Mission Type Order”; Jason M. Brown, 
“Airpower Is Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance,” Air & Space Power Journal 27, no. 4 (August 
2013); Matthew J. Martin, “Unifying Our Vision - Joint ISR Coordination and the NATO Joint ISR Initiative,” 
Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ), no. 72 (Quarter 2014); Nicholas P. Cowan, “Rethinking Command and Control of 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)” (U.S. Air Force, July 2015). 
597 For an outstanding account of the evolution, shortfalls and potential of the ATO Cycle, see Robert P. 
Winkler, “The Evolution of the Joint ATO Cycle” (Master of Science in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy, 
Norfolk, VA, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, 2006), dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA451239. 
598 Michael L. Downs, “Rethinking the Combined Force Air Component Commander’s Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Approach to Counterinsurgency,” Air & Space Power Journal 22, no. 3 (Fall 
2008). 
599 Cowan, “Rethinking Command and Control of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)”; Carl 
Rhodes, Jeff Hagen, and Mark Westergren, “A Strategies-to-Tasks Framework for Planning and Executing 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Operations” (RAND, Project Air Force, 2007). 
600 Adam B. Young, “Employing Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance -  Organizing, Training, and 
Equipping to Get It Right,” Air & Space Power Journal 28, no. 1 (Jan-Feb), 2014. 
601 See for example Steven Maceda, “Control of Theater Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance for the 
Ground Commander,” Air & Space Power Journal 22, no. 4 (Winter 2008). 
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Never before have intelligence products been as available as they are now to military units, 
whether they belong to the tactical, operational, or strategic level. This immense amount of 
information does pose significant challenges. The requirement to process and analyse 
significant caches of data (“Big Data”) has prompted further discussions pertaining to the 
requirement for onboard computers, to autonomously process sensor information into 
actionable intelligence, through so-called autonomous processing, exploitation and 
dissemination (PED). Autonomous PED will eventually provide the foundation for inflight 
analysis and the in-flight transmission of processed intelligence. Other challenges, such as 
control of unmanned systems beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS), survivability in contested 
airspace, common command and control infrastructure, open architecture, and standardized 
data link systems, are all lessons from the past 20 years that are shaping discussions for the 
future development of airborne ISR.602  
In order to contextualize the discussion on ISR requirements in the High North, it is 
beneficial to arrive at a few basic elements to frame that discussion. It is the ambition of this 
thesis to build a theoretical foundation for just such a discussion; one that can also facilitate a 
framework for similar assessments elsewhere and in a different strategic and tactical setting. 
A generic framework will put factors such as range, communications and sensors at the 
appropriate level, and structure the characteristics of airborne ISR under what really matters: 
The effect delivered to the force. By analysing the history of airborne ISR, manned or 
unmanned, aircraft or satellite, it has become possible to identify three categories or tiers that 
should structure the discussion of the characteristics and capabilities involved. The lowest 
and most basic tier includes the factors that facilitate airborne ISR in the first place. They 
have been narrowed down to altitude, speed, range, communications, and survivability. The 
second tier consists of the sensors that the airborne asset is carrying, facilitating the 
respective intelligence products that can be delivered. The top tier involves the processing 
and eventual dissemination of these products, in a given time and with a given product 
maturity. The actual sensor data processing is an important factor for airborne ISR, as it is for 
 
602 For more details, see for example Slava Frayter and Koen Willems, “Increased Efficiency or Beyond Line-
of-Sight in Airborne ISR Operations” (National Geospatial Agency (NGA), 2013), 
proceedings.spiedigitallibrary.org/proceeding.aspx?articleid=1688649; David Bottom, “Overcoming ISR Data 
Challenges” (National Geospatial Agency (NGA), 2013), 
spie.org/Publications/Proceedings/Paper/10.1117/12.2019033; USAF Chief Scientist, Technology Horizons - A 
Vision for Air Force Technology 2010-2030 (Maxwell AFB, Montgomery, Alabama: Air University Press, 
2010); Mike Fowler, “The Future of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,” Global Security and Intelligence Studies 1, 
no. 1 (Fall 2015); Jenny R. Holzer and Franklin L. Moses, “Autonomous Systems in the Intelligence 
Community: Many Possibilities and Challenges,” Studies in Intelligence 59, no. 1 (2015); Puong F. Yeh, “The 
Case for Using Robots in Intelligence Analysis,” Studies in Intelligence 59, no. 4 (2015). 
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all intelligence collection and dissemination. In cases where there is no on-board processing 
capability, neither human nor automated, the sensor data is transmitted raw. If there is a 
processing capability on-board, whether it be by humans or computers, the airborne asset 
becomes capable of disseminating processed intelligence to some degree of maturity. Real-
time dissemination of sensor data more or less exclusively consists of raw sensor data. 
Strategic intelligence, on the other hand, has been processed, validated and contextualized, 
but it takes time to reach that maturity level. Together, these three tiers of airborne ISR 
comprise a generic, theoretical framework.  
 
7.3 Tier 1: Characteristics of airborne ISR 
If we narrow down the history airborne ISR to the basic building blocks that comprise the act 
of exploiting the air domain for information gathering, we note that some enduring elements 
stand out. The basic characteristics of airborne ISR are therefore the building blocks that 
facilitate the missions that aircraft are tasked to execute. The exploitation of the air rests on 
the three enduring tenets of airpower: altitude, speed, and range.603 In addition, there are two 
basic facilitators for battlefield integration; communications, and survivability. 
Height, or altitude, was the original attribute required by surveillance aircraft in order to gain 
the proper perspective. Altitude is a matter of giving the sensor the appropriate elevation for 
the right angle and placement against a target. The higher the altitude, the further the sensor is 
able to see and detect signals. The higher the altitude the less impact elevated features such as 
tall buildings and mountains have on the ability to collect on the target. However, higher 
altitudes demand more capacity from the sensors – for optical sensors this means a 
requirement for a larger aperture. Higher altitudes also mean more interference for the RF 
antennae attempting to distinguish between many more signals in the air than is the case at 
lower altitudes. Very high altitudes also demand special engines for the aircraft flying in 
ultra-thin air. And, of course, the higher the altitude the greater the chance of weather and 
cloud coverage obscuring the target for optical sensors. Traditional maritime patrol aircraft 
have been operating at very low altitudes, and have been equipped with turbo-propeller 
engines, which are more efficient at low altitudes. Traditional MPA tactics, as the ones 
utilized during the tracking of Soviet submarines in the 1970s and 1980s, demand low 
 




altitudes in order to plot sonobuoys that have been dropped into the water onto the tactical 
overview. Low altitude has also facilitated a higher responsiveness with regards to attacking 
the target as well as getting close enough for a visual confirmation of any target close to or on 
the surface. Jet aircraft have traditionally flown at much higher altitudes because they operate 
more efficiently in thinner air. But at very high altitudes, this changes again, and the thin air 
requires specialized jet engines. Lower altitudes give a more recognizable picture to the 
interpreter of the imagery, both for technical analysis and by untrained operators. The low 
altitude of small, tactical unmanned systems used extensively in the past two decades has 
lowered the threshold for “layman” interpretation of imagery, simply because the aspect of 
the imagery is familiar to the operator.604  
Speed is another original tenet of airpower in general, and of airborne ISR specifically. Speed 
allows you to cover a larger area, respond rapidly to an incident, and increase survivability. 
An extreme example of speed is the SR-71 Blackbird ISR aircraft, flying more than three 
times the speed of sound. Likewise, modern jet-powered MPAs fly faster and are thus more 
responsive compared to older, propeller-driven models. The ability to respond to a situation 
or incident somewhere can be crucial for intelligence collection. The last known position of a 
submarine, or datum, is a good example of this. In operations where ISR aircraft have flown 
fast and low in order to avoid detection and enemy fire, it was at times a challenge to get 
images with clarity and proper resolution.605 Lower speeds and higher altitudes have 
mitigated this issue. Finally, speed facilitates a larger area covered for surveillance in a 
mission. MPAs have evolved from relatively slow flying propeller aircraft to much faster jet-
powered MPAs. This will facilitate both shorter reaction times and coverage of larger areas.  
Range – the ability to fly beyond enemy lines, to observe remote locations, to monitor the 
vast oceans – has always played a key role for airborne intelligence collection. Range is also 
one of the characteristics of modern ISR aircraft to influence how ISR is integrated into over-
 
604 See for example Ferris, “Netcentric Warfare, C4ISR, and Information Operations: Towards a Revolution in 
Military Intelligence?,” 220–21. There has also been a range of articles and books on mistakes done by drone 
operators in assessing a potential target for a drone attack, leading to the killing of innocent people, see for 
example Gregoire Chamayou, Drone Theory (New York: Penguin Random House, 2015); Ed Pilkington, “Life 
as a Drone Operator: ‘Ever Step on Ants and Never Give It Another Thought?,’” The Guardian, November 15, 
2015; Ryan Devereaux, “The Drone Papers - Manhunting in the Hindu Kush,” The Intercept, October 15, 2015, 
https://theintercept.com/drone-papers/manhunting-in-the-hindu-kush/. A good article with a defence of drone 
operations is T. Mark McCurley, “I Was a Drone Warrior for 11 Years. I Regret Nothing.,” Politico, October 
18, 2015, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/10/drone-pilot-book-213263. Regardless of viewpoint, 
the lowered threshold for acting militarily on imagery is on display in the mentioned material.  
605 Oxlee, Aerospace Reconnaissance, 88; Doug Gordon, Tactical Reconnaissance in the Cold War (Barnsley: 
Pen & Sword Aviation, 2006), 181. 
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land operations. Some unmanned aircraft can stay aloft for more than 24 hours, which 
facilitates more or less continuous monitoring of targets, which again leads to greatly 
improved battle-space awareness.606 Aircraft endurance is not necessarily connected to the 
level of warfare, although most short-range aircraft are utilized tactically, and most strategic 
aircraft have a long endurance. In the middle we find aircraft servicing the operational level, 
that boast immensely long endurance but can provide surveillance over one specific area for 
the tactical or operational level. Maritime surveillance and reconnaissance usually require 
long endurance due to the vast surveillance areas or the remote target location. Maritime 
airborne ISR also entails peripheral intelligence flights along the border of foreign countries, 
normally requiring long endurance as well. Range and lack of range have also been 
instrumental in the geographical delineation of responsibility between different MPA nations 
in the North Atlantic, as we have seen. Furthermore, increased range has the potential of 
changing international dynamics in the High North with regards to airborne surveillance, 
where new technology can bypass any Norwegian national guidelines for operating in the 
Arctic that might apply. 
The most central aspect with communications for airborne ISR assets is the ability to transmit 
sensor data to a receiving unit for action. The time it takes for sensor products to be 
transmitted to a receiving unit on the battlefield is correlated to the level of battlefield 
integration. Following this, the requirement for urgent transmission of intelligence has led to 
ever increasing demands for “real-time intelligence.” From a technological standpoint this 
means that the ISR aircraft has its communications suite connected to it sensor(s) or sensor 
processing systems, which enables the airborne asset to transmit either real-time, or parts of 
the gathered sensor data after processing it to a certain degree in near real-time. As the 
previous chapters have shown, communications for MPA in the High North have traditionally 
not been a major issue, due to the nature of the operations and the lack of any requirement for 
detailed, high bandwidth instant communication. However, new adversary technology and 
modus operandi are posing new requirements for communication solutions in the Arctic. In 
an increasingly complex battlespace, there is an imperative to be connected with the rest of 
the force through the use of data link systems. Link systems provide awareness of friendly 
and enemy positions, awareness of threats to own unit and the force as a whole, and updates 
 
606 John L Trefz, “From Persistent ISR to Precision Strike - The Expanding Role of UAVs” (Master’s Thesis, 
Rhode Island, NY, Naval War College, 2003), 12–14. 
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to battlespace developments. They provide an automated ability to communicate and 
coordinate with the rest of the force.607  
The reciprocal element of transmitting data from the aircraft is receiving updated information 
from the ground. This usually involves directions and guidance for employment of the ISR 
asset, and can involve updated orders in case of a manned aircraft, or electronic steering and 
detailed waypoints for an unmanned aircraft. This can be summarized as the ability to 
execute command & control (C2) of an ISR asset. In the context of airborne ISR, C2 is about 
the level of ability to communicate intentions and requirements, and receive orders and 
requirements from other units.608 Dynamic C2 rests on the ability to communicate, and the 
ability to change areas for surveillance and reconnaissance and the coordination and de-
confliction with other aircraft such changes entail. The way any ISR aircraft is tasked for its 
mission also falls under C2 and shapes the flexibility in the utilization of that aircraft. Most 
historical strategic reconnaissance and surveillance were executed with minimal input from 
any higher entity: They flew on orders given before the flight, and received few amendments 
in situ. Most modern airborne ISR aircraft are in continuous contact with their commanding 
authority, which either makes them flexible to strategic or operational demands during the 
mission, or has them answer to orders from the supported tactical ground unit at any given 
time. It must be stressed that in the context of this theoretical framework, the focus is the 
ability to integrate C2, rather than on C2 per se. It is about the ability to receive orders and 
changes in situ, not about how orders have been developed or from what level in the military 
hierarchy those orders were transmitted. This aspect is particularly important when we 
discuss autonomy in military units, manned or unmanned. 
Survivability is another core characteristic of any aircraft operating close to, or within 
adversary or contested airspace. Of great importance during ASW missions during the Cold 
War, a generation of warfighters has in the new millennium operated in war-zones in the 
Middle East with little to no air threat, nor threats from the ground or surface. Most planners 
and analysts agree that future warfare will not necessarily entail such freedom of manoeuvre 
in the air, and threats from both enemy air, ground and maritime units will demand a much 
higher degree of survivability through self-protection than has been and is the case for many 
military ISR aircraft. However, the mission being executed shapes the necessity for self-
 
607 Thor A. Simensen, “Link-11 Communication” (Master’s Thesis, Monterrey, CA, Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS), 1992), 8–9. 
608 Cowan, “Rethinking Command and Control of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR),” 12–15. 
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protection: Tactical maritime reconnaissance aircraft far out to sea usually have fewer 
concerns about being shot down, but aircraft approaching the firing-range of hostile surface-
to-air missiles will have to function with an increased level of risk, or be able to protect 
themselves against the threat.  
This is an important aspect of any warfighting aircraft, but the dangers associated with even 
peacetime reconnaissance during times of tension is shown through all the ISR aircraft that 
have been shot down outside of war.609 Survivability can be improved through a host of 
measures. Speed and altitude were historically the main features of survivability, but now – in 
response to the advances made in the field of missile technology – counter-measures within 
the airframe of an aircraft designed to neutralize or defend against incoming attacks have 
come to play a more important role. Classic examples are physical measures such as 
deploying chaff, which are streams of metal that disturb the radar picture of incoming 
missiles, and flares, which are chemical elements deployed burning at an extremely high 
temperature, in order to disturb heat-seeking missiles. Further, there are jamming devices that 
will disturb the radio-frequency spectrum for enemy aircraft and missiles, and lasers that 
dazzle hostile sensors attempting to track an aircraft. The discussion around the Atlantic 
procurement program showed that weapons, too, play a role in an aircraft’s self-defence.  
The core characteristics of airborne ISR can thus be listed as the following: 
Altitude of the asset Communication capabilities 
Range of the asset Survivability & self-protection  
Speed of the asset 
Table 7-1. Core characteristics of airborne ISR (Tier 1) 
With every airborne ISR mission and aircraft through history we see these characteristics to 
differing degrees. They do vary by airframe, which shapes aircraft capability in total.  
However, every core characteristic has implications for the others. Long endurance 
potentially denotes a significant amount of data that must be processed and analysed. The 
level of survivability affects areas the asset can cover and fly into, with implications for 
command & control, and the ability to communicate with friendly units. These are but a few 
examples, but they show an inter-connectedness among the basic building blocks of airborne 
 
609 For a detailed account of Western surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft that were shot down during the 
Cold War, see Larry Tart and Robert Keefe, The Price of Vigilance - Attacks on American Surveillance Flights 
(New York: Ballantine Books, 2001). 
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ISR, as highlighted by the negotiations to procure a common MPA for NATO during the late 
1950s. 
 
7.4 Tier 2: Sensors  
Tier 2 covers the type of intelligence products an airborne asset is capable of developing. 
These products depend on the sensors an aircraft is able to carry. Sensors, then, are the key to 
any type of remote sensing, and the utilization of sensors essentially comes down to efficient 
exploitation of the electromagnetic spectrum. The improvement in sensor technology over the 
past century has been immense, from the early handheld cameras to today’s hyperspectral 
sensors that are able to distinguish between different types of materials through frequency 
analysis.  
In the history of airborne ISR, the first sensor utilized for elevated observation was, of course, 
the human eye. But as soon as technology evolved, cameras were utilized, providing the basis 
for IMINT.610 The most common airborne ISR sensors are electro-optical (EO) cameras that 
provide still and moving imagery. By now, IMINT includes advanced mapping and imagery 
radars, such as SAR, and a host of other imaging sensors, such as infra-red sensors, spectral 
imagery, and lidars. Further, as interception and exploitation of electronic signals through the 
air became reality, the analysis of enemy usage of the electromagnetic spectrum led to 
airborne SIGINT. SIGINT is traditionally deduced to analysis of ELINT, and interception of 
adversary communications, facilitating COMINT. In addition, collecting signals between a 
missile being tested and the controlling ground station known as telemetry, is considered 
foreign instrumentation and signals intelligence (FISINT), which also falls under SIGINT. In 
the context of maritime airborne surveillance and of particular interest of this thesis, 
intelligence collection on submarine sound signatures have played a crucial part in the art of 
ASW, as will be discussed in the final chapters. ACINT is thus an important discipline for 
reconnaissance and surveillance in the maritime arena. It is important to note that airborne 
and space-based sensors are (still) not able to penetrate water, in the sense that they can 
conduct underwater search from up high. For this, one is still dependent on sensors in the 
water, such as sonars mounted on a ship, or sonobuoys dropped into the water. 
 
610 IMINT is part of Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT), where the purpose is to “describe, assess, and visually 




This list is clearly not exhaustive, but it portrays the most common intelligence products 
delivered by airborne sensors. It is important to note that the requirement for analysing and 
interpreting sensor data before it can be put to use varies from sensor to sensor. EO camera 
imagery, for example, is assumed by many to be the most intuitive data to interpret and 
understand. However, the notion that a “picture is a picture”, as some laymen seem to think, 
can have serious consequences for decisions in targeting situations. This factor will be further 
discussed below. 
 
7.5 Tier 3: Processing and delivery of intelligence products 
Having described the two lower tiers of airborne ISR, we have now arrived at the crux of 
airborne ISR: the intersection between intelligence and operations.611 Turning to history 
again, as well as lessons from modern warfare, there is a clear link between the level of 
interaction with ground and/or surface units and the level of warfare intelligence assets are 
serving: tactical intelligence collection – close interaction with ground units; strategic 
intelligence collection – no interaction with ground troops. The type of information gathered 
is also linked to the level of warfare intelligence assets are serving: information on enemy 
troop movements – tactical; targeting information for war plans – strategic. In the absence of 
war, the utilization of airborne intelligence assets was more or less exclusively strategic. The 
operational requirements that are at the forefront of planning and operational discussion drive 
investment to service those requirements. In between wars, this means strategic, future 
requirements. During wars, the ongoing fighting on the ground and at sea shaped urgent 
developments of intelligence and weapons systems. In order to stay true to the core and 
purpose of airborne intelligence collection – the support of operations based on decision-
makers’ intent – we must dare to point to the very intersection between airborne intelligence 
products and operations being supported. Two basic tenets can be derived, forming the top 
tier in a theoretical approach to airborne ISR.  
The level of warfare being supported can be expressed in a more principled manner: time. If 
the intelligence collector is supporting the development and adjustment of war plans, it is 
considered to be support of a strategic nature, and the intelligence takes time to develop and 
 
611 Michael I. Handel, “Intelligence and Military Operations,” Intelligence and National Security 5, no. 2 (1990): 
1–95; Ferris, “Netcentric Warfare, C4ISR, and Information Operations: Towards a Revolution in Military 
Intelligence?”; Anderson, “A Holistic Approach to Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance”; Deptula and 
Brown, “A House Divided - The Indivisibility of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance”; Brown, 
“Airpower Is Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance.” 
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contextualize. Also, this type of strategic intelligence will have time to mature in the sense 
that it can be supported by other sensors and intelligence sources for the sake of 
corroboration and verification. The interaction with ground units with specific regard to 
strategic intelligence does not usually take place – that type of interaction becomes almost 
irrelevant.  
On the other end of the scale we find the real-time dissemination of sensor products – for 
instance streaming of live video – from a collecting asset down to ground and surface units. 
At the lowest level, this is dissemination of a raw, unprocessed sensor product to the 
consumer. It is picked up by the respective sensor, and the only delay in transmission is 
whatever delay would be inherent in the electronic system converting data from a sensor 
format to transmittable information.612 This is common practice at the tactical level. 
The element of time is thus closely linked to the level of warfare that the ISR assets are 
serving. It is further connected to the type of targets the surveillance and reconnaissance 
efforts are covering. One important factor in the assessment of the level of warfare being 
supported is the ability and willingness to share the sensor-products, processed or 
unprocessed, with the joint force or other national entities. 
- Combat information and tactical intelligence613: Sensor products which are 
transmitted in order to build an understanding of the target in real-time, should be 
considered combat information. Combat information is not processed and 
contextualized by an analyst at all, but used by the receiving unit in direct support of 
tactical actions. Airborne ISR here supports immediate and local action, limited in 
time and space. Tactical intelligence is information that is not utilized or acted upon 
immediately, but facilitates the planning and execution of tactical actions that will 
take place within minutes, hours, or days after receiving the information.614 
 
 
612 For an interesting discussion on the development of this capability in the early 1990s, see James P. Marshall, 
“Near-Real Time Intelligence on the Tactical Battlefield,” Research Report (Maxwell AFB, Montgomery, 
Alabama: Air University, January 1994). 
613 NATO defines the “tactical level” of war as “the level at which activities, battles and engagements are 
planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical formations and units.” (AAP-06) 
614 For a discussion on the challenges of near-real time distribution of sensor products and intelligence following 
the Gulf War in 1991, see Marshall, “Near-Real Time Intelligence on the Tactical Battlefield,” 47–78. 
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- Operational intelligence615: Sensor products that are analysed and provide a basis for 
how the operational level distributes its forces should be considered operational. Any 
airborne ISR product that builds a foundation for near-term planning approximately 3-
30 days out, at the joint force level, should be considered operational ISR. 
 
- Strategic intelligence616: U-2 aircraft flying over Soviet missile sites during the Cold 
War, and maritime patrol aircraft monitoring enemy ballistic missile test firings from 
submarines were gathering information on enemy strategic capabilities. The 
intelligence products inform own weapons and systems development, and deliver 
crucial information to war planners at the strategic level. The level of warfare being 
supported is these cases are therefore strategic.617 
Any and all sensor data are interpreted at some point, either by a soldier that sees the imagery 
or other raw data, or by a trained analyst that processes, interprets and possibly collates the 
data and places it in a tactical, operational, or strategic context. The importance of this aspect 
is just this: imagery is not necessarily as easily interpreted as one would think, and there are 
trained analysts for every type of sensor information. Some ISR aircraft transmit their data in 
real-time, leaving it to the recipient to understand what is being seen on the screen. Other 
aircraft, with sensor operators on-board, can do basic interpretation on-board and provide 
tactical and operational updates to the force based on onboard processing. Others yet again 
bring raw sensor data back to their home base where the sensor data is thoroughly analysed 
and contextualized. This spectrum of sensor analysis is shaping how intelligence products are 
utilized, and at what level they are being utilized. As we shall see, these elements are also 
crucial for any discussion on autonomous PED to begin.  
Historians discussing airborne ISR conducted during the Cold War highlight the sporadic 
shift between strategic and tactical focus for the ISR community.618 This shift back and forth 
 
615 NATO defines the “operational level” of war as “the level at which campaigns and major operations are 
planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations.” 
(AAP-06) 
616 NATO defines the “strategic level” of war as “the level at which a nation of a group of nations determines 
national or multinational security objectives and deploys national, including military, resources in order to 
achieve them.” (AAP-06) 
617 For an introduction to the different levels of war and their relationship to intelligence, see Handel, 
“Intelligence and Military Operations,” 26–27. 
618 John T. Furquhar, A Need to Know: The Role of Air Force Reconnaissance in War Planning, 1945-1953 
(Maxwell AFB, Montgomery, Alabama: Air University Press, 2005); Tyler Morton, “Ears and Eyes in the Sky: 
The Evolution of Manned Airborne ISR” (Master’s Thesis, Maxwell AFB, Montgomery, Alabama, School of 
Advanced Air and Space Studies, 2012), www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=AD1019401. 
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is, if not problematic, challenging both for operators and analysts, and the organization as a 
whole. With the uncertainties that exist on the nature of future conflicts, an ISR organization 
must be prepared to service the entire spectrum of operations. There is a comparison to be 
made between the Cold War shifts in focus and contemporary ISR units that have been 
accustomed to a tactical focus for two decades, and that might face strategic challenges in the 
future. Commentators have also warned of too much tactical focus and what they perceive as 
“neglect of strategic intelligence”, calling for a holistic approach to strategic intelligence as 
fundamentally necessary to encompass all other intelligence activities.619 This warning is 
closely linked to the aforementioned “fetishization of speed and tacticisation of strategy.” 
The historical chapters of this thesis have shown airborne ASW to be an excellent case study 
of the spectrum in sensor analysis, ranging from real-time processing and immediate use of 
sensor data for their own targeting in a tactical setting, to post-flight, deep analysis of sensor 
data facilitating platform, weapons and sensor development in a strategic sense. Another 
historical example is the effort that went into introducing the new ELINT tools to modern 
warfare – the actual benefits from these new operations were questionable.620 Several factors 
played their part: The lack of understanding with commanding officers for intelligence as a 
tool; the lack of ability to change perspective on operations and plans based on new 
intelligence that contradicts that baseline perspective; and, of course, the organisational 
challenges that echo to this day – a warfighting organisation that does not necessarily know 
and understand how to process and effectively and efficiently disseminate the information 
that comes out of the intelligence processes.621  
In any case, the sensor data being collected are either analysed onboard for own use (e.g. 
weapons drop); transmitted as raw data in real-time, correlated with a database, and then 
transmitted; they are interpreted by a sensor operator before transmission; or they are 
 
619 For more on this discussion, see John G. Heidenrich, “The State of Strategic Intelligence. The Intelligence 
Community’s Neglect of Strategic Intelligence.,” Studies in Intelligence 51, no. 2 (2007); Deptula and Brown, 
“A House Divided - The Indivisibility of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance”; Harrison Donnelly, 
“Q&A - Lt.Gen. John C. Koziol, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Joint and Coalition Warfighter Support, 
Directore DoD ISR Task Force,” Geospatial Intelligence Forum 8, no. 6 (September 2010); Deptula and 
Fransisco, “Air Force ISR Operations - Hunting versus Gathering.” 
620 John Ferris and Michael I. Handel, “Clausewitz, Intelligence, Uncertainty and the Art of Command in 
Military Operations,” Intelligence and National Security 10, no. 1 (1995): 17–30. 
621 For writings on general intelligence theory, see for example Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace 
and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); David Kahn, “An Historical Theory of Intelligence,” 
Intelligence and National Security 16, no. 3 (2001); Lock Johnson, “Bricks and Mortar for a Theory of 
Intelligence,” Comparative Strategy 22, no. 1 (2003): 1–28; Arthur S. Hulnick, “What’s Wrong with the 
Intelligence Cycle?,” Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 6 (2006): 959–79; Michael Herman, J. Kenneth 




analysed post-flight and then disseminated. This relates to the second axis of intelligence 
processing in support of effects and intent: the maturity of the intelligence product. It is 
useful to distinguish between tactical and strategic processing of raw sensor data. Data with 
tactical maturity refers to sensor data that has been analysed sufficiently to be acted upon in a 
tactical situation. For acoustic data, it is usually the direction or range to the submarine from 
the sonobuoy in the water, in other words, positional data. Even in this category there are 
sub-levels of maturity, for example, if the sensor operator is too uncertain about a frequency 
line for it to be entered into the tactical plot of the aircraft. But if further analysis brings more 
clarity and certainty, the information can be taken into the plot and acted upon. Once it 
becomes an active part of the tactical calculations and assessment, we can term the sensor 
data tactically mature. The other category of maturity is of a strategic nature. In terms of 
acoustic data, this is a level of maturity that comes after time-consuming analysis post-
mission, where analysts can dwell on certain frequency lines to identify more and new 
characteristics of the submarine itself. When information from several sonobuoys are 
analysed together, analysts are able to find out details on propulsion and propeller blades, 
machinery internal to the submarine, equipment external to the submarine, details of the gear 
box technology and more. This information in turn can be used to describe the actual 
capabilities of the submarine, what types of missions she can be expected to perform, and 
other types of information of strategic nature. It provides insight into submarine deployments 
and behaviour, which, in turn, can help provide insight on enemy operations and strategy. 
This type of information has been pivotal of NATO’s understanding of Soviet and later 
Russian strategy and operating concepts and capabilities. This level of intelligence can be 
termed strategic maturity, but is too time-consuming and complex to be performed in-flight. 
Strategically mature sensor data plays a crucial role for many processes, such as the 
development of own submarines, new sensors and the improvement of existing ones, the 
development of underwater weapons and counter-measures, and crucially: improving tactics 

















Figure 7-1. Hierarchy of aerial ISR tenets. 
The key point of this overview is that any discussion on airborne ISR requires a holistic 
approach. This means that discussing single tenets, such as speed or sensors alone, will not 
give us any understanding of what the requirements are, nor what products in what format the 
respective asset is capable of delivering. In order to clarify the requirements for an airborne 
ISR service, we cannot stop at describing the basic building blocks (Tier 1) – we must go on 
to describe the actual intelligence product we require (Tier 2), and then in what format and 
with what urgency we expect this to be integrated with the force and the intelligence 
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A visualization of the top tier in a different way assists us in framing contemporary 













Figure 7-2. Time-product maturity matrix 
The figure above shows the axes of time and product maturity, and the traditional, linear 
connection between the two. As a rule-of-thumb, the less time that has passed between when 
a sensor has intercepted a signal until the airborne asset has transmitted the information, the 
less mature the product necessarily is. If it is transmitted in real-time or near-real-time, the 
sensor data has not been processed [A]. This means that the responsibility to analyse and 
contextualize the data rests with the recipient. It is most often the case that this type of data is 
used during combat, and on the tactical level. If, however, a long time passes before the data 
is disseminated to the user, it is usually because the asset with the sensor cannot or will not 
transmit in-flight, and the sensor data will be thoroughly analysed post-mission. This further 
means that the data usually is obsolete for any tactical use, and thus is meant to support the 
operational or strategic levels [B][C]. Both [D] and [E] represent extreme cases, due to 
different rationales. In the case of [D], immature intelligence, or rather: not properly 




















improper use of intelligence, or incompetence in the strategic analysis process. Both 
situations can happen, however, one would hope that any responsible nation would strive to 
avoid them. The case of [E] is much more interesting, as this situation requires processed 
information to be disseminated in near-real-time. A contradiction-in-terms, some would say, 
but the next step for autonomous sensor analysis, others would argue. In the case of [E], the 
airborne asset is able to remotely sense whatever it is capable of intercepting, and 
immediately process and analyse the information as it is gathered. Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
will likely in the not too distant future be able to process information and sensor data in a 
manner and speed that humans simply are incapable of doing, and it is AI technology that 
will facilitate the extreme case of [E]. This discussion is made even more relevant when we 
know that future unmanned aircraft, or drones, will base their decision making on what they 
see themselves, including the release of weapons.622 However, the dissemination of raw data, 
as in the situation of [A] raises the question of both relevance and utility of the data being 
transmitted. Who interprets the data on the ground? Are there sensor data where analytical 
interpretation is not even required? There are important questions to be answered when 
people make decisions based on unprocessed and uncontextualized data, as is taking place 
with real-time dissemination of sensor data.623 The following figure is yet another way of 







Figure 7-3. Time/product maturity symbiosis 
 
622 For an assessment on this, see Birkeland and Dyndal, “Fremtidig Autonom Droneteknologi Og -Konsepter.” 
623 Former drone operators from modern drone warfare have revealed significant uncertainty with regards to the 
basis, that is the sensor data and information, upon which decisions of weapons release have been made. See for 
example Pilkington, “Life as a Drone Operator: ‘Ever Step on Ants and Never Give It Another Thought?’”; 
Chamayou, Drone Theory. 
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7.6 Armed reconnaissance 
The historical chapters of this thesis have shown how ASW and acoustic intelligence have 
constituted a significant part of airborne ISR in the High North since the end of WWII. MPAs 
on patrol are, at least in wartime, prepared to engage the submarines they are hunting with 
weapons. This means that for maritime patrol, engagement and targeting play important parts. 
Armed reconnaissance must briefly be discussed for two reasons. Most importantly, it will 
place ASW in the context of this theoretical framework. Secondly, it will contextualize the 
ongoing debate on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) in the sense that it 
provides more clarity to the basis for LAWS’ decisions to apply military force. 
The theoretical framework presented above also helps to explain the underlying factors 
facilitating targeting performed by aircraft. Targeting solutions can in the context of airborne 
assets be achieved either by an ISR asset providing targeting information to other assets 
carrying weapons, or an airborne asset providing targeting for its own weapons, often 
characterized as armed reconnaissance. The mission execution phase of targeting in military 
operations as described in NATO doctrine consists of the elements of find, fix, track, target, 
engage, exploit, and assess.624 Finding the target relies on the basic intelligence support to 
operations, and an intelligence planning assessment of what elements in theatre constitute 
relevant targets for the force. Fixing is the process of geolocating and identifying the target, 
often based on cross-cueing of sensors and multiple intelligence disciplines. Tracking means 
that ISR assets are monitoring and following the target over time. Targeting is the process of 
acquiring attack criteria, and assessing collateral damage, the necessity of the strike, the 
relevance towards the prioritized targeting list, and ultimately receiving final approval to 
engage the target. Engaging the target means releasing a weapon in order to achieve the 
desired effect. Exploitation in this context means taking advantage of short and long-term 
opportunities that the immediate engagement presents. Assessment is an evaluation of the 
results of the engagement, assessing whether the desired effects have been achieved.625 The 
elements can be structured as has been done in the following: 
Function ISR Fires Plans ISR 
Action Find Fix Track Target Engage Exploit Assess 
 
Table 7-2. NATO targeting sequence 
 
624 NATO, “Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Targeting” (NATO Standardization Agency, April 2016), 2-4-2–6. 
625 NATO, 2-5-2–6. 
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It is clear that ISR is the foundation for any type of targeting – we require detailed 
information on a target before any lethal force is applied. This information has traditionally 
been gathered by designated aircraft, such as airborne ISR platforms, and the information 
corroborated by other types of intelligence, for example human intelligence (HUMINT).626 
As technology has evolved, more and more armed aircraft are capable of providing their own 
targeting solutions, or at least the final “piece of the puzzle”, with other intelligence sources 
providing an important foundation before the aircraft arrives on the scene. In essence, this 
means that the aircraft is carrying sensors that can bring the firing solution up to the required 
attack criteria for the respective mission, and fire weapons based on that sensor information. 
Three examples are worth looking at briefly in order to contextualize this discussion. 
Example #1. A modern fighter aircraft often carries a targeting pod, which is a capable 
imaging sensor in support of the aircraft’s targeting.627 The fighter aircraft is then able to find 
and track an enemy tank, or an enemy anti-air artillery battery on the ground, and fire 
weapons based on this sensor information.  
Example #2. An MPA is capable of finding and tracking submarines. During operations, 
MPAs will carry torpedoes which enable them to attack the enemy submarines being hunted. 
This means that they can engage their targets in addition to finding and tracking them. This is 
slightly more complicated than the previous example, all the while there is a high probability 
that the enemy submarine will be submerged during the hunt. This further means that there is 
a good chance that the aircraft crew will drop a weapon on a target they cannot see. The crew 
has, however, achieved the required confidence level for a targeting solution based on their 
interpretation of sensor information. ASW requires relatively complex interpretation of 
sensor data before weapon release. 
Example #3. A drone flies an armed reconnaissance mission, searching for a specific human 
target. The person targeted has been under surveillance for weeks, and several other pieces of 
intelligence have been accumulated before the drone mission. The aircraft finds a person that 
meets the parameters of the pre-mission briefing, but the imagery is hard to interpret for the 
sensor operator, among other things because of the altitude the aircraft is operating at to avoid 
 
626 HUMINT is a category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources. 
For details, see Joint Publication (JP) 2-0, “Joint Intelligence,” B-4-B-5. 




detection. Together with the drone pilot and the mission commander, they declare attack 
criteria to be met, and release the weapon on the person as he is driving away in a car. 
Example 1 is the least controversial, and the least demanding. Military targets are fairly easily 
distinguished from their surroundings by a trained operator. Example 2 is much more 
complex, all the while the sensor data is harder to interpret, and the attack criteria more 
demanding. Example 3 is a relatively new form of operating armed aircraft, and one that has 
attracted controversy.628  
 










Figure 7-4. Airborne ISR as basis for targeting 
This theoretical framework will not discuss the important question on the decision to fire a 
weapon per se, including rules of engagement, moral and ethical considerations on 
maintaining meaningful human control of autonomous weapons and more. However, it is 
important to highlight that the underlying foundation for making that decision rests on the 
interpretation of sensor data. And that is where the maturity and reliability of the sensor data 
 
628 See for example Human Rights Watch, “Heed the Call - A Moral and Legal Imperative to Ban Killer Robots” 
(Human Rights Watch, August 21, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/08/21/heed-call/moral-and-legal-
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come into play: the level of maturity of the intelligence product that facilitates tactical, 
operational, and strategic decisions. 
Working towards autonomous processing and analysis of sensor data will eventually lead to 
in-flight, near real-time processing of sensor data, and further near real-time dissemination of 
intelligence products. This will facilitate new ways of operating ISR aircraft, and potentially 
shorten the targeting sequence.  
The three categories indicated in figure 7-5 above are relevant when we discuss what we 
require from the respective ISR asset vis-à-vis a targeting context. A category I delivery is 
not directed at targeting in the traditional sense, but rather supporting tactical, operational and 
strategic levels of warfare with intelligence products. A category II delivery is targeting 
information delivered to a third party, which is actually capable of engaging the target. This 
can be a drone giving detailed vectors to a frigate firing a torpedo or a missile. Finally, a 
category III delivery is a platform acquiring attack criteria, and being able to engage the 
target itself. A classic example is an MPA dropping a torpedo on a submerged target based on 
its own sensor information.  
 
7.7 The theoretical framework and the hunt for submarines 
In accordance with the theoretical framework presented, one would require the following for 
hunting submarines: the elements of Tier 1, to varying degrees; acoustic and other ASW 
sensors (Tier 2), and the ability to disseminate this information or to act on it by oneself (Tier 
3). In discussing the airborne ISR requirements for ASW, some of the elements above stand 
out more than others. 
First, there is an overlap between ASW and ISR. ISR includes general surveillance, more 














Figure 7-5. The overlap between ISR and ASW 
ASW includes finding the target, fixing it, tracking it, targeting it, and then, possibly, 
engaging it. Only possibly, though, since we from our definition of ASW know that one can 
execute efficient anti-submarine warfare, not necessarily by sinking the adversary submarine, 
but by denying area access, suppressing its operations, and more. This overlap between ISR 
and ASW is illustrated in the figure above. When the NATO Group of Experts in the late 
1950s were considering what aircraft they required, they were considering a long-range ASW 
aircraft, which, given the operational characteristics put forward, would be able to conduct 
other types of surveillance as well as ASW. When the Norwegian Chief of Defense in 2015 
proposed to phase out the P-3 Orion from the Norwegian inventory and replace the MPA 
fleet with drones, he effectively removed the ability to conduct long-range airborne ASW. 
Instead, he focussed on the ability to conduct surface surveillance and reconnaissance with 
unmanned systems. No unmanned aircraft flying today are capable of conducting searches 
underwater, nor are drones today capable of carrying weapons that can neutralize adversary 
submarines. This is, however, expected to change in the future. 
Second, the factor of range is crucial for any credible maritime airborne ISR platform. To 
begin with, the aircraft must have a minimum range to reach an adversary’s operating areas. 
In addition, one would preferably be able to monitor that area for some time, not only fly out 
and back. This further leads to a requirement for range based on the extent one knows where 
the target is in the first place. If one is able to provide cueing to the aircraft, the aircraft would 
spend less time and fuel to search a given area. Another key factor that played an important 
role during the Cold War for NATO MPA was the sheer predictability of Russian submarine 
deployments, as we have seen. The aircraft operators were not only cued by SOSUS, but they 
knew the general direction of the submarine, broadly their patrol areas, and the approximate 
duration of their deployment. The very distances involved demanded long endurance, but if 
ISR 





such knowledge had not been available, the search for enemy submarines would have taken 
even longer. And if cueing from other sensors is not available, one would be relying on 
historical modus operandi, intelligence reports, and the sensors of the aircraft itself in the 
initial search. Thus the longer the range, the more time an aircraft has to search, conduct 
general surveillance, and build general situational awareness in an area. 
Third, sensor interpretation is key to ASW. Acoustic intelligence and in-flight processing of 
acoustic data have always been challenging. The acoustic environment in which the operators 
onboard an aircraft have to manoeuvre to find and track a submarine is constantly 
complicated by other sound sources in the water and by increasingly silent submarines. Many 
of these interpretation processes have been automated compared to the early days of ASW, 
however they have not been automated completely. This means that even in 2020, as new P-8 
Poseidon MPAs are operationalized, there is still a requirement for human operators onboard 
to interpret acoustic sensor data. This further means that if one is to track a submarine in a 
complex acoustic environment, computers without human input or interpretation will likely 
fall short, even in 2020. We should expect, however, AI to assume this type of interpretation 
in the not too distant future, enabling autonomous drones, surface vessels and submarines to 
conduct acoustic intelligence and ASW. Autonomous PED will thus significantly influence 
Tier 3 of the theoretical framework and alter what unmanned aircraft and vessels are able to 
do in a communications-degraded environment. 
Finally, if the airborne platform is not able to engage a target, the ISR asset will be somewhat 
of a lame duck. With the distances involved, for example in the Atlantic, there is little to no 
time for a flying asset to call for weapons support from another asset when it has found an 
enemy combatant that must be engaged. In the context of ASW, with the relatively short 
acoustic ranges involved from state-of-the art submarines such as the Russian Severodvinsk 
class, it is becoming increasingly difficult to find and keep track of enemy submarines. Once 
a targeting solution has been achieved, that targeting solution is very easily lost. This means 
that the target submarine will likely not be engaged at all if it is not engaged by the ISR asset 
tracking it. This, too, will in future factor into targeting and engagement by unmanned 
aircraft. Autonomous PED will likely facilitate unmanned systems engaging targets based on 




7.8 Chapter conclusion 
The theoretical framework presented here seeks to identify and nuance the elements that 
comprise airborne ISR. The discussion on the basic building blocks can at times overshadow 
important elements such as processing capability of an ISR asset. In discussing the 
requirements for surveillance and reconnaissance one must not only bring out the respective 
factors of the three tiers, but also carefully consider the most efficient and effective means of 
satisfying those requirements. Is manned airborne ISR necessarily the answer to one’s 
requirements? How much of the information required can be provided by space-based 
services? How much can be solved by unmanned systems? What does one gain and lose by 
shifting from manned to unmanned systems? These questions can be answered in the context 
of the presented framework, and it is the main objective of this presentation to bring clarity to 
any evaluation of modern airborne ISR requirements, particularly in the context of anti-
submarine warfare. To illustrate how this might work, the final chapter will therefore use the 
theoretical framework to discuss the new threat environment that is emerging in the High 
North, and what role airborne ISR assets can play in mapping the elements of that 
environment. It will also discuss alternative technologies that in time are likely to push well 












8. Discussion and conclusion: Where do we go from here? 
 
8.1 Identifying the threat 
Russian maritime doctrine aims at countering Western ASW technologies, and challenging 
NATO and the USA’s presence in the Atlantic, the Baltic, the Mediterranean and the Black 
Sea through increasing the Russian presence in those areas, including the Arctic. The 
Russians are open about the fact that they are conducting testing and exercises in the Barents 
Sea, and has historically and will regularly publish the coordinates for such activity in order 
to ensure that no ship will sail or aircraft will fly into the danger areas.629 They fire air 
defence missiles and strategic missiles; they will exercise coastal landings and assaults on 
Russian islands in the Arctic, and they will conduct advanced exercises with submarines. 
These activities are important in themselves for technical intelligence collection, but they also 
play a crucial role in demonstrating Russian capabilities and ambitions in the Arctic.630 
Vessels under development in the Russian navy will typically undergo sea trials in the 
Barents Sea before being commissioned in their respective fleets.631 The Northern Fleet also 
regularly tends to announce test firings of strategic weapons concurrently with Western naval 
exercises, such as the announcement of the firing of a salvo of Bulava missiles during the 
NATO exercise Cold Response in Norway in 2016.632  
In addition to actual operations and strategic patrols in the High North with SSBNs, Russian 
units have also conducted aggressive signalling through exercise and training in the North. 
Russians aircraft have flown attack profiles towards the intelligence service’s radar in Vardø, 
against NATO units exercising off the coast of Norway, and against the National Joint 
Headquarters in Bodø.633 The increase in Russian activity is also evident through the higher 
intensity and regularity in Russian military aircraft flying out from the Kola peninsula and 
down the Norwegian coast. Although not at the level of the Cold War, the numbers are much 
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higher now than at the turn of the millennium.634 In addition, the Russian Armed Forces have 
deployed cruise missile batteries to the Kola peninsula and towards the Norwegian border 
during the Russian exercise Zapad 2017.  
However, NATO units operating in other theatres have experienced significantly more 
tension than those operating in the Barents Sea: attack profiles were flown against the USS 
Donald Cook in the Baltic in 2016; a US surveillance aircraft was intercepted by a Russian 
fighter aircraft within 15 feet that same year; and an EP-3 Aries was intercepted and harassed 
in the Black Sea in early 2018.635 The primary actors in the Barents Sea, the Russians and the 
Norwegians, have managed to maintain relatively low tensions in the High North, and aim to 
continue to do so in the foreseeable future. It seems fair to assume that the Norwegian policy 
of integration/deterrence – screening/reassurance has contributed to this.  
Even so, there has been a marked increase of Russian exercises and operations when 
compared to the previous two decades. The Northern Fleet exercised in mid-June 2018, with 
the largest deployment of ships seen in 10 years.636 The Russian Navy followed up with a 
major naval exercise in the Western Barents Sea in March 2019.637 In mid-August 2019, the 
Russian Navy conducted another major naval exercise off the western and northern 
Norwegian coast. The Russian activities were closely monitored by Norwegian, American 
and Canadian MPA flying out of Andøya.638 The Russian named Exercise Ocean Shield 
included cross-theatre coordinated manoeuvres between the Baltic, Barents and Black Sea 
fleets. It demonstrated the bastion defence, and clearly situated the northern part of Norway 
as engulfed by the Russian bastion.639   
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Then, in October 2019, the Russian Navy initiated the largest submarine exercise conducted 
in the North Atlantic since the Cold War.640 The exercise had similarities to the Ocean Shield 
surface combatant exercise conducted the previous month, but this time only submarines took 
part. NIS reported the submarines operated west, south and east of Bear Island in order to 
monitor the entry points for the Barents Sea, and further south into the Norwegian Sea. The 
latter was executed in order to exercise deep diving in the significant depths there, compared 
to the Barents Sea. The objective of the exercise, according to the NIS, was to show that the 
Russian Navy can deploy submerged into the North Atlantic and reach North America with 
cruise missiles from forward firing positions. A further objective was to test the West’s 
ability to respond to such a substantial deployment of strategically important assets.641 The 
US and Canada sent MPAs to Andøya in Norway to cover the Russian activities together 
with the Norwegians.642 Large Russian naval exercises off the Norwegian coast seem to 
exercise fundamental elements of the bastion concept of sea control and sea denial. The 
mission of the Northern Fleet is still to protect the strategic nuclear deterrent in the High 
North.643 Although the role of disrupting Western SLOCs across the Atlantic seems to be 
somewhat downplayed, the threat against the SLOCs in times of crisis and war should not be 
discarded.  
In addition to the expanded conventional military activities on display from the Russians, 
there is another aspect of Russian warfare that has cemented itself in strategic discourse in the 
past years: hybrid warfare. The publishing in February 2013 of a military article by the Chief 
of the Russian General Staff, General Valeriy Gerasimov, did not gain much attention at 
first.644 But when the Russians annexed Crimea mostly using tactics associated with what we 
term hybrid warfare one month later, the article stood out as a blueprint for methods used 
during that annexation. Hybrid warfare can be described as “the synchronized use of multiple 
instruments of power tailored to specific vulnerabilities across the full spectrum of societal 
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functions to achieve synergistic effects.”645 This is not new, nor revolutionary. However, the 
systematic use and scale of hybrid warfare tools as means to achieve ends outside of kinetic 
conflict is something to which the West must adapt quickly. There are discussions ongoing as 
to the validity of the Gerasimov doctrine as a doctrine, per se.646 But regardless of these 
discussions, one fundamental factor on which most analysts concur, is that Russia will work 
to achieve her security policy objectives while remaining below the threshold of war. The 
Gerasimov doctrine provides a depiction of the vast range of tools available before the 
threshold of conventional military power is reached. 
 
Figure 8-1. The role of non-military methods in inter-state conflict resolution647 
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Hybrid warfare in the maritime domain has not been discussed as much as in the land and 
informational domains. However, it seems increasingly clear that the maritime will be equally 
exploited as other domains in an effort to achieve policy goals without entering a 
conventional military conflict. As James Stavridis explains,  
“The fundamental idea of hybrid warfare is to find the space short of clear-
cut military action with direct and recognizable tactical, operational, and 
strategic impact and compress it into a zone wherein sufficient ambiguity is 
created to allow an offensive actor a better chance of accomplishing an 
objective without full-blown, overt offensive action.”648 
The toolbox in maritime hybrid warfare includes the use of civilian and fishery vessels; larger 
ships that function as mother ships for unmanned underwater vessels or smaller surface 
vessels; fishermen that deploy fixed seabed listening devices on the sea bed; manipulation or 
destruction of underwater infrastructure such as pipelines for fossil fuels, communication 
cables and such; command & control over civilian, commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) open 
networks; the use of laser dazzlers and small jamming devices; and more.649 These tools will 
be supported by conventional means such as submarines and special forces, in a mix that will 
constitute maritime hybrid warfare. Russian captains on civilian vessels calling on Norwegian 
ports have reportedly been instructed to familiarize themselves as much as possible with the 
Norwegian coastline and ports, in case of a conflict.650 This mixing of operating platforms, 
personnel and domains is and will be a fundamental challenge for determining the “normal 
situation”, for example in the High North. In order to meet this challenge, it seems inevitable 
that the surveillance platforms of the future must be able to operate cross-domain, 
persistently, and with the ability to communicate with other sensors as well as home base and 
other elements of the intelligence cycle in real-time.  
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One example of such unconventional military activities is the Russian Navy’s intelligence 
collection on undersea cables laying on the sea bed in international waters.651 The Russian 
navy deploys special purpose submarines that can carry other, smaller submarines and 
autonomous or remotely piloted vessels. These are utilized for both research purposes and 
intelligence gathering. Rebuilt strategic submarines from the Oscar and Delta classes are 
being used for gathering intelligence on Western sea-bed communication systems.652 NATO 
reports that Russian special purpose submarines have over time conducted operations around 
civilian, underwater communication cables between Europe and the United States.653  
 
Figure 8-2. Overview over transatlantic communications cables.654 
Reports suggest that the special purpose submarine AS-31 Losharik, which experienced a 
fatal fire on board whilst operating in the Barents Sea on 1 July 2019, is a part of an 
underwater intelligence unit that specialises in tapping into and preparing for the destruction 
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of undersea communication cables.655 It seems that with special purpose-built submarines 
such as the Losharik, Paltus and Uniform able to conduct advanced sea-bed operations, the 
submarine branches of the Russian armed forces are also an integrated part of hybrid 
warfare.656 This type of activity has historically also been carried out by the US Navy.657 
 
8.1.1 Submarines 
Submarines remain the capital ships of the Russian Navy.658 Open sources reveal that the 
Northern Fleet has somewhere between 20 and 30 operational submarines in its inventory.659 
Legacy SSN and SSGN submarines from the Cold War that are still operational are the Victor 
III, the Akula, the Sierra II class SSNs, the Oscar II class SSGN, and the Delta IV class 
SSBN. In addition, several new classes are inbound. The Severodvinsk is meant to replace the 
SSNs and SSGNs mentioned above. It is a multipurpose, nuclear attack submarine which is 
incredibly capable, exceptionally quiet, and vastly expensive.660 Overall plans are to build 
eight to ten Severodvinsk class submarines.661 However, the production tempo of the 
Severodvinsk class has slowed due to budgetary constraints. The submarine class is likely one 
of the more expensive pieces of military hardware in the Russian inventory, writ large.662 The 
SSGN carries a wide array of missiles, namely the SS-N-26 Strobile supersonic anti-ship 
missile (range 190 nm/350 km), the SS-N-21 Sampson missile, similar to the US Tomahawk 
missile with the option to carry a nuclear warhead (land-attack, range 1,600 nm/3,000 km), 
the SS-N-27 Sizzler (anti-ship, range over 270 nm/500 km) and 32 units of the SS-N-30 
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Kalibr missile (land-attack, range approximately 1,300 nm/2,500 km).663 Work is reportedly 
ongoing to find a more affordable follow-on for the Severodvinsk class.664  
The Husky class may take on two separate designs in order to fulfil two particular roles: first, 
to protect surface strike groups from hostile submarines; and second, to function as a 
platform for cruise missiles.665 The Husky will reportedly start construction in 2023, and will, 
in addition to Kalibr missiles and torpedoes, carry the hypersonic SS-N-33 Zircon anti-ship 
cruise missile – capable of flying more than eight times the speed of sound. It will cost far 
less than the Severodvinsk class, but is expected to continue the trend of ever more quiet 
acoustic characteristics for Russian submarines.666 Between 15 and 20 Husky submarines are 
expected to be operational by 2040.667 
The Dolgorukiy seems to be the future workhorse of the Russian SSBN fleet. Three have 
been commissioned, and plans are to build eight to ten Dolgorukiy class submarines in total. 
The follow-on vessels of the initial boat are expected to have redesigned hulls leading to 
improved acoustics and lower sound levels.668 These vessels carry 16 missiles of the type SS-
N-32 Bulava, with six to ten nuclear warheads in each missile and a range of 4,600 nm/8,500 
km.669 The Dolgorukiy class SSBN has been operationalized, and is patrolling at fairly regular 
intervals in tandem with remaining Delta IV SSBNs. 
The diesel-electric Kilo class has been a successful design for both domestic use and for 
export. It has proven its worth in modern conflict through the firing of Kalibr missiles into 
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Syria.670 The replacement submarine for the Kilo was planned to be the Petersburg class, but 
this project has been wrought with failures during development. So much so, that it is 
reported that the Petersburg class may be terminated altogether, in favour of a new design, 
the Kalina class SSK.671 The Kalina will be an Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) submarine, 
and will take over the duties of the Kilo class as part of the layered defence of the bastion, 
and patrols in the littorals.672 
 
8.1.2 Cruise missiles 
The development of capable cruise missiles has been a priority for the Russian armed forces, 
to the point where the weapons being fielded are considered to be among the most capable in 
the world.673 Cruise missiles provide a combination of tactical flexibility and strategic 
leverage.674  
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Figure 8-3. Nominal Kalibr LACM ranges from fleet areas.675 
They are a tactical and operational threat to any adversary unit or force, and they can 
simultaneously hold strategic targets at risk from great distances. Russian cruise missiles are 
an increasing concern for strategic force planning in NATO.676  
Likely the most prominent and versatile Russian cruise missile is the Kalibr family of 
missiles. There are more than ten variants of the Kalibr missile depending on launch 
platform, range, target profile and speed. The most common categories are the anti-ship and 
land-attack versions. Both carry high precision conventional munitions between 220-450 kg 
but are also capable of carrying nuclear payloads. The land-attack version is designated SS-
N-30A Kalibr by NATO and has a maximum range of 1,350 nm/2,500 km at subsonic 
speeds.677 Figure 8-3 above depicts the firing range for missiles launched approximately from 
the home ports of the respective Western Russian fleets (nominal range depicted is 1,000 
nm). The following figure shows the nominal range of a Kalibr missile launched by a 
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Figure 8-4. Russian sub-launched Kalibr missile holding Northern European ports at risk from a position well 
north of the GIUK line 
 
Land-attack cruise missiles (LACM) are complex weapons, more so than their anti-ship 
brethren. LACMs have to navigate terrain, change communications environments, navigate 
through air defence layers, and differentiate their target from surrounding landscapes. One 
example of such a complex route to the missiles’ target is the firing of Kalibr cruise missiles 
into Syria by two surface vessels in the Caspian Sea in autumn 2015. The missiles had to 
negotiate Iranian, Iraqi and Syrian territory before hitting their targets.679  
The anti-ship version has a shorter range of approximately 160 nm/300 km, and skims low 
over the sea in order to avoid detection. The missile is active radar-homing, and performs 
evasive manoeuvres as it approaches its target. In doing so, it increases from Mach 0.8 in 
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cruising speed to Mach 3, and lowers its altitude to less than 5 meters over the water, making 
it very hard to detect and engage.680 The NATO designation of the anti-ship version is SS-N-
27 Sizzler, and the weapon can be launched against a single target or group, and approach the 
target(s) from different directions, significantly complicating the defensive task.681 An anti-
submarine variant is reportedly under development, a tactical ballistic missile with the range 
of 27 nm/50 km for the submarine-launched version and 22 nm/40 km for the ship-launched 
version. 682 Compared to a torpedo, this missile will have a much longer range and a 
significantly shorter delivery time. 
The range and flexibility that are inherent in these weapons will be a significant factor for 
several theatres of operations, simultaneously. In short, a submarine from the Northern Fleet, 
operating in the North Atlantic, will potentially have enormous impact in the Baltic Sea and 
on the European continent. This intra-theatre approach and connectivity has among other 
things been exemplified by the aforementioned Caspian Sea flotilla firing Kalibr missiles into 
Syria. Commentators also noted that the way the relatively small flotilla carried out the 
attacks was a showcase for export of Kalibr weapons: One does not require a great missile 
cruiser or destroyer to deliver formidable naval fire power.683 It is also a sign of a distributed 
force structure, with numerous smaller vessels distributed across the theatre being able to 
provide formidable firing power both in a tactical as well as a strategic setting.684 
In addition to the Caspian Sea firings of missiles, on 08 December 2015 Russia fired four 
Kalibr cruise missiles into Syria for the first time from a Kilo class submarine in the eastern 
Mediterranean Sea.685 The updated Kilo class is slightly longer and is fitted with improved 
engines and an improved combat system, in addition to new noise reduction technology. The 
submarine is reportedly able to operate on patrols for 45 days at a time.686 It can fire both 
torpedoes and cruise missiles, the latter proven several times through the aforementioned 
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firing into Syria.687 This was a showcase of the new, credible Russian naval threat: the 
combination of quiet, stealthy submarines that are easy to defend, and capable long-range, 
multi-purpose cruise missiles that are hard to defend against.688 In addition to the 
Severodvinsk class, the older submarines are also undergoing upgrades and retrofitting. In 
particular, the old Akulas, Oscar IIs and Delta IIIs are being retrofitted to carry both anti-
surface and land-attack missiles.689 The Oscar class will replace the SS-N-19 Shipwreck anti-
ship cruise missiles with Kalibr missiles, a mix of anti-ship and land-attack missiles – 72 
missiles in total.690 In comparison, the American Ohio class SSGN can carry 152 Tomahawk 
missiles, which is roughly considered to be a Kalibr equivalent. Part of the test and 
development regime is now the operational Severodvinsk class, which on occasion has been 
firing Kalibr missiles at test ranges on the Kola Peninsula.691 A Severodvinsk class submarine 
also fired a Kalibr cruise missile from the Kola Peninsula in early 2019 while moored to a 
pier in Zapadnaya Litsa, some 60 km from the Norwegian border.692  
In addition, the Russians are reportedly well underway in developing hypersonic missiles for 
launch from aircraft and missile silos on land, and have also initiated work to place such 
missiles on submarines.693 Hypersonic missiles are hard to defend against, both because they 
manoeuvre at incredibly high speeds, but also because they are harder to detect and track by 
existing missile defence sensors. The Zircon hypersonic anti-ship cruise missile will likely be 
the main armament in the next class of multipurpose submarines, the Husky class, which is 
planned to be launched in 2027.694 The Zircon is expected to have slightly shorter range than 
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the Kalibr. The Severodvinsk class will also reportedly carry the Zircon hypersonic cruise 
missile in the future.  
The new missiles are eroding the distinction between attack submarines and multi-purpose 
submarines, further blurring the Allied understanding of roles and missions for each 
respective submarine class. When a scouting attack submarine, operating ahead of a naval 
force, is capable of engaging land targets with capable cruise missiles from distance, the 
threat scenario expands in scope. With a wider array of missiles on board, the respective 
submarine will pose a multi-dimensional threat, leading to a requirement to maintain 
situational awareness of more submarines than was earlier the case. The case for a robust 
ASW and underwater search force therefore only strengthens. The new and extremely 
capable Russian missiles that can be fired from submarines are shaping the naval battle for 
the future.695 The stand-off distance for a submarine attacking an adversary naval force is 
increasing, seemingly making it all the more important to be able to neutralize the submarine 
at a distance.696  
 
8.1.3 Russian strategy and posture 
If Russian developments and deployments of submarine and missile technology prove 
anything it is that the bastion strategy remains alive and well. The concept is not only a topic 
for academic and military strategic discussion, but also an integral part of the political and 
media discourse on Norwegian security policy.697 Russian naval operations and exercises 
have increasingly emphasized the concept as new and capable units are sent to sea.  
Some naval experts doubt that the Russian fleet is sufficiently capable of providing adequate 
protection of their high value units through the bastion defence, due to the fact that the 
Russian fleet is so small compared to the fleet that comprised the original bastion defence of 
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quality over quantity, as is evident through the significantly improved modern Russian 
vessels when compared to previous generations. Focus is now given to smaller, multi-role 
vessels with capable long-range weapons. The Russian Navy is operating what can be termed 
a “dual fleet”, a combination of legacy vessels with new and modern units, as many units 
from the Cold War are still operational.699 As we have seen throughout this thesis, this 
strategic ambivalence between the old school of thought, with a Mahanian focus on large 
surface combatants and aircraft carriers, versus the new school, with a focus on submarines as 
the primary fighting force of a lean, coastal defence navy, has actively influenced the 
operational capabilities of the Russian Navy.700 The dual fleet seems to be a result of this. 
Russia established the Arctic Command in 2015, co-located with the Northern Fleet in 
Murmansk.701 This command aims to streamline the operations of all the branches of the 
Northern Fleet in its area of responsibility in the Arctic under one hub for command & 
control.  
In addition to the new, capable and quiet submarines of the Russian Navy, another prominent 
feature of Russian modernization and capabilities are measures for denying access and 
freedom to operate in designated areas, so-called anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) measures. 
Elements of A2/AD have been operating for decades, one can say centuries, as they are 
essentially capabilities meant to deny one’s adversary access to, or control over, a certain area 
of interest. What is new is the systematic approach to this type of denial, and the significantly 
improved capabilities of the weapons involved. Crucial elements of denial for air assets are 
missile threats, jamming of communications and jamming of positioning systems. One of the 
biggest concerns for NATO planners is the array of A2/AD elements in the Russian layered 
defence.702 Below we will discuss how this affects airborne surveillance in the High North. 
It seems clear that in terms of naval combat, submarines provide the most bang-for-the-buck. 
Or as Kathleen Hicks explains: “the Russian Navy’s use of submarines to signal presence, 
reach and power achieves an effect that is disproportionate to the resources committed.”703 
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Although submarines are unable to command, or control, the sea, they are able to clear it of 
hostile surface forces.704 The capable missile technology now being fielded facilitates a 
continued responsibility on the part of Russian SSGNs to deny NATO surface and sub-
surface vessels entry into and freedom of manoeuvre in the North Atlantic where they would 
be able to conduct cruise missile strikes against the Russian mainland. The primary mission 
of Russian attack and multi-role submarines is therefore not only to protect the SSBNs on 
patrol behind them (pro-SSBN), but simultaneously to deny operations to adversary units 
such as aircraft carriers (anti-carrier).705 The very essence of sea denial by submarines is the 
uncertainty projected on an approaching adversary based on the unpredictability of the 
submarines’ whereabouts. This underlines the move from a predictable patrol pattern during 
the Cold War to an unpredictable operations modus operandi in contemporary submarine 
operations. 
The secondary mission of the submarine fleet is power projection on land. Very quiet, multi-
role submarines, capable of carrying several dozen Kalibr missiles, operating from virtually 
anywhere in the North Atlantic, will pose a credible threat to significant points of importance 
to NATO and its allies. The inherent potential in the offensive aspects of a layered defence 
such as the Northern Strategic Bastion mentioned above, are also increasingly being 
discussed among strategists and scholars. The Russian bastions are seen as a key element of 
future offensive warfare, particularly in terms of long-range precision guided cruise 
missiles.706 Finally, the development of an anti-ship version of the Kalibr missile should be an 
indicator that the old SLOC mission of the Russian submarines has not been removed from 
their mission portfolio, contrary to Russian statements in the late 1990s.707 Albeit not 
necessarily a SLOC mission in the traditional sense, where the threat to merchant shipping 
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has been submarines roaming the Atlantic in search of Allied convoys to sink, the mission for 
modern Russian submarines likely entails neutralizing key Allied ports and airfields. In future 
conflicts it seems likely that Russian submarines will pose a significant threat to the 
transatlantic logistics link without ever having to venture south of the GIUK gap. Some 
analysts suggest that if NATO is capable of controlling the GIUK gap, then the SLOCs will 
be secured.708 Situated well above that line, a Severodvinsk class will still be able to hold all 
of Northern Europe’s main ports at risk, as well as many of the important airfields used for 
logistics. It seems likely that the modern approach to the SLOC mission is to hold-at-risk 
NATO sea ports as opposed to patrolling the actual SLOCs at sea.709 
 
8.2 Alliance steps to keep track of the threat 
Although the political climate between Russia and the West, including Norway, for some 
time has been challenging at best, both Russia and Norway regularly point to the potential for 
cooperation on fishery regulation and administration, maritime trade, and technology.710 
There is also cooperation taking place between the two coastguards, as well as for search and 
rescue in the Arctic.  
However, Norway has since 2008 consistently been working to get NATO to re-focus more 
on the North Atlantic and the maritime domain.711 The lack of warning times in a potential 
modern conflict in the High North necessitates presence and encompassing surveillance, an 
understanding that has settled at the highest political level in Norway.712 And indeed, NATO 
has in the past years shifted its focus back to the maritime domain and ASW in particular.713 
Exercise Trident Juncture in autumn 2018 was the largest exercise held in Norway in several 
decades, and during the exercise a US aircraft carrier sailed north of the Arctic circle off 
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Norway for the first time since 1991.714 The recent rise in Western nuclear submarines calling 
on Norwegian ports is another sign of increased activity by Western submarines on highly 
classified missions in the High North.715 Commentators also take note of NATO increasing 
the regularity and scope of the Alliance’s ASW exercises since the Wales summit in 2014, in 
reaction to increased Russian submarines activities.716 In mid-2017, the US, UK and Norway 
signed a trilateral Statement of Intent (SoI) that focusses on cost-efficient logistics and 
enhanced cooperation for the three nations’ P-8 operations.717 The statement does not 
elaborate as to what this operational cooperation looks like in practice. However, it is likely 
that the three nations, flying the same aircraft, will work closely in peacetime as well as 
during crises to monitor the North Atlantic, both above and under the surface. As we have 
seen in the previous chapters, there is much experience on this type of collaboration to build 
on from the Cold War. The US Navy is again showing interest in a regular presence at 
Keflavik, after closing the base in 2006.718 But the US Navy has also considered regularly 
utilizing Evenes in Northern Norway as a base for maritime airborne surveillance in the High 
North, indicating that Keflavik is still not close enough to the areas of interest.719 However, 
Norway still enforces her basing policy, and it will be interesting to see if dynamics on allied 
aircraft operating from Norwegian soil will change in the near future. Supported by tanker 
aircraft in coordinated missions, both American and British SIGINT aircraft regularly cover 
the Barents Sea, particularly during exercises or other activities of particular interest.720  
In addition to this, two Norwegian intelligence collection ships operate more or less 
continuously in the High North. The ageing Eger has the main responsibility for monitoring 
the northern parts of the Norwegian Sea and Western Barents Sea, while the much larger 
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vessel Marjata monitors the Eastern parts of the Barents Sea.721 The Marjata has been sailing 
in the Barents Sea since 2016, and is considered one of the most advanced vessels of its kind. 
The rationale for the more or less constant presence of these ships is to map all military 
activity and some civilian activity in the Barents Sea and areas close to Norway in order to 
establish what constitutes the normal situation or baseline activity.722 The Norwegian Navy 
has also increased its presence in the High North, with regular frigate patrols, in particular.723 
The re-establishment of the US Navy 2nd Fleet in Norfolk, VA, in May 2018, with a focus on 
high-end naval warfare in the Atlantic was another reaction to the rise in Russian naval 
activities.724 The 2nd Fleet will have the entire North Atlantic as its area of responsibility 
(AOR), based on both the expansionist nature of Russian naval operations and the new long-
range weapons that are being fielded.725 The High North is to an increasing degree regarded 
as a potential battlespace of the future, as opposed to the protection of sea lines of 
communication further south.726   
In the summer of 2018, moreover, NATO established Joint Force Command (JFC) in 
Norfolk, with a focus on NATO command and control of naval operations in the North 
Atlantic. It, too, was established as a direct consequence of increased military activity in the 
North Atlantic and the Arctic.727 NATO has also boosted the personnel of the Alliance’s 
primary naval commander and advisor, MARCOM.728 
In sum, both NATO and individual member states have taken steps to respond to the re-
emergence of a stronger, more adversarial Russian naval presence in the High North. This is 
now recognised as a field of strategic priority. 
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8.3 Discussion within the theoretical framework 
The shift away from the predictable tracking patters of Soviet submarines during the Cold 
War to the more unpredictable operational movements of Russian submarines today has 
created new challenges for Norway and her allies in the High North. In particular, it has 
complicated the task of ASW. 
In addition to reforming command structures, NATO and its member-states must update their 
ASW and especially their airborne ISR capabilities. It is this author’s contention that the 
theoretical framework presented in the previous chapter, combined with historical precedence 
from the Cold War era, can point the way forward. The following section thus provides 
suggestions for how new technology and new approaches to airborne surveillance might 
facilitate an improved situational awareness and basis for targeting in the High North. 
8.3.1 Altitude 
One benefit for airborne ISR is that when an MPA is flying along a sovereign national 
border, or some other line of restriction (e.g. stand-off distance to surface-to-air weapons) the 











Figure 8-5. Increased sensor range with increased altitude 
International airspace National airspace, or stand-off to 










The P-8 is capable of operating at a higher altitude than the P-3 (41,000 feet versus 
approximately 29,000 feet, respectively).729 The theoretical radar range at 29,000 feet is 
approximately 210 nm.730 At 41,000 feet, this range increases to approximately 250 nm. If an 
asset is capable of operating at 60,000 feet, the theoretical radar range increases to a little 
over 300 nm. Figure 8-6 below emphasizes the increase in sensor range based on speed as a 
constant and altitude as a variable. With a baseline of 29,000 with a reference cruising speed 
of 330 knots, the area covered in one hour by the radar sensor increases by 20% at 41,000 
feet, and 40% at 60,000 feet. For area coverage and particularly for non-acoustic sensors, 
altitude thus matters significantly.  
One historic example of assets at different altitudes working together was the British Vulcan 
bombers flying high and the Shackleton MPA flying low. In working together, they made the 











Figure 8-6. Increase in sensor coverage over time with increase in altitude 
A modern example of such cooperation is a High Altitude/Long Endurance (HALE) 
unmanned system flying at 60,000 feet, maintaining area overview in support of a manned 
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MPA flying at lower altitudes, investigating and prosecuting contacts. NATO has dubbed 
such cooperation “High boy/Low boy” tactics.731 
Other systems with an obvious high ground with regards to surveillance, are satellites. 
Extensively used for maritime surveillance already, the clear downside is the relatively short 
amount of time they can focus over a given area, and the lack of flexibility with regards to 
real-time tasking and changes to areas of focus and thus priority. In addition, satellites are 
limited to surface surveillance. But in combination with other assets, satellites provide 
extreme endurance, albeit only periodically, thus supporting the establishment of a pattern-of-
life in an area. And perhaps most importantly, satellites can pass over adversary territory, 
without running the risk of being shot down. 
Traditional airborne ASW, meanwhile, is characterized by aircraft flying at very low altitudes 
in order to react quickly to submarine movements, more precisely place sonobuoys into the 
water, and utilize sensors such as MAD and radar for fine tuning a submarine’s position. 
Newer generations of MPA will work at high altitudes in order to gain overview of the area, 
but will to a larger degree be able to operate from medium to high altitudes also in the search 
and tracking phase of the prosecution. Historically, MPA crews have been forced through the 
cumbersome process of electronically relocating individual buoys at low altitudes at regular 
intervals and plotting them into the tactical overview, due to the set and drift in the ocean. 
Today, modern buoys with built-in Global Positioning System (GPS) will inform the aircraft 
tactical system of their position continuously throughout their lifespan, enabling tracking 
tactics to be executed from up high. This new technology also facilitates unmanned aircraft 
flying at high altitudes executing ASW search and tracking. 
 
8.3.2 Speed 
For maritime airborne ISR, speed means that the aircraft can get to the operations area or a 
datum of a submarine in a shorter amount of time. As a continuation of this, the sporadic 
nature of modern Russian submarine movements requires MPAs to be able to move quickly 
from one place to another to investigate a contact. And, once positive contact has been 
achieved, there is presumably less time to acquire attack criteria and execute an attack due to 
the short acoustic ranges of the sounds emitted by the submarine, as will be discussed below. 
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In this context, speed will be of critical essence. The combination of unpredictable operations 
patterns of the threat and short acoustic ranges means that the relevancy of a datum is shorter 
now than before. If the tracking aircraft (e.g. an unmanned aircraft carrying sensors but not 
weapons) cannot neutralize the target itself, then the platform employed to execute the attack 
(e.g. an MPA carrying torpedoes) must be able to transit quickly to the perishable datum.   
A hypothetical datum, mid-way between the three core maritime air bases in the North 
Atlantic, lies approximately 950 nm from each base. A P-3 Orion will require approximately 
2 hrs and 50 minutes to get to the scene, and a P-8 Poseidon will get there in 2 hrs and 10 
minutes. Not only will the increased speed provide 1 hr and 20 minutes longer on-station time 
for the P-8, but the submarine will have had 40 minutes less time to evade the datum in the 
case of a P-8 hunting it. In a tactical example where the MPA is reacting to its own sensor 
hits, the difference is obviously less, though important. An MPA with a 210 nm radar horizon 











Figure 8-7. A hypothetical datum with equal distance to all three MPA bases in the North Atlantic.  
210 nm is covered in 38 minutes at 330 knots (P-3) and in 30 minutes at 420 knots (P-8). In 
those eight minutes, the evading submarine will have transited anywhere from 1 to 3 nm 
(submarine speed between 5 and 15 knots), which with contemporary ranges (see below) can 


















Finally, speed allows for the coverage of a larger area in a shorter amount of time. For 
example, the P-8 flies faster than the P-3, with cruising speeds of 420 knots versus 330 knots, 
respectively. The following figure thus emphasizes the increase in sensor coverage based on 











Figure 8-8. Increase sensor coverage with increased speed. 
Calculating with altitude, and thus sensor range, as a constant, an increase in speed will 
facilitate an increase in sensor coverage. In a direct comparison between the P-8 and the P-3 
where both aircraft are flying at an altitude of 29,000 feet, an increase from 330 knots to 420 
knots gives an increase in sensor coverage in one hour of more than 27%. 
 
8.3.3 Range 
As we have seen time and again in this thesis, range in many ways epitomizes the very 
concept of maritime airborne ISR. The vast ocean areas that have been under surveillance by 
the aircraft discussed in this thesis have shaped the MPA force, and range was the single most 
debated operational characteristic among the Group of Experts for the NATO Atlantic 
program in the 1950s and 60s. One simply must be capable of reaching the point of interest in 
order to be relevant.   
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In the case of the Barents Sea, arguably the most relevant area for intelligence collection in 
the North Atlantic for NATO MPAs, the speed combined with range of the P-8 will be a 
factor for considering the relevance of the old 24-degree East guideline of the Norwegian 
government. The objective of the restrictions was always to facilitate Allied activity and 
presence in combination with maintaining low tensions in the North. Svein Efjestad of the 
Norwegian MoD points to new surveillance technology as crucial in facilitating new 
activities as well as old activities in new ways in areas of Norwegian interest.732 The new 
technology will necessitate a more flexible and dynamic approach to the guidelines. 
Figure 8-10 below shows the transit routes to the Barents Sea from the three main MPA bases 
in the North Atlantic, and the approximate position of the 24E guideline that applies for 
foreign MPA operating from Norwegian soil. A change in transit speed from 330 knots for 
the P-3 to 420 knots for the P-8 means that the transit from Keflavik to the Barents Sea 
(approximately 1,000 nm) will be reduced from 3 hours to less than 2,5 hrs. This reaps a 40% 
increase in on-station time from 3 hours to 4 hours and 14 minutes.  
Throughout the Cold War, the 24E guideline gave the Norwegians a de facto monopoly in 
maritime airborne surveillance in the High North and the Barents Sea.733 With new 
technology, new capabilities and a new security environment, it seems likely that other actors 
will carry out intelligence operations in areas such as the High North if the intelligence 
requirements in the area outpace the capacity of local actors to deliver. The most prominent 
change in the framework of the Norwegian maritime air monopoly on collection in the 
Barents Sea will be experienced by the former P-3 operating nations, the US and Norway. As 
transit speeds of new aircraft increase, more on-station time is gained. Also, increasingly 
capable unmanned aircraft will be able to take off from outside Norwegian soil and operate in 
the Barents Sea over extended periods of time. New technology may therefore challenge and 
force changes to the Norwegian guidelines for airborne operations off the coast of Kola. 
With a more forward leaning Russian Navy, it seems natural that the notion that intelligence 
collection and presence in the Barents Sea shall be reserved strictly for Norwegian assets can 
once again be challenged in the near future by Norway’s allies. The fact remains, however, 
that Norway will, due to geography, always boast the quickest response time and the longest 
on-station time in the Barents Sea. 
 
732 Efjestad, Norwegian self-imposed restrictions in the High North. 












Figure 8-9. Transit and onstation times for MPA in the Barents Sea 
The elements of hybrid warfare combined with the unpredictable modus operandi of Russian 
submarines are building the case for persistent surveillance in the High North. This 
persistency can only be facilitated by assets staying in the area for very long periods of time, 
and overlapping with a relieving asset. Satellites have regularity and predictability over a 
very long time period (several years), but they lack continuous persistency. They are 
continuously circling the globe, but over a given geographical area they are only 
intermittently present. MPAs have long endurance, but even with AAR the onstation time in 
unlikely to pass much more than 20 hours, if only due to human fatigue. Current and future 
technology therefore points to unmanned aircraft that can stay aloft for more than 30 hours 
today, and much more in the future. Ground crews operating and/or monitoring the aircraft 
can function in shifts, by definition removing the element of human fatigue. The case for 
high-altitude, unmanned aircraft for persistent maritime surveillance in the High North is 
pertinent indeed. They do not, however, have the capability to conduct underwater ASW. 
Another point with the new modus operandi of Russian submarines, is that all three MPA 
bases stand to be good launch sites for MPA missions in search of Russian submarines in the 




























Figure 8-10. Short transit times to area of interest in the North Atlantic 
In terms of air power, range facilitates two basic factors that play fundamental roles in the 
execution of a mission. Firstly, range provides the ability to fly a certain distance, perform a 
mission, and then either return to home-base or fly to a different destination. Secondly, 
endurance provides the ability to stay in and above an area and thus gather information from 
that area over time. Tracking Soviet submarines during the Cold War demanded range in the 
context of the first factor. An MPA would fly to a point along the transit route, and be 
prepared to track the submarine for a certain distance along that route (situation A, figure 
below). Searching for and tracking modern Russian submarines is a different matter, 
however, as the operations area essentially encompasses the entire North Atlantic.  
This in turn demands ISR assets to be able to stay in the area over time in order to bring 
continuation to the search, and to be able to respond in an appropriately short amount of time 
































Figure 8-11. Efficient use of MPA range in a predictable submarine transit pattern (A, red). Demanding 
endurance requirements for unpredictable submarine modus operandi (B, black) 
Given that the P-8 has approximately the same range and endurance as the P-3, the range 
factor in relation to ASW is reduced to the modus operandi of the target submarine.734  As 
aforementioned, the predictability of the Cold War Soviet SSBN transit worked in favour of 
the Western MPA that were hunting it. The endurance available was utilized more efficiently 
than what is possible when the hunter effectively is searching large parts of the North 
Atlantic basin. This further evolves as modern search tactics are even more dependent on 
cueing – other assets that loiter above, on, or below the surface of a given area in search of 
indications of targets of interest, which in turn cue more capable search, track and attack 
assets for the actual prosecution of the target.   
By flying faster and higher, however, the P-8 is able to cover a larger area in a shorter amount 
of time. Getting to the operations areas faster, the P-8 is also able to loiter in the operations 
area for longer than the P-3.  
 
 
734 The US Navy notes that the P-3 Orion is able to operate for 3 hours at 1346 nautical miles, and the P-8 
Poseidon for 4 hours at 1200 nautical miles. See US Navy, “Fact File - P-3C Orion and EP-3 Aries” (US Navy, 
December 3, 2018), https://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=1100&tid=1400&ct=1; US Navy, 



















Traditional MPA operations did not require detailed analysis and reporting to be sent back to 
HQ at all times. MPAs were mainly operating far away from other units, hunting submarines, 
only sporadically reporting home. Today, submarines are far more integrated into joint 
operations. And in the case of Russia, we see integrated, cross-theatre submarine operations, 
which means that submarine operations for example in the Baltic can and will most likely 
affect submarine operations in the North Atlantic. In order to better understand this 
complexity in adversary behaviour, it is paramount that headquarters is able to fuse 
movements, indications and warnings nearly instantly, in order to understand what is 
happening and gain information superiority over one’s adversary. Modern communication 
suites and support assets (such as satellites) are integral elements of this ability to build a 
tactical, operational and strategic picture of the battle. For example, encrypted, broadband 
satellite communication facilitates exchange of acoustic analyses in order to engage subject 
matter expertise for solving it, in such cases where the aircraft sensor operator is struggling 
with in-flight analysis. Instant dissemination of ISR information also enables faster detection 
of anomalies, if many sensors together are capable of monitoring large parts of the area of 
interest. In a hybrid warfare environment at sea, where adversary actions are not necessarily 
the traditional and conventional naval movements, it will require more persistent and detailed 
information gathering in order to detect anomalies from the normal situation.        
Given the nature of the operations that MPA traditionally execute over the open ocean there 
was historically only a requirement for basic communication with other units and with 
headquarters and home base. The traditional setup consisted of HF long-range 
communications over voice and basic text messages (teletype). The NATO maritime Link-11, 
originally introduced in the mid-1960s, facilitated an exchange of tactical information, 
leading to a basic, common tactical picture. For radio communications with other military 
units, UHF was utilized, as remains common today. In essence, the transmission out of the 
aircraft were short bursts of either voice or text transmissions, consisting of very short safety 
or tactical updates. Mostly, MPAs operated by themselves and reported widely only after 
landing. An important element of the lack of communication has also been that radio silence 
removed the possibility of detection by enemy ELINT. Particularly, active transmissions 
from the aircraft would give away the presence of the MPA to a submarine at periscope depth 
checking whether it is safe or not to surface.  
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In addition to the traditional maritime NATO Link-11, the NATO Link-16 has been integrated 
into the onboard systems of the P-8. Link-16 provides more detailed information, with a 
significantly higher rate of updates, compared to Link-11. This means that the MPA can to a 
significantly higher degree be integrated into the joint theatre of operations, and thus share a 
comprehensive tactical overview. 
Internet connection is also integrated in the new MPAs, enabling transfer of data to home-
base in addition to the military SATCOM connection, the latter being a necessity for 
integration into modern operations. A significant challenge for SATCOM communications in 
the High North is that the most commonly used communication satellites are geostationary: 
they orbit the Earth directly outside the equator, with the same speed as the rotation of the 
Earth, leading them to be perceived as static to an observer on the Earth’s surface. This gives 











Figure 8-12. SATCOM coverage in the High North 
 
There are commercial, global communication satellite networks available, but these are 
meant for civilian communications and usually provide a narrow bandwidth. In order to share 
intelligence products such as imagery, acoustic analyses or video, much broader bandwidth is 
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contractor, which evades the cost of launching a satellite. But then there is a requirement for 
end-to-end encryption, further decreasing the usually narrow bandwidth. One can also 
conduct civilian-military cooperation, where a military communications payload is placed 
onboard a civilian satellite, and the overarching costs of launching and “flying” the satellite is 
shared. This is emerging as one of the most cost-efficient solution to the problem. Finally, 
one can launch a satellite by oneself, leading to full control of the satellite but having to bear 
the entire cost of launch and daily operations. The part government-owned company Space 
Norway is in the midst of a project that seeks to remedy this situation and plans to launch 
satellites in orbits that have a sufficient inclination in comparison to the equator, providing 
good communications coverage in the High North. When these satellites are up and running 
according to plan in 2023, NATO MPAs monitoring the Arctic will have their means of 
communication vastly improved for the foreseeable future. 
 
8.3.5 Survivability 
The issue of survivability is frequently neglected in discussions of MPA operations. This fact 
seems to be a remnant from the time when MPAs were operating by themselves, far out to 
sea, with limited or no real threat posed towards them. In general, MPAs feature in NATO 
military discourse as an asset that primarily can be utilized during peacetime and times of low 
tension, depending on the anti-air threat involved and the level of acceptable risk.  
The main threat towards aircraft flying over the ocean are surface-to-air missiles (SAM) from 
submarines and surface ships, air-to-air missiles (AAM) from carrier-based aircraft, and 
SAM and AAM threats from shore-based assets when operating within range of the adversary 
coastline. The SAM systems onboard the Kirov battle cruiser include the SA-N-20 Gargoyle 
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Figure 8-13. Russian SAM ranges in the Barents Sea.736 
The Udaloy class destroyer carries the SA-N-9 Gauntlet which has a range of a little more 
than 8 nm/15 km.737 The anti-aircraft armament of the relatively new Admiral Gorshkov class 
frigate is the Hurricane SAM system, a derivative of the land-based S-400 system with a 
range of up to approximately 66 nm/120 km.738  
AAMs inherently have long ranges due to their airborne launch platforms. In addition to the 
range of the aircraft, the Russian AA-13 Arrow, for example, has a range in excess of 150 
nm.739 This poses a significant threat to any adversary flying asset in the area.  
Finally, when operating close to the Russian coastline, any air asset will have to negotiate a 
three-layered missile defence system, based on some of the world’s most capable long-range, 
medium-range and point defence systems. The S-200 and the S-400 create an outer layer air 
 
736 These generic range circles have been adopted from the interactive map posted by Ian Williams, “The Russia 
- NATO A2AD Environment,” Missile Threat Project (CSIS), January 3, 2017, 
https://missilethreat.csis.org/russia-nato-a2ad-environment/. 
737 Russian name: 3K95 Kinzhal. Wood, Russia, the Asymmetric Threat to the United States - A Potent Mixture 
of Energy and Missiles, 62. 
738Russian technical designation: 9M96E/9M96E2. Military-Today.com, “Admiral Gorshkov Class - Multi-Role 
Frigate,” Military-Today, accessed December 6, 2019, http://www.military-
today.com/navy/admiral_gorshkov_class.htm. 
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defence bubble of more than 220 nm.740 This is followed by a second, medium-range layer 
consisting of the S-300 or the Buk system. Then, the innermost layer consists of short-range 
systems such as 9K33 Osa and S-125 Neva for concentrated protection of key areas.  
Figure 8-14 above illustrates the generic SAM threats from surface vessels north of Norway 
and from shore-based systems on the Kola peninsula. Not depicted on the figure are the 
shore-based interceptor and fighter aircraft that will carry AAMs, and that will pose a 
significant threat to any aircraft venturing into the area in which the Russian ambition of 
control stands firm.  
All these threats taken into account, one would be hard pressed to send a manned, large (with 
a significant radar cross section, easily acquired by missile homing), relatively low flying 
(below SAM ceiling of minimum 70,000 feet741), slow moving (well below the speed of 
sound) and slow manoeuvring aircraft, lacking proper self-protection measures, into the 
Barents Sea to conduct ISR operations, including ASW, during times of tension or war. The 
Orion or the Nimrod had modest self-protection measures, consisting of chaff and flare.742 
This means that as the tension rises the risk to the aircraft does as well, which leads to a 
retreat by MPAs from the operational areas of responsibility. Continued MPA operations 
based out of Evenes and Andøya will therefore quickly become a part of an operational risk 
assessment.743  
One natural reaction will be to move the MPA base further south, due to a combination of 
insufficient base protection and the lack of aircraft self-protection. The mere fact that the 
survivability of MPAs can lead to a strategic intelligence asset effectively being removed 
from the theatre of operations in times of war should be a significant cause for concern. 
MPAs will be moved back from the front lines in times when the need for accurate and 
actionable intelligence is greatest. This inherent weakness of the MPAs is a factor that has not 
been sufficiently discussed, not in the MPA community, nor in military nor civilian 
academia. There seems to be a sense of complacency towards MPAs in that a future threat 
 
740 Andresen and Bukkvoll, “Russian Weapons Development towards 2020,” 56, 58; Missile Defense Project, 
“Russia Air and Missile Defense” (Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), June 14, 2018), 
https://missilethreat.csis.org/system/russian-air-defense/. 
741 Missile Defense Project, “Russia Air and Missile Defense.” 
742 Reade, The Age of Orion - The Lockheed P-3 Story, 55–56; Valerie Insinna, “The US Military’s Chaff and 
Flare Industry Is on Fragile Ground,” Defense News, November 13, 2018, 
https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2018/11/13/the-militarys-chaff-and-flare-industry-is-on-fragile-ground/. 
743 The Norwegian Government, “Presiseringer Om Utbyggingen Av Evenes” (The Norwegian Government, 
April 17, 2018), https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/presiseringer-om-utbyggingen-av-evenes/id2598125/. 
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that will deny the utilization of MPAs in crises and war is not properly discussed in 
peacetime. The obvious danger being that when the MPAs are pulled back from the front 
line, a gap in maritime situational awareness and understanding will emerge, as well as the 
ability to deliver long-range lethal force against a submarine threat. 
 
Figure 8-15. The Russian bastion and the reach of the bastion defence.744 
This can be termed the MPA mission portfolio paradox: In times of war, the MPA fleet is 
geographically significantly restricted from executing its key mission: ACINT and ASW. 
Given the reach of modern surface-based SAMs and land-based aircraft with AAMs, the area 
in which there will be considerable risk associated with operating in the High North will 
stretch beyond the Barents Sea, likely further down into the North Atlantic, as depicted in 
Figure 8-15. If the capability to perform long-range, airborne ASW is not supplemented, this 
key capability will diminish as soon as the risk level rises.    
 
744 Rolf Tamnes et al., “A Unified Effort to Strengthen the Defence of Norway” (Norwegian Ministry of 
Defense, April 28, 2015), 21. 
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Supplements to long-range airborne ASW aircraft on the grounds of survivability vary, and 
can be facilitated by several factors: the sensor can operate out of reach from the A2/AD 
measures (e.g. satellites carrying non-acoustic ASW technology745); the sensor can operate 
without being seen by adversary defensive systems (e.g. submarines, manned and unmanned, 
and in the future unmanned aircraft that have an extremely low radar cross section); the 
sensor can operate on a platform with extreme manoeuvrability (e.g.  unmanned aircraft that 
can fly faster and that is more manoeuvrable than any known missile system); or the sensor 
can be carried by a platform with counter-measures that neutralize the respective A2/AD 
measures (e.g. a platform that carries credible and effective counter-measures to any known 
anti-air system, such as artificial intelligence-based reaction to threats and powerful lasers to 
neutralize them746). The latter three will effectively mean that such assets can operate inside 
denied areas at significantly reduced risk. 
A2/AD threats are not denying ISR operations in peacetime. They are latent threats, waiting 
to be employed in times of crisis and war. However, the challenge of operating MPAs in 
denied areas will not disappear. On the contrary, it escalates precisely when one requires 
capable ASW assets the most. 
 
8.3.6 Sensors 
The principles for hunting submarines are essentially the same today as they were during the 
Cold War (and even WWII). It is the significantly improved capacity of the respective 
sensors that take the search to a new level, particularly when combined with highly improved 
onboard computer processing capacity and the ability to share and triangulate sensor 
information nearly instantly with other units.   
Most important to this discussion is the airborne platform’s acoustic sensor. The most 
significant progress achieved for this sensor has without a doubt been the processing capacity 
onboard the aircraft. The P-3 Orion is capable of monitoring 32 buoys simultaneously, while 
the P-8 Poseidon can monitor 64. New generation MPAs carry powerful processors. The 
 
745 It is possible to shoot down a satellite, but a kinetic anti-satellite kill is problematic due to the thousands of 
fragments of the destroyed satellite then automatically entering separate orbits. See for example Leonard David, 
“China’s Anti-Satellite Test: Worrisome Debris Cloud Circles Earth,” Space.Com, February 2, 2007, 
https://www.space.com/3415-china-anti-satellite-test-worrisome-debris-cloud-circles-earth.html. 
746 Tamir Eshel, “Lifting the Veil of Israel’s Classified Laser Weapon Program,” Defense Update, January 8, 
2020, https://defense-update.com/20200108_hel_israel.html; CNN.com, “USAF: Fighter Jet Lasers 5 Years 




operating environment for the sensor operators onboard the aircraft has also been improved 
through reduced noise and fewer vibrations. This allows operators to work with more 
concentration and focus for a longer time.747 
The acoustic sensitivity of the buoys themselves, however, has not improved significantly. 
Some of the reasoning for this lies in what can be termed the “acoustic challenge.”  
 
Figure 8-15. The acoustic challenge.748 
Figure 8-16 depicts how sound in the water is reduced over distance, and the distance in this 
case is that between a sound emitting submarine and a sensor. The upper curve displays the 
sound from a relatively noisy submarine, and the curve below that from a relatively quiet 
submarine. Sound diminishes with the square of the distance, which means that by doubling 
the distance you cut the sound by a factor of four.749 The upper dotted line illustrates the 
capacity of a normal sonar, and the lower dotted line that of an improved sonar. The normal 
sonar detects the noisy submarine at a range corresponding to that of point C, whilst an 
improved sonar detects the noisy submarine all the way out to point D. The sound curve of 
 
747 Fein and Jean, “Changing the Game: U Navy Applies New Approaches to Submainres Threats.” 
748 U.S. House of Representatives, “Advanced Submarines Technology and Antisubmarine Warfare,” § 
Committee on Armed Services (1990), 60; Birkeland, “The Potential of LIDAR as an Anti-Submarine Warfare 
Sensor,” 18. 
749 Birkeland, “The Potential of LIDAR as an Anti-Submarine Warfare Sensor,” 18. 
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the quiet submarine starts lower on the graph, and quickly drops to the point of detection for 
both the normal sonar as well as the improved one. This means that improving the sonar will 
help significantly when tracking a noisy submarine, but only marginally when searching for 
and tracking a quiet submarine. As a corollary to this, more passive sonar equipment is 
required in order to cover the same area acoustically than was the case before.750 Tactically, 
one therefore seems forced to convert to active buoys and sonar at an earlier stage in the 
search for the quiet submarine, or relying more on non-acoustic search methods.751 In order to 
search for a quiet submarine using passive acoustic sensors from the air, one requires many 
and capable buoys, spread out over a large area, to be monitored over time. This, in turn, 
requires extended MPA endurance (to stay longer in the area), higher altitude (to pick up the 
signals from more buoys/several buoy fields at the same time), and more processing capacity 








Figure 8-16. Sound range versus demand for buoys. The longer the range, the fewer buoys are demanded (A).  
The shorter the range, the more buoys are demanded (B). 
 
In an example provided by a NATO report from 2016, passive sonobuoy ranges were in the 
1970s and 80s often at 3,000 yards (1,5 nm).752 These ranges had by the mid-2010s been 
reduced to less than 500 yards (0,25 nm). When modern submarines reduce their sound 
emissions, the sensitivity of the sensor must increase significantly – alternatively one can 
place more sensors in the water, reducing the distance between them.  
 
750 Birkeland, 18–19; Perkins, “Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare - A Forecast for Maritime Air ASW 
in the Future Operational Environment,” 39–40. 
751 Birkeland, “The Potential of LIDAR as an Anti-Submarine Warfare Sensor,” 18–19. 
752 Perkins, “Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare - A Forecast for Maritime Air ASW in the Future 





Figure 8-18. Development in detectability of Russian and Chinese submarines, as estimated by                              
the US Navy Office for Naval Intelligence (ONI).753 
Less sound emitted also leads to fewer instances (if any) of convergence zones at large 
distances. In addition, today’s ocean is filled with more sounds, mainly from human 
activities, which leads to more ambient noise and clutter for the acoustic sensor operator to 
work through.754 Several high-ranking American naval officials have explicitly stated in open 
sources that the Severodvinsk class will pose significant challenges to NATO’s ability to 
maintain control of her whereabouts due to her capabilities and silent propulsion.755 The 
second ship of the Severodvinsk class, which initiated sea trials in 2019, is reportedly an 
improved version of the first vessel.756 
Following on from this, the previously mentioned modus operandi of the adversary 
submarine also comes into play for acoustic sensors. There is a fundamentally lower chance 
 
753 Office of Naval Intelligence, “The People’s Liberation Army Navy - A Modern Navy with Chinese 
Characteristics” (Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), August 2009), 22. 
754 Perkins, “Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare - A Forecast for Maritime Air ASW in the Future 
Operational Environment,” 38. 
755 Dave Majumdar, “U.S. Navy Impressed with New Russian Attack Boat,” USNI News, October 28, 2014, 
https://news.usni.org/2014/10/28/u-s-navy-impressed-new-russian-attack-boat; Franz-Stefan Gady, “Russian 
Sub Combat Patrols Nearly Doubled in 2015,” The Diplomat, March 23, 2016, 
https://thediplomat.com/2016/03/russian-sub-combat-patrols-nearly-doubled-in-2015/. 
756 Franz-Stefan Gady, “Russia’s First Yasen-M Attack Sub to Begin State Trials in 2019,” The Diplomat, 
December 8, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/12/russias-first-yasen-m-attack-sub-to-begin-state-trials-in-
2019/; Thomas Nilsen, “Sevmash Floats out Second Yasen-M Class Nuclear Attack Submarine,” The Barents 












Figure 8-18. (A) Predictable submarine pattern: higher chance of detection of systematic datums. 
 (B) Unpredictable submarine pattern: lower chance of detection of sporadic datums.  
 
If one can increase the sensitivity of the passive acoustic sensors, the probability of detection 







Figure 8-19. (C) Unpredictable submarine pattern: higher chance of detection of sporadic datums through 
increased sensor range. 
Another challenge to the acoustic operator is the finite sonobuoy life. Sonobuoys usually used 
by airborne NATO units have a maximum life of approximately 8 hours. After this, they are 
automatically scuttled and sunk. The limited buoy life is based on the limited timespan of an 
MPA sortie: When dropped into the water, the buoy will rarely service the MPA with 
acoustic data for more than a few hours, and as a common MPA sortie rarely spans beyond 
10 hours, there are obvious cost-saving measures in reducing battery life. When a submarine 
contact was historically handed over from one MPA to another, the frequency channel of the 





the oncoming aircraft would use the same frequency channels on its buoys as the previous 
aircraft, and if they were searching or tracking in similar areas over time, the buoys from the 
previous aircraft would interfere with the buoys of the oncoming aircraft. It would then be in 
the interest of the overtaking asset that as many buoys as possible not relevant for the 
continued tracking were scuttled ahead of time. 
Therefore, more feasible than significantly increasing the sensitivity of the buoys, one can 
increase their battery life. When a modern submarine is evading detection, she now has the 
benefit of two factors against the airborne ASW platform: her own reduced sound emissions, 
and the temporary nature of the airborne search. In one day, the submarine is sailing and 
operating for 24 hours, but a single MPA can only be onstation for approximately 10 of those 
hours. And within the time available, the MPA has to choose where to place its finite number 
of sonobuoys. If, however, the buoys could be monitored by other assets that operated in the 
area after the MPA left the scene, there would be a more efficient utilization and exploitation 
of the buoys’ capacity, in addition to the reduction in manoeuvrable areas for the adversary 
submarine, due to the large areas of buoy patterns being monitored over time. For example, 
an MPA can place several buoy patterns in areas of interest, monitors these until offstation 
time, and then the buoys are monitored by a high-altitude unmanned aircraft with an 
endurance of more than 30 hours. Such tactics, however, demand an increased range of 
transmitting frequencies for the buoys than are available today, in order to deconflict all the 
frequencies in use. 
The significantly improved processing capacity of modern MPAs presents possibilities for 
the further development of multi-static technology and procedures. This system facilitates 
two important aspects in a submarine search. First, it improves the active search by 

















Figure 8-21. Increased search area for an active buoy in a MAC setup (B), compared to                                











Figure 8-22. MAC fields supporting area denial operations 
In a field of MAC buoys, one active transmission can be picked up and analysed by multiple 
buoys, either by detecting a return from the object (submarine), or by analysing the reduced 
signal and attenuation caused by the sonar shadow. One active buoy will together with a 
series of passive MAC buoys cover a larger area than is possible with a single active buoy. 
Second, a large area actively searched by MAC units will provide a stronger picture of where 
a submarine is not (a negative search). This approach to negative search results also support 
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area denial operations. Active transmissions function as part of both search for adversary 
submerged units, as well as denying those units freedom to operate.  
 
8.3.7 Maturity and time: Processing, exploitation and dissemination (PED) 
Finally, the first tier of our theoretical framework consists of the processes that transform raw 
sensor products into actionable intelligence at some level of maturity. For airborne platforms 
prosecuting a submarine, the relevance is in the ability to reach tactical sensor data maturity. 
The technology for acoustic analysis has improved over the years, in particular in regards to 
processing capacity, for example for multi-static systems. However, the inherent problem 
with MAC is that it involves active procedures, which alert the submarine of the MPA focus 
area. In terms of passive detectability, some progress has been made, but not what is required 
to meet the significant quieting progress in submarine development, as figure 8-18 above 
from ONI demonstrates. All in all, a modern MPA such as the P-8 will be able to reach 
tactical sensor maturity in less time than the P-3, when the sound emitting submarine is used 
as a constant and the processing capability is used as a variable. However, when the search 
technology is used as a constant and the development of submarine silencing is used as a 
variable, it will take longer to reach tactical sensor maturity against a modern submarine than 
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The louder sounds emitted by older submarines together with the older modus operandi of the 
target required less time before MPA reached attack criteria in the 1980s than is the case 
today. Once again, two fundamentally negative factors therefore stand out. Firstly, the 
adversary submarine has become significantly more quiet. Secondly, the adversary submarine 
is operating in an unpredictable pattern. As explained above, the quieting of submarines has 
more effect than the increased sensitivity of the sensor. The search for and subsequent 
tracking of a submarine by acoustic means is what can be termed a wicked problem, perhaps 
best explained by a former leading figure in British maritime airborne surveillance:  
“A simple problem is orders: Run over there, take that Nimrod to Kinloss. 
That is a simple thing. (…) A complex problem is a bit like writing an ATO. 
It’s lots of moving parts, it is difficult, but if you throw enough horsepower at 
it, it will get done. It is a process thing. (…) It is a bounded problem. ASW 
falls in the category of what I call wicked problems. When you start off on it, 
you don’t know what the end result is going to look like. You haven’t got a 
clue. You’ve got all the procedure you’ll do, but it’s a wicked problem 
because it is unbounded. And there will be lots of shades of grey that you have 
to interpret along the way.”757 
Processing passive acoustic sensor information is in itself demanding. In short, the operator 
requires whatever help that can be provided. Developing technology for processing so-called 
Big Data will likely be pivotal for sifting through immense amounts of oceanographic 
information and detecting what is relevant. Modern sensors are simply picking up too much 
information for any human to handle, and complex sensor analysis is, and will only become, 
more dependent on Big Data analysis and artificial intelligence.758 This will particularly be 
the case if drones are to take over ASW responsibilities from MPAs. And with sonobuoys 
increasingly incapable of detecting and tracking modern submarines by themselves, airborne 
ASW assets are dependent on close cooperation and coordination with other assets, in space, 
in the air, on the surface or below the surface. Finally, in today’s fiscal environment it seems 
impossible to mount a fully layered approach to ASW by one single nation alone. A multi-
national approach is required. The factors of silencing adversary submarines, their 
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unpredictability in operating patterns, and the challenging sensor processing therefore 
demands an even more holistic approach to submarine search by air assets than was the case 
previously.  
Three principled avenues for improving the chance of detection stand out. First, there is a 
requirement for improved acoustic sensor processing. It is telling that in 2020, when the 
world’s most powerful Navy, backed by the most encompassing research and development 
environment in the world is fielding the state-of-the-art MPA that is the P-8 Poseidon, there 
is still a requirement for two human acoustic sensor operators onboard. Acoustic tactical 
analysis is a wicked problem, and if one is to delegate that work to a computer it will likely 
have to be one that runs on artificial intelligence. ASW is not just a mathematical problem. 
Oceanographic factors that come into play are changes in salinity and temperature that 
combine with pressure increase with depth and cause multiple sound layers in the water 
column; ambient noises caused by human activities and unpredictable animals and life in the 
sea complicate the background for the frequency analysis; and of course the human factor of 
submarine tactics and general unpredictable behaviour lead to qualified guessing being an 
integral part of ASW.   
Further building on the idea of assistance, the sensor analysis process will be vastly improved 
if two computers would be able to correlate their findings in geographical areas that are in 
proximity to each other. One example is two P-8 Poseidons working in tandem on a tracking 
challenge, with one being able to “complete the picture” of the other asset. Similarly, there 
are likely benefits in transmitting acoustic data to an analysis centre ashore, with Big Data 
capable computers and more subject matter expertise able to assist as a reach-back solution. 
Second, building on experiences from the past, there is a requirement for a layered, multi-
asset approach to searching for and tracking modern submarines. In order to meet the 

















Figure 8-24. Six layers for a holistic approach to ASW 
Together, these layers will cover as many search angles against the adversary submarine as 
possible. A layered approach like this will also provide redundancy in cases of elements, such 
as the MPA, being neutralized (or removed from the area of interest).   
Finally, a comprehensive layered approach like the one described above requires 
international cooperation. Not even the mighty US Navy is able to muster all these layers in 
the High North at the same time. This is intelligence gathering and acoustic searches for some 
of the most capable submarines in the world. An Allied approach is required to build this 
order of battle. With regards to command & control, the fact remains, and the previous 
chapters have shown, that historical ASW operations in the North Atlantic have not been 
coordinated and executed by NATO per se, but by individual nations coordinating in a bi- 
and multilateral context.759 They have been coordinated by national headquarters, controlling 
national assets on national missions. These nations happen to be NATO members, and they 
adhere to procedures that have been established by operating together with Allies in exercises 
and daily operations. In order to be capable of seamless and efficient multinational 
coordination of complex ASW operations, NATO should integrate as many national 
headquarters as possible into the Alliance command structure in peacetime. This might lead 
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to an Alliance command structure not sitting idly, waiting to have forces assigned to it, but an 
organization that is actively engaging in operations on a daily basis. 
In addition, international cooperation will require close intelligence relationships, beyond 
those that exist within the framework of NATO. Proposals for surveillance cooperation 
within the framework of the Alliance are commendable, but there are show-stoppers as to 
intelligence-sharing in these projects: this kind of intelligence cannot be shared with just 
anyone.760 It is clear that the US and the UK have a special relationship with regards to 
intelligence. Norway, too, has long-standing cooperation with the US with regards to 
surveillance in the High North. As was the case for tracking Russian strategic submarines on 
their way to and returning from patrols during the Cold War, these three nations stand to gain 
significant benefit from close operational cooperation. All three nations operating P-8 
Poseidons in the future will certainly assist in this respect. 
 
8.4 Conclusion  
The early years after WWII and the 1950s were significantly formative for international 
security politics in the High North in general, and for security politics for Norway in 
particular. With the existential threat of the Nazis removed, the relationship between East and 
West turned confrontational in the late 1940s. Norwegian authorities had to find their place in 
the middle of great power competition between the US and the USSR. The neutral stands 
during WWI and the “forced” inclusion into the group of Western allies during WWII had 
made it abundantly clear to the Norwegian government that an active stands had to be taken, 
and in 1949, Norway became a founding member of the NATO alliance. This membership 
was to become the cornerstone of Norwegian security politics. NATO quickly assumed an 
offensive posture in the North Atlantic to contain any Soviet expansion. Exercises, both at sea 
and on land in the North, were the manifeststion of this posture. This posture brought with it 
an explicit and enduring challenge to Norwegian security policy: How best to integrate with 
the Alliance of which Norway was a member, and still maintain low tensions towards the 
increasingly powerful neighbour to the East? The basing policy of the late 1940s provided the 
grounds for the detailed operational restrictions that were put in place for allied activities on 
and based from Norwegian soil in the High North. These formal restrictions played a dual 
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role in Norwegian security policy in the North. Firstly, they did just what they were explicitly 
intended to do: They kept capable allies at arms length in order not to stir up tensions in what 
was becoming increasingly sensitive areas to the Russians. The military build-up on the Kola 
peninsula turned the areas neighbouring Norway into the heart of Russian military operations 
and strategic capabilities in the High North and the Atlantic. Secondly, the Norwegian 
restrictions for allied units indirectly made the areas off the coast of Kola the responsibility of 
Norwegian armed forces and intelligence assets. We know that allied aircraft and clandestine 
submarines regularly ventured into the Barents Sea without coordinating with, or receiving 
approval from, Norwegian authorities. Sailing from or taking off from foreign soil, the latter 
was not necessary. However, the main, regular effort of keeping track of Soviet naval 
operations and testing of new weapons and sensor systems in the Barents Sea had to be 
executed from Norwegian soil, if only due to the sheer distances involved. With the policy of 
restricting Allied assets from entering the Barents Sea from Norway, the restrictions became 
a political tool in both ensuring low tensions and establishing somewhat of a monopoly on 
intelligence collection in the High North, east of Norway. 
The Norwegian MPAs that returned from the UK after WWII were incapable of keeping 
track of the developments on the Soviet side of the border. Norwegian authorities on their 
side did not see the requirement to monitor these developments either in the aftermath of 
WWII. In the mid-1950s, Norwegian authorities were sensing a mounting pressure on 
acquiring the proper tools to support the Americans and the Alliance with timely and relevant 
intelligence from the Kola peninsula. Norway, however, could not afford any heavy 
investments in new equipment. The aircraft that served during WWII were now taking part in 
re-building the country after five years of Nazi occupation. The NATO common project from 
the mid-50s therefore came at an opportune time.        
The history portrayed in this thesis has examined how NATO debated the requirements for 
MPA in meeting the emerging Soviet submarine menace, and how the basic tenets of 
airborne ISR were involved in those discussions. These tenets play a key role also in 
establishing an understanding of today´s requirements. Norway, however, even in the face of 
a common alliance project that would presumably be cost-efficient compared to going it 
alone, had to rely on the support from the US and the MDAP. This led to the compromise that 
was the Albatross. The aircraft as affordable to operate for the Norwegians, and capable of 
providing just enough basic intelligence and surveillance for the Alliance, at least in the 
beginning. However, as the Soviet Union developed more capable submarines and missiles in 
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the 1960s, NATO adhered to a defensive barrier strategy, which was dependent on capable 
airborne ASW platforms and a framework of international MPA cooperation. It became clear 
that the Norwegians did not provide sufficient intelligence through the use of their 
Albatrosses, and it was in the 1960s that Norway, all the way up to the highest political 
levels, established an understanding that Norwegian MPAs had to be capable of actual anti-
submarine warfare, surveillance and reconnaissance, against Russian submarines. This led to 
negotiations in the mid-1960s between the US and Norway, conducted personally between 
the defense ministers of the two nations, culminating in the first P-3 Orion procurement. The 
Orion was operationalized in 1969 for Norway, and became the operational tool that would 
alleviate the pressure put on Norway´s retrictions on Allied operations in the North. For the 
first time, Norwegian authorities could follow up their severely limiting restrictions with 
significant operational intelligence deliveries from the Barents Sea.  
The political dynamics of détente in the 1970s prolonged the defensive maritime approach to 
strategy in the North Atlantic and towards Russian submarines on patrol. This suited the 
Norwegian government well. The expansion of exclusive economic rights to 200 nm in the 
late 1970s meant that the dialogue with Soviet authorities on several delineations in the High 
North, as well as the management of natural resources, was demanding. Additional military 
tensions would only have exacerbated an already challenging dialogue. The 1970s and early 
1980s were the golden years of airborne ASW in the North Atlantic. Norwegian MPAs 
conducted intelligence gathering which fed into US and NATO strategic assessments, and 
even though very few military investments and weapons systems can be considered low-cost, 
at least to the Norwegian government in the 1960s, the investment in an ASW capable MPA 
fleet provided significant political returns. The intelligence relationship between Norway and 
the US became a cornerstone of the security policy relationship between the two nations writ 
large.  
In addition to the intelligence gathering in the Barents Sea, this study has underlined the 
signifncant international efforts that went into monitoring and holding at risk Soviet strategic 
submarines on patrol in the Atlantic. The three main nations executing this task were the US, 
the UK and Norway. Although based on NATO procedures and infrastructure, the operational 
coordination was a tri- and bilateral matter. This coordination was necessary, because one 
nation could not cover the vast ocean areas by itself. It was also successful, so much so that 
NIS estimated that it had overview of Soviet strategic submarine movements with a certainty 
of 80-90%. This “ASW happy time” would come to an end, however. As Soviet submarine 
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quieting took hold in the 1980s, it became increasingly difficult to follow the Russian 
submarines. Even though the strategic submarines were increasingly kept in home waters and 
on patrol in the High North after the establishment of the bastion defense strategy, the attack 
submarines fielded in the 1980s that constituted the forwards elements of the bastion strategy 
gave cause for concern. The attack submarines of the 1980s were very hard to find and 
follow.  
The early 1980s saw the new Maritime Strategy of the US Navy, and the CONMAROPS of 
NATO, manifest themselves through a forward naval posture reminiscent of that from the 
early 1950s. As the Soviet Northern Fleet established its defensive bastion in the Barents Sea, 
the US Navy followed it up north. Regular clandestine patrols with both US and UK attack 
and intelligence submarines were conducted in the backyard of the Russian fleet. This led to 
several individuals, to include the Norwegian defence minister, explaining that too much of 
an offensive posture in naval strategy in the High North would be inherently destabilizing. 
The Norwegians were thus back to their challenge from the 1950s: They desired credible 
allied presence in order to make allied reinforcements credible and thus a stable deterrent. 
However, too much offensive presence would be destabilizing and constitute a threat to low 
tensions in the North. Norwegian MPAs, on their side, continued to provide intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance, backing up their Government in their efforts to execute a 
demanding security policy balancing act.  
The challenge of modern, Russian submarines became mute with the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1991. Over a short period of time, the pendulum swung far to the other side: The 
Alliance looked towards dialogue and cooperation, and sought to capitalize on the peace 
dividend. Threats of the Cold War were increasingly downplayed, and the military 
organizations of both alliance members and the Alliance as a whole were downsized and 
organized towards expeditionary operations. The 1990s passed without the necessary 
reorganisation to military infratstructure in Norway, leading to a gap between the resource 
allocated by politicians and the vast basing infrastructure that was directed towards a defence 
from invasion. At the turn of the millennium, the armed forces of Norway was also 
reorganized towards expeditionary operations as opposed to an invasion defence.  
The decades following the collapse of the Soviet Union led to an identity crisis within the 
MPA community, where NATO MPAs were extensively utilized in support of operations 
over land. Although the Russian activities in the Barents Sea as a whole did not drop as much 
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as the number of strategic patrols did, the focus of the military and political entities were 
elsewhere. After the terrorist attacks on the US in 2001, the strategic focus on the Middle 
East became all-encompassing. Maritime air operations involved no ASW at all, and the 
ASW competency of the Alliance atrophied.  
In 2008, the Norwegian defence minister presented a non-paper to her colleagues, which 
called for a renewed focus on the security challenges that lay within the more traditional 
geographical areas of the Alliance. This was the start of an enduring effort on the part of the 
Norwegians to bring the focus of the Alliance back to strategic matters closer to home, and 
the defence of NATO´s core geographical area. And when new and improved Russian 
submarines became operational in the 2010s, it became evident that the Alliance was ill 
prepared to meet the resurgent Russian submarine threat. NATO members had to make 
difficult decisions regarding their MPA communities in an ambiguous threat scenario. The 
increasingly forward leaning and offensive Russian posture in the North Atlantic, and the 
illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 underlined the importance of the Norwegian initiative.  
However, almost as a paradox if seen against the emerging security policy situation, the 
Norwegian CHOD decided in 2015 that he could perform maritime surveillance in the High 
North through the use of unmanned aircraft, without MPAs. This would effectively remove 
the Norwegian long-range airborne ASW capability that had served the nation so well for the 
past 55 years. The politicians, however, were convinced that the nation could not live without 
a capability of such strategic importance, and overturned the CHOD decision. This thesis has 
shown the rationale for the latter decision. It has also explained the fundamentals of the 
discussion of airborne surveillance in the High North, against the most fundamental naval 
asset the Russian Navy has at its disposal: its submarine fleet.  
Over the past few years the submarine activites of the Russian fleet has increased 
significantly. Large exercises in the Barents Sea and the North Atlantic are both underlining 
the bastion concept of operations, and showing a capacity to break out from home waters and 
pose a significant threat to European cities and infrastructure. Missile firing into Syria have 
demonstrated, in live operations, the ability to operate cross-theatre with capable submarines 
with state-of-the-art cruise missiles. This increased activity shows the renewed requirement 
for anti-submarines capabilities and intelligence assets on the part of the Norwegian 
government: There is a renewed threat from Russian submarines, which now not only are 
more quiet than ever, but operate in a muc more unpredictable pattern posing a threat to a 
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diverse set of potential targets. Also, the new weapons systems are being tested in the areas 
that are close to Norway, meaning that the relevance of strategic intelligence on weapons 
development and employment in the Barents Sea is only growing.  
With the unpredictability that comes with modern Russian submarine modus operandi, it 
seems absolutely crucial that the effort to keep track of them must be approached from an 
international standpoint. This thesis has depicted the problem set of the acoustic challenge, 
and in order to approach modern adversary submarine operations holistically, the operations 
must be a multi-national and multi-asset endeavour. The main candidates for such a close 
cooperation are the US and the UK. The US have flown the P-8 since 2012, and the UK is 
operationalizing their first aircraft in 2020/2021. Norway is planning on phasing in their P-8 
aircraft in 2022/2023. This means that in a few years´time, all three nations will be flying the 
same type of MPA for the first time. This facilitates close international cooperation on most, 
if not all, aspects of operating the P-8.    
In order to understand the complexities of this challenge and how MPAs fit into it, it has been 
necessary to deconstruct the fundamentals of airborne ISR in general, and to place ASW 
within that framework. This has been done utilizing open sources and declassified material, 
which means that the entire discussion has tacitly been made available and understandable to 
the public. This latter point has been the core motivation for pursuing this thesis. A principled 
understanding of the elements that constitute the tenets of airborne ISR should inform any 
serious debate on why certain assets are necessary, or how their use has become obsolete, or 
how a certain framework for conducting surveillance in the High North must evolve.  
The key research objective of this thesis has been to define the role of ASW within the 
airborne ISR mission set in the High North. The answer is that ASW is a fundamental and 
crucial element in airborne ISR in the High North, and without credible ASW search, 
tracking and neutralizing capability, nations will be blind to the most significant naval threat 
in the North Atlantic. Two factors stand out in futher explaining the complex. 
First, submarines are the capital ships of the Russian Navy, and have been so since the early 
Cold War. They remain the key factor for Russian naval operations, and will likely continue 
to be so in the future. Submarines should be considered the centre of gravity for the Northern 
Fleet, and most likely the Navy as a whole. They are likely to expand as the crucial factor for 
naval and joint operations for the Russian Armed Forces. The Northern Fleet submarines’s 
mission is most likely first, to constitute an assured second-strike capability. Second, they are 
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to comprise a forward and fundamental element of the bastion defence. Third, they are to 
pose a credible, dual-capable land-attack threat against both the European mainland (without 
crossing the GIUK gap) and the US East coast. And fourth, they are likely to pose a 
somewhat revised anti-SLOC threat, in the sense that they will likely not target the SLOCs 
directly, but indirectly through striking objects of fundamental strategic importance, such as 
ports. The movements of the submarines have changed, from a fairly predictable and repeated 
transit route to, in and from known patrol areas, to operating over periods of time in large 
patrol areas posing a threat to all of Europe – without having to pass the GIUK gap. They are 
far more silent than before, and carry significantly more capable missiles. 
Second, MPAs are by themselves not a cost-efficient tool for conducting maritime airborne 
ISR in the High North in this contemporary context. It is fundamentally important to keep in 
mind that although the new MPAs are more capable than their predecessors, they do not fully 
address the submarine threat: they must be a part of a system of systems. If politicians and 
military strategists are concerned that vast resources are being invested in new aircraft, they 
must also be made aware that this expensive investment is just one piece of the puzzle. First, 
the onboard processing systems and operators are not capable of handling the acoustic 
quietness of modern Russian submarines as they are configured today. The way to bridge that 
gap is through the utilization of artificial intelligence, Big Data processing, and collaborative, 
real-time sensor processing in order to close in on the adversary submarine. In addition, the 
MPAs are just one of six layers that are necessary to cover the search holistically. Satellites, 
unmanned systems in the air, on the surface and below the surface, as well as sea-bed 
sensors, must also contribute to a comprehensive search picture. Finally, international 
cooperation is required. However, it is likely that established Alliance frameworks are not 
sufficient for the intelligence sharing agreements required. As before, a niche collection of 








This thesis has developed a set of concluding recommendations for maritime airborne ISR for 
Norway and her close allies as part of effectively tracking Russian submarine movements in 
the High North.  
 
8.5.1 Altitude 
High boy/low boy tactics 
The US Navy is taking high boy/low boy tactics further with the BAMS concept, in which a 
MQ-4 Triton HALE unmanned aircraft operates at altitude, facilitating a significantly more 
efficient use of high cost, shorter-endurance assets such as the P-8 Poseidon. For mitigating 
the complexities of modern maritime surveillance, this combination stands out as a 
requirement for credible airborne surveillance of large ocean areas, until long-endurance 
unmanned aircraft are able to perform the entire mission portfolio of contemporary MPAs, 
including ASW. With the current state of technology, one or the other will not suffice – we 
need both. 
   
Satellites should be an integrated element of maritime surveillance 
Satellites are already extensively used for surveillance tasks, including in the maritime 
domain. Sensors from space do not penetrate water, but regular surveillance from space 
through the use of IMINT and ELINT sensors to cover more or less the entire area of interest 
in one pass will constitute the uppermost layer in a layered approach to covering vast ocean 
areas. The space dimension will support communications, surveillance and targeting.   
 
8.5.2 Speed 
Speed should be exploited for expanded area coverage and increased responsiveness 
Increased speed means quicker reaction times to a datum and a larger area covered during a 
sortie. Decreased reaction time should be exploited, and improved in the future. This can be 
achieved through sensors operating at higher altitudes without the ability to act on their own 
findings (satellites, high-altitude unmanned aircraft), operating in an interconnected manner 
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with weaponized platforms (today MPAs, in the future weapons-laden unmanned aircraft) 
that can move quickly and deploy sensors and weapons into the water. 
 
8.5.3 Range 
Norwegian guidelines for allied aircraft in the Barents Sea should be reconsidered   
The Norwegian government should reflect on the guidelines for Allied activity in the High 
North and their relevance. New technology, particularly in terms of extremely long-
endurance unmanned vessels and aircraft, coupled with new air-to-air refuelling capabilities, 
can shift the weight from Norwegian platforms to include Allied aircraft operating out of 
airfields far from Norwegian soil. This will lead to a more demanding dialogue in the future 
with Allies that want to operate in the High North. 
 
In order to exploit range versus base location, international cooperation will be key 
Due to the vast areas in question, and the uncertainties associated with the Russian submarine 
modus operandi, close international coordination will be key to efficiently covering the North 
Atlantic with capable platforms. Norway should look to the past and geographical delineation 
arrangements that can inform future constructs for international cooperation.  
 
Long range is key for pattern of life 
Not only necessary in order to reach the respective points of interest in the vast North 
Atlantic, range is crucial to establishing the pattern of life in the area of interest. The modus 
operandi of the Russian Navy seems to include more elements of what can be termed hybrid 
warfare, which complicates the building of a comprehensive understanding of what is normal 
and what is not. If the goal is to notice anomalies, a solid understanding of normal day-to-day 







SATCOM for broadband communications and targeting 
ASW assets will benefit greatly from being able to instantly exchange acoustic data with 
other units nearby, or as an analysis reach-back function in order to be able to analyse the 
large amounts of acoustic data that become available in a modern ASW prosecution. This 
will require broadband, over-the-horizon communications, that can only be facilitated by 
SATCOM. Also, long-range maritime platforms will require encrypted and robust space-
based communications for providing targeting to Allied units at distance. 
 
Civilian-military cooperation for space-based assets 
New Space has brought with it an expanding civilian market for space services. This must be 
exploited for the military. Commercial capabilities should be utilized where possible in order 
to save costs. Civilian-military cooperation is a cost-efficient framework for modern 
capabilities, be it in support of communication or surveillance. 
 
8.5.5 Survivability 
MPAs must be supplemented by assets that can operate within the realm of A2/AD measures.  
The MPA mission portfolio paradox demands that in order to facilitate long-range ASW in 
areas threatened by A2/AD measures, MPAs must be supplemented by platforms that are 
stealthy, or that have extreme manoeuvring capabilities. If MPAs are to be utilized in 
offensive operations in crises and war, irrespective of operating area, they must be protected 
(either by themselves or by other assets), capable of employing stand-off weapons, and/or 




Long-life sonobuoys – multi-platform exploitation 
Very long-life sonobuoys with GPS-tracking of their own position could constitute a long-life 
search field in an area of interest, such as a choke point. An improved communications suite 
that can handle more frequency channels will mitigate the challenge of interference between 
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different buoy fields being monitored and analysed at the same time. This means that an 
MPA can fly out and drop a field of sonobuoys, work and analyse the incoming acoustic 
information, and then hand off to a high-altitude, long endurance asset that would remain in 
the area for much longer than the MPA. This will mitigate the finiteness of the MPA 
presence, and complicate the options for movement available to the submarine.        
 
Multi-statics 
Multi-statics will be a revolution for ASW acoustic sensor operators, and seems to be 
evolving into an absolute necessity for modern submarine prosecution, even though it is an 
active sensor. MAC systems will be key for executing denial operations against adversary 
submarines. In the near future, one might be able to link up several MAC prosecutions into a 
system of systems, in order to cover an even larger area holistically. This will require 
significant data processing capabilities, in addition to encrypted broadband communications 
between the search units.  
 
8.5.7 Maturity and time: PED 
AI and Big Data processing 
Artificial intelligence and Big Data processing should be incorporated into airborne ASW 
platforms as soon as feasible, in order to handle the complexities of modern acoustic analysis. 
Allies should investigate the possibility for collaborative analysis of acoustic data, based on 
instant or near-real time dissemination of own acoustic data. Processing capacity and the 
ability to exchange large amounts of data more or less instantly, should be fully exploited in 
order to mitigate the acoustic challenge. 
 
Layered persistent sensor framework 
A layered approach to ASW must be adopted. MPAs by themselves are not nearly enough to 
meet the emerging Russian submarine threat. Six layers for ISR and targeting of submarines 
should be sought: space-based asset for sensors, communications and targeting; high-altitude 
long-endurance unmanned aircraft for near-constant presence; MPAs for ISR and weapons 
employment; surface assets (manned and unmanned) for long-range, near-persistent presence 
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with underwater sensors; underwater platforms (manned and unmanned) for near-persistent 
underwater presence, ISR and carrying weapons; and finally sea-bed sensors for persistent 
ISR and cueing for other ASW platforms.  
 
International cooperation and intelligence exchange 
Historically, airborne ASW operations were coordinated by NATO alliance members, but all 
coordination was done under a national, bilateral or multilateral framework. NATO 
procedures were used, as well as NATO funded infrastructure. However, stating that the 
operations were conducted “by NATO” undermines an important element in describing the 
operations: There are key nations that were, and to a degree still are, able to handle ASW 
coordination of this sort. For the North Atlantic, this has been the US, the UK and Norway. 
Whether the infrastructure, procedures and competency to coordinate and lead such operation 
is present in today’s NATO Command Structure per se is quite a different matter. The close 
hold that is inherent in acoustic intelligence as discussed in the historical chapters is likely 
still a prominent factor, leading to a tension between intelligence collection and intelligence 
sharing. Close cooperation between selected partners thus stands out as crucial for releasing 
the potential inherent in international cooperation. As a continuation of this, NATO should 
integrate national headquarters closely with the NATO Command Structure writ large, in 
order to exploit the capability and situational awareness that is built on a daily basis outside 




















NATO archives, Brussels 
AC/126-D/1 (REV). “The Group of Experts on Maritime Patrol Aircraft - The Status of 
Development of Maritime Patrol Aircraft,” June 28, 1957. CD: IS-AC-0385. NATO 
Archives, Brussel. 
AC/126-D/2. “Group of Experts on Maritime Patrol Aircraft - Desired Operational 
Characteristics,” August 22, 1957. CD: IS-AC-0385. NATO Archives, Brussel. 
AC/126-D/3. “Group of Experts on Maritime Patrol Aircraft - Desired Operational 
Characteristics of the Maritime Patrol Aircraft,” December 3, 1957. CD: IS-AC-0385. 
NATO Archives, Brussel. 
AC/126-D/5. “Group of Experts on Maritime Patrol Aircraft - Report to the Armaments 
Committee - 16th December 1958,” December 16, 1958. CD: IS-AC-0385. NATO 
Archives, Brussel. 
AC/126-D/6. “Group of Experts on Maritime Patrol Aircraft - NATO Multilateral 
Procurement and/or Production for a Maritime Patrol Aircraft,” November 10, 1958. 
CD: IS-AC-0385. NATO Archives, Brussel. 
AC/126(DS)R/1. “Group of Experts on Maritime Patrol Aircraft - Sub-Group on Design 
Studies - Summary of Meeting Held on 10-11 March 1958,” March 11, 1958. CD: IS-
AC-0385. NATO Archives, Brussel. 
AC/126(DS)R/4. “Group of Experts on Maritime Patrol Aircraft - Sub-Group on Design 
Studies - Summary Record of Meeting 9-10 July 1958,” July 10, 1958. CD: IS-AC-
0385. NATO Archives, Brussel. 
AC/126-R/1. “Group of Experts on Maritime Patrol Aircraft - Summary of the First Meeting, 
16 April 1957,” April 23, 1957. CD: IS-AC-0385. NATO Archives, Brussel. 
AC/126-R/2. “Group of Experts on Maritime Patrol Aircraft - Summary Record of the 
Meeting Held at Palais de Chaillot, Paris, 11 October 1957,” October 23, 1957. CD: 
IS-AC-0385. NATO Archives, Brussel. 
AC/126-R/3. “Group of Experts on Maritime Patrol Aircraft - Summary of Meeting Held on 
16 and 17 January 1958,” January 17, 1958. CD: IS-AC-0385. NATO Archives, 
Brussel. 
AC/126-R/4. “Group of Experts on Maritime Patrol Aircraft - Summary Record of Meeting 
on 10 March 1958,” March 10, 1958. CD: IS-AC-0385. NATO Archives, Brussel. 
AC/126-R/5. “Group of Experts on Maritime Patrol Aircraft - Summary Record of Meeting 
22-24 October 1958,” October 24, 1958. CD: IS-AC-0385. NATO Archives, Brussel. 
AC/137/D/20. “Statement on Future Trends in Anti-Submarine Warfare Made at the Second 
Meeting of the Science Committee by the SACLANT Representative.” NATO, July 
17, 1958. CD: IS-AC-0385. NATO Archives, Brussel. 
AC/137-R/3. “Science Committee - Summary Records of Meetings Held at the Palais de 
Chaillot, Paris, 5-8 January 1959.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 
January 19, 1959. CD: IS-AC-0385. NATO Archives, Brussel. 
AR(56)GENERAL-WP/1. “Report on the 1956 Annual Review,” November 23, 1956. 
Electronic Document Folder: IMS/1955-1959. NATO Archives, Brussel. 
240 
 
C-M(59)39. “Standing Group - SACLANT Anti-Submarine Warfare Centre.” NATO, April 
14, 1959. CD: IS-AC-0385. NATO Archives, Brussel. 
C-R(68)5. “Summary Record of a Meeting of the Council Held at the Headquarters, Brussels, 
on Wednesday, 24th January at 10.15 A.M.” NATO, February 7, 1968. Electronic 
Document Folder: IMS/MC-MCM-SG/1953-1970. NATO Archives, Brussel. 
IPT 098-195. “Military Comments on the 1956 Annual Review - Note by the International 
Planning Team,” November 8, 1956. Electronic Document Folder: IMS/1955-1959. 
NATO Archives, Brussel. 
MC 14/2. “The Overall Strategic Concept for the Defence of the NATO Area,” October 14, 
1956. Electronic Document Folder: IMS/MC-MCM-SG/1953-1970. NATO Archives, 
Brussel. 
MC 48/3. “Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept for the Defence of the NATO 
Area.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), December 8, 1969. Electronic 
Document Folder: IMS/MC-MCM-SG/1953-1970. NATO Archives, Brussel. 
MC 70. “A Report by the Military Committee to the North Atlantic Council on The 
Minimum Essential Force Requirements, 1958-1963,” January 29, 1958. Electronic 
Document Folder: IMS/1955-1959. NATO Archives, Brussel. 
SG 161/8 (Part II). “The Soviet Bloc Strength and Capabilities 1955-1959.” NATO, March 
18, 1955. NATO, online archive. 
SG 161/10. “The Soviet Bloc Strength and Capabilities 1957-1961 - Part I,” March 20, 1957. 
Electronic Document Folder: IMS/MC-MCM-SG/1953-1970. NATO Archives, 
Brussel. 
 
National archives, Kew, United Kingdom 
AIR 27/2978. “Operational Records - 201 Squadron - 1961-1963.” UK Ministry of Defense, 
1963 1961. UK National Archives, Kew. 
AIR 27/2979. “Operational Records - 201 Squadron - 1963-1965.” Royal Air Force, 1965 
1963. UK National Archives, Kew. 
AIR 27/3161. “Operational Records - 201 Squadron - 1966-1968.” Royal Air Force, 1968 
1966. UK National Archives, Kew. 
AIR 27/3162. “Operational Records - 201 Squadron - 1969-1970.” Royal Air Force, 1970. 
UK National Archives, Kew. 
AIR 27/3357. “Operational Records - 201 Squadron - 1972-1975.” Royal Air Force, 75 1972. 
UK National Archives, Kew. 
AIR 27/3694. “Operational Records - 201 Squadron - 1983-1984.” Royal Air Force, 1984 
1983. UK National Archives, Kew. 
AIR 27/3697. “Operational Records - 201 Squadron - 1981-1982.” Royal Air Force, 1982 
1981. UK National Archives, Kew. 
DEFE 24/20. “British Surveillance Efforts against the Soviet Northern Fleet - Summer 
Exercises 1965.” UK Director of Naval Intelligence, 1965. UK National Archives, 
Kew. 
———. “Operation Beresford - Letter from Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence to the 
Ministry of Defence.” UK Director of Naval Intelligence, October 5, 1965. UK 
National Archives, Kew. 
———. “Operation Beresford - Planning Guide.” UK Director of Naval Intelligence, 1965. 





Naval History and Heritage Command, Washington, D.C., USA 
“Command History Report (CHR) for VP-5 (1960-1963).” US Navy, 1963 1960. FOIA case 
number: DON-NAVY-2018-001782. Naval History and Heritage Command. 
“Command History Report (CHR) for VP-5 (1992).” US Navy, 1992. FOIA case number: 
DON-NAVY-2018-00574. Naval History and Heritage Command. 
“Command History Report (CHR) for VP-5 (1993).” US Navy, 1993. FOIA case number: 
DON-NAVY-2018-00574. Naval History and Heritage Command. 
“Command History Report (CHR) for VP-7 (1952).” US Navy, 1952. FOIA case number: 
DON-NAVY-2018-001782. Naval History and Heritage Command. 
“Command History Report (CHR) for VP-10 (1955).” US Navy, 1955. FOIA case number: 
DON-NAVY-2018-00574. Naval History and Heritage Command. 
“Command History Report (CHR) for VP-10 (1970).” US Navy, 1970. FOIA case number: 
DON-NAVY-2018-001782. Naval History and Heritage Command. 
“Command History Report (CHR) for VP-16 (1978).” US Navy, 1978. FOIA case number: 
DON-NAVY-2018-001782. Naval History and Heritage Command. 
“Command History Report (CHR) for VP-16 (1995).” US Navy, 1995. FOIA case number: 
DON-NAVY-2018-001782. Naval History and Heritage Command. 
“Command History Report (CHR) for VP-21 (1959).” US Navy, 1959. FOIA case number: 
DON-NAVY-2018-00574. Naval History and Heritage Command. 
“Command History Report (CHR) for VP-21 (1960-1965).” US Navy, 1965 1960. FOIA case 
number: DON-NAVY-2018-001782. Naval History and Heritage Command. 
“Command History Report (CHR) for VP-23 (1965).” US Navy, 1965. FOIA case number: 
DON-NAVY-2018-00574. Naval History and Heritage Command. 
“Command History Report (CHR) for VP-23 (1979).” US Navy, 1979. FOIA case number: 
DON-NAVY-2018-001782. Naval History and Heritage Command. 
“Command History Report (CHR) for VP-23 (1980).” US Navy, 1980. FOIA case number: 
DON-NAVY-2018-001782’. Naval History and Heritage Command. 
“Command History Report (CHR) for VP-23 (1981).” US Navy, 1981. FOIA case number: 
DON-NAVY-2018-001782. Naval History and Heritage Command. 
“Command History Report (CHR) for VP-24 (1968).” US Navy, 1968. FOIA case number: 
DON-NAVY-2018-001782. Naval History and Heritage Command. 
“Command History Report (CHR) for VP-24 (1969).” US Navy, 1969. FOIA case number: 
DON-NAVY-2018-001782. Naval History and Heritage Command. 
“Command History Report (CHR) for VP-24 (1974).” US Navy, 1974. FOIA case number: 
DON-NAVY-2018-001782. Naval History and Heritage Command. 
“Command History Report (CHR) for VP-24 (1991).” US Navy, 1991. FOIA case number: 
DON-NAVY-2018-001782. Naval History and Heritage Command. 
“Command History Report (CHR) for VP-44 (1967).” US Navy, 1967. FOIA case number: 
DON-NAVY-2018-001782. Naval History and Heritage Command. 
“Command History Report (CHR) for VP-44 (1969).” US Navy, 1969. FOIA case number: 
DON-NAVY-2018-001782. Naval History and Heritage Command. 
“Command History Report (CHR) for VP-44 (1979).” US Navy, 1979. FOIA case number: 
DON-NAVY-2018-001782. Naval History and Heritage Command. 
“Command History Report (CHR) for VP-44 (1986).” US Navy, 1986. FOIA case number: 
DON-NAVY-2018-001782. Naval History and Heritage Command. 
“Command History Report (CHR) for VP-44 (1987).” US Navy, 1987. FOIA case number: 
DON-NAVY-2018-001782. Naval History and Heritage Command. 
“Command History Report (CHR) for VP-49 (1970).” US Navy, 1970. FOIA case number: 
DON-NAVY-2018-001782. Naval History and Heritage Command. 
242 
 
“Command History Report (CHR) for VP-49 (1972).” US Navy, 1972. FOIA case number: 
DON-NAVY-2018-00574. Naval History and Heritage Command. 
“Command History Report (CHR) for VP-49 (1974).” US Navy, 1974. FOIA case number: 
DON-NAVY-2018-00574. Naval History and Heritage Command. 
“Command History Report (CHR) for VP-49 (1993).” US Navy, 1993. FOIA case number: 
DON-NAVY-2018-00574. Naval History and Heritage Command. 
“Command History Report (CHR) for VP-56 (1962).” US Navy, 1962. FOIA case number: 
DON-NAVY-2018-00574. Naval History and Heritage Command. 
“Command History Report (CHR) for VP-56 (1970).” US Navy, 1970. FOIA case number: 
DON-NAVY-2018-001782. Naval History and Heritage Command. 
“Command History Report (CHR) for VP-56 (1971).” US Navy, 1971. FOIA case number: 
DON-NAVY-2018-001782. Naval History and Heritage Command. 
“Command History Report (CHR) for VP-56 (1973).” US Navy, 1973. FOIA case number: 
DON-NAVY-2018-001782. Naval History and Heritage Command. 
“Command History Report (CHR) for VP-56 (1975).” US Navy, 1975. FOIA case number: 
DON-NAVY-2018-001782. Naval History and Heritage Command. 
“Command History Report (CHR) for VP-56 (1978).” US Navy, 1978. FOIA case number: 
DON-NAVY-2018-001782. Naval History and Heritage Command. 
“Command History Report (CHR) for VP-56 (1984).” US Navy, 1984. FOIA case number: 
DON-NAVY-2018-00574. Naval History and Heritage Command. 
 
Intelligence assessments 
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). “Russia Military Power - Building a Military to Support 
Great Power Aspirations.” Defense Intelligence Agency, 2017. 
NIE 11-3-55. “Soviet Capabilities and Probable Soviet Courses of Action through 1960.” 
Director of National Intelligence, May 17, 1955. CIA, Online archive. 
NIE 11-6-54. “Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in the Guided Missile Field.” 
National Intelligence Estimate. Director of National Intelligence, October 5, 1954. 
CIA, Online archive. 
Norwegian Intelligence Service. “FOKUS 2011 - The Assessment of the Intelligence 
Service.” Annual Unclassified Assessment. Oslo, 2011. 
https://forsvaret.no/fakta_/ForsvaretDocuments/FOKUS-2011.pdf. 
———. “FOKUS 2013 - The Assessment of the Intelligence Service.” Annual Unclassified 
Assessment. Oslo, 2013. https://forsvaret.no/fakta_/ForsvaretDocuments/FOKUS-
2013.pdf. 
———. “FOKUS 2015 - The Assessment of the Intelligence Service.” Annual Unclassified 
Assessment. Oslo, 2015. https://forsvaret.no/ForsvaretDocuments/FOKUS2015-
endelig.pdf. 
———. “FOKUS 2019 - The Assessment of the Intelligence Service.” Annual Unclassified 
Assessment|. Oslo, 2019. 
Office of Naval Intelligence. “The People’s Liberation Army Navy - A Modern Navy with 
Chinese Characteristics.” Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), August 2009. 








NATO and military publications and official statements 
AAP-6. “NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.” NATO Standardization Agency, April 
3, 2013. 
AJP 3.3.3. “NATO Maritime Air Coordination.” NATO, December 2014. 
Annex 2-0. “Global Integrated Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Operations.” 
US Air Force, January 29, 2015. 
Joint Doctrine Publication 0-30. “UK Air and Space Operations.” UK Ministry of Defense, 
July 2013. 
Joint Doctrine Publication 2-00. “Understanding and Intelligence Support to Operations.” UK 
Ministry of Defense, 2011. 
Joint Publication (JP) 1-02. “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms.” United States Department of Defense, February 15, 2016. 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf. 
Joint Publication (JP) 2-0. “Joint Intelligence.” United States Department of Defense, 
October 22, 2013. 
 
Official government statements and transcripts 
Barth Eide, Espen. “Forsvarets Oppdrag i Nordområdene (‘The Mission of the Armed Forces 
in the High North’).” Speech presented at the Nordområdekonferansen, Bodø, March 
30, 2006. 
Defense Contracts Online. “P-8A Programme Progresses.” Defense Contracts Online, (date 
unknown). https://www.contracts.mod.uk/do-features-and-articles/p-8a-programme-
progresses/. 
Forsvarsdepartementet. “NATO-Toppmøtet: Viktige Avklaringer Om Fremtidens NATO.” 
The Norwegian Government, September 3, 2014. 
https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/NATO-toppmotet-Viktige-avklaringer-om-
fremtidens-NATO/id766528/. 
———. “Norge Har Inngått Kontrakt Om Kjøp Av Fem Nye P-8A Poseidon.” The 
Norwegian Government, March 29, 2017. 
https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/norge-har-inngatt-kontrakt-om-kjop-av-fem-
nye-p-8a-poseidon-maritime-patruljefly/id2546045/. 
Haddon-Cave, Charles. “The Nimrod Review - An Independent Review into the Broader 
Issues Surrounding the Loss of the RAF Nimrod MR2 Aircraft XV230 in Afghanistan 
in 2006.” Report to the House of Commons. London: House of Commons, October 
2009. 
Innst. S nr.151 (1995-1996). “Recommendation to Parliament by the Defense Committee - 
Confirmation of Norway’s Self-Imposed Restrictions in Security Policy.” Stortinget, 
March 13, 1996. Stortinget, online archive. 
Kremlin. “Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation.” Translated by Anna Davis. U.S. 
Naval War College, 2015. 
Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation. “Severodvinsk Nuclear Submarine of the 
Northern Fleet Carried out Missile Firing,” August 18, 2017. 
http://eng.mil.ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12138913@egNews. 
NATO. “Active Engagement, Modern Defense - Strategic Concept for the Defense and 
Security for the Members of NATO.” NATO, November 20, 2010. NATO, online 
archive. 




———. “Brussels Summit Declaration.” NATO, July 11, 2018. NATO, online archive. 
———. “Counter-Piracy Operations.” NATO, December 19, 2016. NATO, online archive. 
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48815.htm#Protector. 
———. “Declaration of the Heads of State and Government - Brussels Summit.” NATO, 
January 11, 1994. NATO, online archive. 
———. “Final Communique - Berlin.” NATO, June 3, 1996. NATO, online archive. 
———. “First NATO AGS Remotely Piloted Aircraft Ferries to Main Operating Base in 
Italy.” NATO, November 21, 2019. 
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_171171.htm. 
———. “Istanbul Summit Communique.” NATO, June 28, 2004. NATO, online archive. 
———. “Lisbon Summit Declaration.” NATO, November 20, 2010. NATO, online archive. 
———. NATO - Facts about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization - 1962. Paris: NATO 
Information Service, 1962. 
———. NATO Handbook 1995. Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1995. 
———. “NATO’s Readiness Action Plan (RAP) - Fact Sheet.” NATO, July 2016. NATO, 
online archive. 
———. “Operation Active Endeavour.” NATO, October 27, 2016. NATO, online archive. 
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_7932.htm. 
———. “Prague Summit Declaration.” NATO, November 21, 2002. NATO, online archive. 
———. “Strasbourg/Kehl Summit Declaration.” NATO, April 4, 2009. NATO, online 
archive. 
———. “The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept.” NATO, November 8, 1991. NATO, online 
archive. 
———. “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept.” NATO, April 24, 1999. NATO, online archive. 
———. “Wales Summit Declaration.” NATO, September 5, 2014. NATO, online archive. 
———. “Warsaw Summit Communique.” NATO, July 9, 2016. NATO, online archive. 
Norwegian Chief of Defense (CHOD). “A Defense Undergoing Change - Fagmilitært Råd 
(FMR) - Defense White Paper.” Norwegian Defense Staff (FST), n.d. 
Norwegian Minister of Defence Jørgen Kosmo. Official correspondance. “Letter from the 
Minister of Defence to the Defense Committee.” Official correspondance, February 
26, 1996. Stortinget, online archive. 
———. “Long Term Challenges for the Armed Forces.” Speech. Oslo Militære Samfund, 
Oslo, January 8, 1996. Stortinget, online archive. 
Norwegian Ministry of Defense. “Response from the Ministry of Defense to the Foreign 
Affairs and Defense Committee on Questions Related to the Long Term Plan - Prop. 
151 S (2015-2016).” Stortinget, August 17, 2016. Stortinget, online archive. 
Putin, Vladimir. “Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on 
Security Policy.” Kremlin, February 19, 2007. 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034. 
Rear Admiral Butts, John. Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for 
Fiscal Year 1986, Pub. L. No. Part 8, § Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 
4364 (1985). 
Robertson, Sue. “Defence Committee - Future Maritime Surveillance.” Written Evidence. 
Government of the United Kingdom, Defence Committee, September 19, 2012. 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmdfence/110/110vw1
0.htm. 
Stortinget. Skriftlig spørsmål fra Willfred Nordlund (Sp) til forsvarsministeren, Pub. L. No. 
15:607 (2018-2019) (2019). 
St.prop. 151 S (2015-2016). “Long-Term Plan for the Norwegian Armed Forces.” Norwegian 
Ministry of Defense, June 16, 2016. 
245 
 
The Kremlin. “Meeting with Defence Ministry Leadership and Military-Industrial Complex 
Representatives,” May 12, 2015. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/49456. 
The Norwegian Government. “Presiseringer Om Utbyggingen Av Evenes.” The Norwegian 
Government, April 17, 2018. https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/presiseringer-om-
utbyggingen-av-evenes/id2598125/. 
———. “Prop. 27 S (2016-2017) - Endringer i Statsbudsjettet 2016 under 
Forsvarsdepartementet.” The Norwegian Government, November 25, 2016. 
https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/a38d11296b8f4d2a8df432ac430335c4/nn-
no/pdfs/prp201620170027000dddpdfs.pdf. 
The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “St.Meld.Nr.38 (2008-2009) - Om Samarbeidet i 
NATO i 2008.” The Norwegian Government, 2008. 
The Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation. “FY2014 DOT&E Annual 
Report.” Annual Report, 2014. 
The Royal Norwegian Air Force. “Forsvarets Doktrine for Luftoperasjoner.” The Norwegian 
Armed Forces, 2018. 
UK Defense Committee. “Future Maritime Surveillance.” Vol I. London: House of 
Commons, September 5, 2012. 
UK MoD. “National Security Strategy and Strategic Defense and Security Review (SDSR) 
2015.” HM Government, November 2015. 
UK MoD. “Major Projects Report 2005 - Project Summary Sheets.” London: National Audit 
Office, November 25, 2005. 
USAF Chief Scientist. Technology Horizons - A Vision for Air Force Technology 2010-2030. 
Maxwell AFB, Montgomery, Alabama: Air University Press, 2010. 
http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/resources/AF_TechnologyHorizons20
10-2030.pdf. 
U.S. House of Representatives. Advanced Submarines Technology and Antisubmarine 
Warfare, § Committee on Armed Services (1990). 
Wilson, Clay. “Network Centric Warfare: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress.” 
Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, June 2, 2004. 
 
Interviews 
Efjestad, Svein. Norwegian self-imposed restrictions in the High North. Interview, September 
2, 2019. Norwegian Ministry of Defense. 
Håvoll, Harald. Norwegian Maritime Patrol Aircraft operations during and after the Cold 
War. Nesodden, Norway, October 22, 2018. 
Klevberg, Håvard. Discussion - Norwegian MPA capability. Norwegian Ministry of Defense, 
Oslo, May 24, 2018. 
Porter, Air Commodore (r) Garfield “Garry.” British Maritime Patrol Aircraft Operations 
during and after the Cold War. Royal Air Force Club, London, May 31, 2017. 
 
Newspaper articles 
Akulov, Andrei. “Kalibr: Russia’s Naval System Upping Cruise Missile Game.” Strategic 
Culture Foundation, May 24, 2016. https://www.strategic-
culture.org/news/2016/05/24/kalibr-russia-naval-system-upping-cruise-missile-game/. 
Allison, George. “First British P-8A Poseidon Will Be ‘Ready to Fly with a UK Crew’ on 





———. “US in Deal with UK and Norway to Form P-8 Poseidon Partnership.” UK Defence 
Journal, July 4, 2017. https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/us-deal-uk-norway-form-p-8-
poseidon-partnership/. 
Antonsen, Øystein, and Arild Moe. “Alle Ser Mot Nord: -Arktis Gir Oss Flere Muligheter.” 
NRK, January 22, 2018. https://www.nrk.no/troms/alle-ser-mot-nord_-_-arktis-gir-
oss-flere-muligheter-1.13879346. 
Ask, Alf Ole. “NATO Møter Utfordringer i Alle Himmelretninger.” Aftenposten. February 
15, 2016. https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/o60K/nato-moeter-utfordringer-i-alle-
himmelretninger. 
Avionews. “The United Kingdom Has No Maritime Patrol Aircraft, Asks NATO for Help.” 
Avionews. October 12, 2014. https://www.avionews.com/item/1164814-the-united-
kingdom-has-no-maritime-patrol-aircraft-asks-for-nato-help.html. 
BBC. “US Senate Votes to Begin Debate on New Start Treaty.” BBC.Com. Accessed October 
4, 2018. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-12004945. 
BBC News Online. “Russia Hits Targets in Syria from Mediterranean Submarine.” BBC 
News Online, December 8, 2015. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-
35041656. 
Bennett, Brian, and W.J. Hennigan. “U.S. Builds up Arctic Spy Network as Russia and China 
Increase Presence.” Los Angeles Times, September 7, 2015. 
https://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-arctic-spy-20150907-story.html. 
Bentzrød, Sveinung Berg. “E-Sjefen: Derfor Trenger Norge to Spionskip i Nord.” 
Aftenposten. September 26, 2016. https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/A9oqM/E-
sjefen-Derfor-trenger-Norge-to-spionskip-i-nord. 
———. “Etterretningsstasjoner i Nord Anklages for Hemmelighold. Nå Slår E-Sjefen 
Tilbake.” Aftenposten. October 8, 2016. 
https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/mwgog/Etterretningsstasjoner-i-nord-anklages-
for-hemmelighold-Na-slar-E-sjefen-tilbake. 
Berger, Eric. “Blue Origin Just Validated the New Space Movement.” Arstechnica.Com, 
October 6, 2016. https://arstechnica.com/science/2016/10/blue-origin-just-validated-
the-new-space-movement/. 
Bodner, Matthew. “NATO Deputy SecGen: Russia’s Anti-Access/Area Denial Build-Up Is 
Biggest Worry.” Security and Policy, February 14, 2016. 
http://securityandpolicy.com/nato-deputy-secgen-russias-anti-accessarea-denial-build-
up-is-biggest-worry/. 
———. “Russia Adds ‘Kazan’ to Its Nuclear Attack Submarine Fleet.” Defense News. 
Accessed October 24, 2019. https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2017/03/31/russia-
adds-kazan-to-its-nuclear-attack-submarine-fleet/. 
———. “Russia Has Plans for Its Future Nuclear Subs, and It Involves Hypersonic Missiles.” 




Brekke, Anders, and Joakim Reigstad. “- Dagens Forsvar Er Ikke Bærekraftig.” NRK, April 
11, 2016. https://www.nrk.no/norge/_-dagens-forsvar-er-ikke-baerekraftig-
1.12894608. 
Budalen, Andreas, and Henrik Ø. Heldahl. “Det Er Uvanlig Høy Russisk Aktivitet Utenfor 




Budalen, Andreas, and Beth Pettersen. “Orion-Flyene Er På Vingene Igjen.” NRK (Online). 
November 8, 2016. https://www.nrk.no/nordland/orion-flyene-er-pa-vingene-igjen-
1.13216832. 
Cass, Stephen. “We May Be Heading for a Space Bubble.” MIT Technology Review Online 
(September 14, 2010). https://www.technologyreview.com/s/420776/we-may-be-
heading-for-a-space-bubble. 
CNN.com. “USAF: Fighter Jet Lasers 5 Years Away.” CNN, December 15, 2015. 
https://edition.cnn.com/videos/us/2015/12/15/us-air-force-lasers-fighter-jets-orig-
vstop.cnn. 
David, Leonard. “China’s Anti-Satellite Test: Worrisome Debris Cloud Circles Earth.” 
Space.Com, February 2, 2007. https://www.space.com/3415-china-anti-satellite-test-
worrisome-debris-cloud-circles-earth.html. 
Episkopos, Mark. “Meet the First Russian Submarine to Fire in Anger since World War II 
(and Its New Cruise Missiles).” The National Interest, January 12, 2019. 
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/meet-first-russian-submarine-fire-anger-world-
war-ii-and-its-new-cruise-missiles-41292. 
Eshel, Tamir. “Lifting the Veil of Israel’s Classified Laser Weapon Program.” Defense 
Update, January 8, 2020. https://defense-update.com/20200108_hel_israel.html. 
Farley, Robert. “Is the Day of the Land Attack Cruise Missile upon Us?” The Diplomat, 
October 9, 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/is-the-day-of-the-land-attack-cruise-
missile-upon-us/. 
Faulconbridge, Guy. “Russian Navy to Start Sorties in Mediterranean.” Reuters, December 5, 
2007. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-navy/russian-navy-to-start-sorties-in-
atlantic-tass-idUSL0518563620071205. 
Fein, Geoff, and Grace Jean. “Changing the Game: U Navy Applies New Approaches to 
Submainres Threats.” IHS Jane’s Navy Internatioinal, 2014. 
https://www.janes.com/images/assets/836/46836/US_Navy_applies_new_approaches
_to_submarine_threats.pdf. 
Flight International. “RMPA Contenders Step up Campaign.” Flight International, no. 1 
(May 7, 1996): 16. 
Gady, Franz-Stefan. “Putin’s ‘Red October’: Russia’s Deadliest New Submarine.” The 
Diplomat, March 4, 2015. https://thediplomat.com/2015/03/putins-red-october-
russias-deadliest-new-submarine/. 
———. “Russia to Upgrade 12 Nuclear-Powered Subs.” The Diplomat, October 5, 2015. 
https://thediplomat.com/2015/10/russia-to-upgrade-12-nuclear-powered-subs/. 
———. “Russian Sub Combat Patrols Nearly Doubled in 2015.” The Diplomat, March 23, 
2016. https://thediplomat.com/2016/03/russian-sub-combat-patrols-nearly-doubled-in-
2015/. 
———. “Russia’s First Yasen-M Attack Sub to Begin State Trials in 2019.” The Diplomat, 
December 8, 2018. https://thediplomat.com/2018/12/russias-first-yasen-m-attack-sub-
to-begin-state-trials-in-2019/. 
———. “Russia’s Pacific Fleet to Receive 2 Fast Attack Subs in 2020.” The Diplomat, July 
3, 2018. https://thediplomat.com/2018/07/russias-pacific-fleet-to-receive-2-fast-
attack-subs-in-2020/. 
Gertz, Bill. “Damaged Russian Sub Linked to Underwater Drone Program.” Soldier of 
Fortune (blog), July 15, 2019. https://www.sofmag.com/damaged-russian-sub-linked-
to-underwater-drone-program/. 
Gibbons-Neff, Thomas. “With No Sub-Chasing Aircraft of Its Own, UK Calls on Allies to 






Gorenburg, Dmitry. “Russian Naval Shipbuilding - Is It Possible to Fulfill the Kremlin’s 
Grand Expectations?” CNA Harvard University, October 2015. 
http://www.ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-memos-
pdf/Pepm395_Gorenburg_Oct2015.pdf. 
Gutterman, Steve. “New Russian Nuclear Submarine Goes into Service.” Reuters, January 
10, 2013. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-submarine/new-russian-nuclear-
submarine-goes-into-service-idUSBRE9090YR20130110. 
Haynes, Deborah. “Putin’s Submarines Spur NATO to Boost Its UK Nerve Centre.” The 
Times. January 10, 2018. https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/putin-s-submarines-spur-
nato-to-boost-its-uk-nerve-centre-8h2bf95qp. 
“Hektisk Jakt På Ubåter.” Vesterålen Online, October 31, 2019. 
https://www.vol.no/pluss/2019/10/31/Hektisk-jakt-p%C3%A5-ub%C3%A5ter-
20289339.ece. 
Higgins, Andrew. “Norway Reverts to Cold War Mode as Russian Air Patrols Spike.” The 
New York Times, April 1, 2015. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/02/world/europe/a-newly-assertive-russia-jolts-
norways-air-defenses-into-action.html?emc=eta1. 
Holmes, James. “More Submarines and Less Aircraft Carriers: If the U.S. Navy Could Be 
Completely Rebuilt.” The National Interest, December 3, 2017. 
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/more-submarines-less-aircraft-carriers-if-
the-us-navy-could-23482?nopaging=1. 
Insinna, Valerie. “The US Military’s Chaff and Flare Industry Is on Fragile Ground.” Defense 
News, November 13, 2018. https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2018/11/13/the-
militarys-chaff-and-flare-industry-is-on-fragile-ground/. 
Johansen, Per Anders. “Putin Med Overraskende Norge-Flørt: På Tide å Utvide Horisonten 
Og Samarbeidet.” Aftenposten, October 21, 2018. 
https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/1kJozl/putin-med-overraskende-norge-floert-
paa-tide-aa-utvide-horisonten-og-samarbeidet. 
———. “Russisk Atomubåt Testet Atomraketter i Barentshavet i Morges.” Aftenposten. 
December 12, 2015. 
Johnsen, Alf Bjarne. “E-Sjefen: Russland Øvde På Angrep Mot Nord-Norge.” VG. March 5, 
2019. https://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/i/1kye4W/e-sjefen-russland-oevde-paa-
angrep-mot-nord-norge. 
———. “NATO: Russerne Kan Sabotere Internett Med Ubåt.” VG, February 17, 2018. 
https://www.vg.no/nyheter/utenriks/i/gPday5/nato-russerne-kan-sabotere-internett-
med-ubaat. 
———. “Russland i Gang Med Ubåtoperasjon i Nord: Største Siden Sovjet-Tiden.” VG, 
October 29, 2019. https://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/i/opxAP0/russland-i-gang-
med-ubaat-operasjon-i-nord-stoerste-siden-sovjet-
tiden?utm_source=vgfront&utm_content=row-2. 
———. “Solberg: Vil Overvåke Mer Med Fly Som Forsvarssjefen Vil Skrote.” VG. October 
12, 2015. https://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/i/22RKr/solberg-vil-overvaake-mer-
med-fly-som-forsvarssjefen-vil-skrote. 
———. “Søreide: Ber NATO Trekke Nordover.” VG. February 15, 2016. 
https://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/i/wWazo/soereide-ber-nato-trekke-nordover. 
Kofman, Michael. “Fire Aboard AS-31 Losharik: Brief Overview.” Russian Military Analysis 
(blog), July 3, 2019. https://russianmilitaryanalysis.wordpress.com/tag/gugi/. 
249 
 
———. “Russian Hybrid Warfare and Other Dark Arts.” War On the Rocks, March 11, 2016. 
https://warontherocks.com/2016/03/russian-hybrid-warfare-and-other-dark-arts/. 
Korolkov, Alexander. “Russia’s Top-Secret Nuclear Submarine Comes into Service.” Russia 
Beyond. June 17, 2014. https://www.rbth.com/defence/2014/06/17/russias_top-
secret_nuclear_submarine_comes_into_service_37483.html. 
Lacey, James. “Battle of the Bastions.” War On The Rocks (blog), January 9, 2020. 
https://warontherocks.com/2020/01/battle-of-the-bastions/. 
LaGrone, Sam. “CNO: New 2nd Fleet Boundary Will Extend North to the Edge of Russian 
Waters.” USNI News, August 24, 2018. https://news.usni.org/2018/08/24/cno-new-
2nd-fleet-boundary-will-extend-north-edge-russian-waters. 
———. “Russian Air Force Chief: U.S. Surveillance Flights Monitor Russia Daily.” USNI 
News, December 17, 2014. https://news.usni.org/2014/12/17/russian-air-force-chief-u-
s-surveillance-flights-monitor-russia-daily. 
Larter, David B., and Mark D. Faram. “The US Navy’s New Command Puts Russia in the 
Crosshairs.” Defense News, May 4, 2018. 
https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2018/05/04/the-us-navys-new-command-puts-
russia-in-the-crosshairs/#.WuzF9tk3w80.email. 
Lieungh, Erik. “Norge Trekker NATOs Øyne Mot Nordflanken.” NRK, February 13, 2016. 
https://www.nrk.no/finnmark/norge-trekker-natos-oyne-mot-nordflanken-1.12801938. 
Lysvold, Susanne Skjåstad. “Klimaendringene Tapper Havet for Oksygen - Fisken Rømmer 
Nordover.” NRK, October 10, 2018. https://www.nrk.no/nordland/klimaendringene-
tapper-havet-for-oksygen---fisken-rommer-nordover-1.14240007. 
Lewis, Jeffrey. “Led Zeppelin Comes to Washington.” Foreign Policy, January 5, 2015. 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/05/led-zeppelin-comes-to-washington-russia-
nukes-putin-arms-control/. 
Madsen, Anders. “Etterretning Er Politisk Kapital.” Aftenposten. February 24, 2016. 
https://www.aftenposten.no/meninger/kommentar/i/vAkl/etterretning-er-politisk-
kapital-per-anders-madsen. 
Madshus, Karin, and Rolf Lofstad. “Norsk Lasteskip Ble Anropt Av Russisk Slagskip.” 
Dagbladet, April 15, 2019. https://www.dagbladet.no/nyheter/norsk-lasteskip-ble-
anropt-av-russisk-slagskip/70985345. 
Majumdar, Dave. “Cruise Missiles Strikes in Syria: Russia’s Big Ad Campaign?,” October 8, 
2015. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/cruise-missile-strikes-syria-russias-
big-ad-campaign-14032. 
———. “U.S. Navy Impressed with New Russian Attack Boat.” USNI News, October 28, 
2014. https://news.usni.org/2014/10/28/u-s-navy-impressed-new-russian-attack-boat. 
Mazzetti, Mark, and Thom Shanker. “Russian Subs Patrolling Off East Coast of U.S.” New 
York Times. August 4, 2009. 
McCurley, T. Mark. “I Was a Drone Warrior for 11 Years. I Regret Nothing.” Politico, 
October 18, 2015. https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/10/drone-pilot-
book-213263. 
Military-Today.com. “Admiral Gorshkov Class - Multi-Role Frigate.” Military-Today. 
Accessed December 6, 2019. http://www.military-
today.com/navy/admiral_gorshkov_class.htm. 
Maceda, Steven. “Control of Theater Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance for the 
Ground Commander.” Air & Space Power Journal 22, no. 4 (Winter 2008). 
Martin, Matthew J. “Unifying Our Vision - Joint ISR Coordination and the NATO Joint ISR 





Martyanov, Andrei. “Russia’s Navy in Search of a Mission.” United States Naval Institute 
Proceedings 140, no. 12 (December 2014). 
McKew, Molly M. “The Gerasimov Doctrine.” Politico Magazine, October 2017. 
McLaughlin, Kevin. “Would Space-Based Systems Defenses Improve Security?” Washington 
Quarterly 25, no. 3 (2002): 177–91. 
Min, Pan. “Fisheries Issue in the Central Arctic Ocean and Its Future Governance.” The 
Polar Journal 7, no. 2 (2017). 
Missile Defense Project. “Russia Air and Missile Defense.” Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS), June 14, 2018. 
https://missilethreat.csis.org/system/russian-air-defense/. 
Mitchell, Simon, ed. Jane’s Civil and Military Aircraft Upgrades 1994-95. Coulsdon, UK: 
Jane’s Information Group Ltd, 1994. 
Mizin, Victor, and Michael Jasinski. “The Future of the Russian Sea-Based Deterrent.” The 
Journal of Slavic Military Studies 16, no. 1 (2003): 69–83. 
Moe, Arild. “The Northern Sea Route> Smooth Sailing Ahead?” Strategic Analysis 38, no. 6 
(2014). 
Moen, Knut E. “Norway’s Self-Imposed Restrictions in the High North, 1945-65.” 
Forsvarsstudier, no. 5/1998 (1998). 
Mozgovoy, Aleksandr. “Russian Navy’s Long Arm: Kalibr Missile Family.” Translated by J. 
Hawk. Natsionalnaya Oborona/Southfront.Org, August 10, 2015. 
https://southfront.org/russian-navys-long-arm-kalibr-missile-family/. 
Nilsen, Thomas. “Alarm-Drill: 36 Russian Warships Sail out to Barents Sea.” The Barents 
Observer, June 13, 2018. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2018/06/36-
russian-warships-sails-out-barents-sea. 
———. “Now, Russia Builds a Submarine Even Bigger than the Typhoon.” The Barents 
Observer, May 3, 2017. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2017/05/russias-
new-military-research-submarine-arctic-waters-will-be-worlds-
largest#.WQnEKkjm64w.facebook. 
———. “Russia in the High North.” Presented at the Matpakkeseminar, Norwegian MoD, 
November 14, 2019. 
———. “Russian Navy Announces Comprehensive Naval Exercises off Northern Norway.” 
The Arctic Today, August 6, 2019. https://www.arctictoday.com/russian-navy-
announces-comprehensive-naval-exercises-off-northern-norway/. 
———. “Russian Sub Launched Cruise Missile without Leaving Port.” The Barents 
Observer, April 3, 2019. https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2019/04/russian-
sub-launched-cruise-missile-without-leaving-port#.XKQ_dO8JV7U.facebook. 
———. “Sevmash Floats out Second Yasen-M Class Nuclear Attack Submarine.” The 
Barents Observer, December 25, 2019. 
https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2019/12/sevmash-floats-out-second-yasen-
m-class-nuclear-attack-submarine. 
———. “Watch Russian Submarine Test Fire Cruise Missile in Barents Sea.” The Barents 
Observer, August 18, 2017. 
https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2017/08/watch-russian-submarine-test-
fire-cruise-missile-barents-sea. 
Nilssen, Tom. “Nye Bildebevis Av Russisk Avskjæring.” NRK, January 31, 2018. 
https://www.nrk.no/urix/nye-bildebevis-av-russisk-avskjaering-1.13894490. 
NTB. “Det Vil Ta Én Til to Måneder for NATO å Hjelpe Norge.” NRK, April 5, 2016. 





Persen, Kjell. “Amerikansk Atomubåt Søkte Nødhavn i Norge.” TV2.No, October 27, 2017. 
https://www.tv2.no/a/9433425. 
Pettersen, Trude. “Black Sea Submarine Fires Cruise Missile from the Barents Sea.” The 
Barents Observer, August 4, 2015. 
https://barentsobserver.com/en/security/2015/08/black-sea-submarine-fires-cruise-
missile-barents-sea-04-08. 
———. “Nuclear Missile World Record Attempt.” The Barents Observer, March 2, 2016. 
https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2016/03/nuclear-missile-world-record-
attempt. 
———. “U.S. Builds up Arctic Intelligence Network.” The Barents Observer, September 8, 
2015. https://barentsobserver.com/en/security/2015/09/us-builds-arctic-intelligence-
network-08-09. 
———. “U.S. Military Returns to Iceland.” The Barents Observer, October 2, 2016. 
https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2016/02/us-military-returns-
iceland#.VsVfwxKHhBK.mailto. 
Pilkington, Ed. “Life as a Drone Operator: ‘Ever Step on Ants and Never Give It Another 
Thought?’” The Guardian. November 15, 2015. 
Portocarrero, Marta. “Russia Fires First Submarine Missiles against Isis Targets in Syria.” 
Independent, December 10, 2015. 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-fires-first-submarine-
missiles-against-isis-targets-in-syria-a6766426.html. 
Press Release. “GRAB Satellite Declassified - NRL Built and Deployed First Reconnaissance 
Satellite System.” U.S. Naval Research Laboratory, June 17, 1998. 
https://www.nrl.navy.mil/media/new-news-releases/1998/grab-satellite-declassified--
nrl-built-and-deployed-first-reconnaissance-satellite-system. 
Roblin, Sebastian. “Why Russia’s Enemies Fear the Kalibr Cruise Missile.” The National 
Interest, January 22, 2017. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-russias-
enemies-fear-the-kalibr-cruise-missile-19129. 
Rogoway, Tyler. “Russia Sends Ten Subs into North Atlantic in Drill Unprecedented in Size 
since Cold War.” The Drive, October 29, 2019. https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-
zone/30728/russia-sends-ten-subs-into-north-atlantic-in-drill-unprecedented-in-size-
since-cold-war. 
———. “USAF`s Nuke Sniffing Plane Is Flying on a Mission near the Arctic Right Now.” 
The Drive, February 22, 2017. https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/7830/usafs-
nuke-sniffing-plane-is-flying-on-a-mission-near-the-arctic-right-now?xid=emailshare. 
RT. “Finaly Flying Colors: Yury Dolgoruky Nuclear Sub Joins Russian Navy.” RT.Com, 
January 10, 2013. https://www.rt.com/news/yury-dolgoruky-submarine-ceremony-
678/. 
Simpson, John. “How Greenland Could Become China’s Arctic Base.” BBC News Online, 
December 18, 2018. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-46386867. 
Sivertsen, Tony. “Må Forvente Noe Lavere Flyaktivitet.” Vestrålen Online (VOL). January 5, 
2019. https://www.vol.no/pluss/2019/01/05/%E2%80%93-M%C3%A5-forvente-noe-
lavere-fly-aktivitet-18189636.ece. 
Staalesen, Atle. “30 Russian Naval Vessels Stafe Show of Force near Coast of Norway.” The 
Barents Observer, August 15, 2019. 
https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2019/08/30-russian-naval-vessels-stage-
show-force-coast-norway. 
Starr, Barbara, and Brad Lendon. “Russian Fighter Came within 15 Feet of U.S. Air Force 




Stewart, Phil. “Russia Jets Make ‘Simulated Attack’ Passes near U.S. Destroyer.” Reuters, 
April 13, 2016. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-russia-simulatedattack-
idUSKCN0XA1UW. 
Stormark, Kjetil. “Bare ETT Operativt Overvåkningsfly.” Aldrimer.No. October 29, 2016. 
https://www.aldrimer.no/norge-har-bare-ett-operativt-overvakingsfly/. 
Strand, Tormod. “Hemmelig Ubåt-Operasjon: ‘Målet Er å Vise at Russland Kan Nå USA.’” 
NRK, October 29, 2019. https://www.nrk.no/norge/hemmelig-ubat-operasjon_-
_malet-er-a-vise-at-russland-kan-na-usa_-1.14761298. 
Thonhaugen, Markus, and Kåre Riibe Ramskjell. “Russerne Med ‘Uvanlig Stor’ 
Militærøvelse: - Lenge Siden vi Har Sett Noe Slikt.” NRK, August 13, 2019. 
https://www.nrk.no/nordland/russerne-med-_uvanlig-stor_-militaerovelse_-_-lenge-
siden-vi-har-sett-noe-slikt-1.14658213. 
Tigner, Brooks. “NATO Considers P-8 as Temporary Gap Filler until 2035.” Jane’s Defense 
Weekly 56, no. 15 (April 10, 2019). 
Tomassen, Jan Harald. “Skal Ha Bedt Russiske Sjøkapteiner Gjøre Seg Godt Kjent Langs 
Norskekysten.” NRK, February 27, 2015. https://www.nrk.no/troms/skal-ha-bedt-
russiske-sjokapteiner-gjore-seg-godt-kjent-langs-norskekysten-1.12234101. 
Vikøyr, Harald. “Historisk Vinteråpning Av Polhavet.” VG. March 4, 2018. 
https://www.vg.no/nyheter/utenriks/i/0Er3n0/historisk-vinter-aapning-av-polhavet. 
Vissgren, Julie, Tormod Strand, and Lokman Ghorbani. “Forsvarssjefen Om Russisk 
Militærøvelse: - En Nasjonal Utfordring.” NRK, August 14, 2019. 
https://www.nrk.no/urix/forsvarssjefen-om-russisk-militaerovelse_-_-en-nasjonal-
utfordring-1.14660898. 
Werner, Ben. “Russian Su-27 Fighter Buzzes U.S. Navy EP-3 Aries Over Black Sea.” USNI 
News, January 29, 2018. https://news.usni.org/2018/01/29/30987. 
Willett, Lee. “Game Changer: Russian Sub-Launched Cruise Missiles Bring Strategic 
Effect.” Jane’s By IHS Markit, 2017. 
https://www.janes.com/images/assets/147/70147/Game_changer_Russian_sub-
launched_cruise_missiles_bring_strategic_effect_edit.pdf. 
Wormdal, Bård. “Tidligere Forsvarssjef Om Nye Russiske Våpen: - En Trussel Som Må Tas 
Alvorlig.” NRK (Online), August 11, 2017. https://www.nrk.no/finnmark/tidligere-
forsvarssjef-om-nye-russiske-vapen_-_-en-trussel-som-ma-tas-alvorlig-1.13767105. 
Ziezulewicz, Geoff, and David B. Larter. “The Navy Sends a Carrier Back to Russia`s Arcic 
Haunts.” Navy Times, October 19, 2018. https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-
navy/2018/10/19/the-navy-sends-a-carrier-back-to-russias-arctic-
haunts/#.W820deP9FUo.email. 






Anderson, Dagvin R.M. “A Holistic Approach to Intelligence, Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance.” Air & Space Power Journal 25, no. 4 (Winter 2011). 
Andresen, Rolf-Inge V., and Tor Bukkvoll. “Russian Weapons Development towards 2020.” 
Forsvarets Forskningsinstitutt (FFI) FFI-rapport 2008/01957 (January 12, 2009). 
253 
 
Angus, Dave. “Command and Control of MPA Assets on the Northern Flank.” Maritime 
Patrol Aviation 2, no. 1 (September 1991). 
Archer, Clive, and David Scrivener, eds. Northern Waters. London: Croom Helm, 1986. 
Ashworth, Chris. Avro’s Maritime Heavyweight: The Shackleton. Bourne End: Aston 
Publications Limited, 1990. 
Atland, Kristian. “The Introduction, Adaptation and Implementation of Russia’s ‘Northern 
Strategic Bastion’ Concept, 1992-1999.” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 20, no. 4 
(2007): 499–528. 
Ballast, Jan. “Merging Pillars, Changing Cultures: NATO and the Future of Intelligence 
Cooperations within the Alliance.” International Journal of Intelligence and 
Counterintelligence 31, no. 4 (2018). 
Bamford, James. “The Walker Espionage Case.” United States Naval Institute Proceedings 
112, no. 5 (May 1986). 
Berdal, Mats. “Forging a Maritime Alliance - Norway and the Evolution of American 
Maritime Strategy 1945-1960.” Forsvarsstudier 4 (1993). 
Borgeld, Warner. “Keflavik - from the Past to the Present.” Maritime Patrol Aviation, 2004. 
Borst, Marco. “Under Arctic Conditions in Europe: Norwegian Orions.” AIR International, 
January 1998, 57–58. 
Bottom, David. “Overcoming ISR Data Challenges.” National Geospatial Agency (NGA), 
2013. spie.org/Publications/Proceedings/Paper/10.1117/12.2019033. 
Breemer, Jan S. “The Soviet Navy’s SSBN Bastions: Evidence, Inference and Alternative 
Scenarios.” RUSI Journal 130, no. 1 (1985): 18–26. 
Brown, Jason M. “Airpower Is Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance.” Air & Space 
Power Journal 27, no. 4 (August 2013). 
Chernyavskii, Sergei. “The Era of Gorshkov: Triumph and Contradictions.” Journal of 
Strategic Studies 28, no. 2 (2005): 281–308. 
Clift, A. Denis. “Intelligence in the Internet Era - From Semaphore to Predator.” Studies in 
Intelligence 47, no. 3 (2003). 
Coleman, I.M. “Journal 33.” Royal Air Force Historical Society Journal 33 (2005): 89–102. 
Conley, Heather A., Jeffrey Rathke, and Matthew Melino. “Enhanced Deterrence in the 
North - A 21st Century European Engagement Strategy.” Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, February 2018. 
Connolly, Richard. “Towards a Dual Fleet? The Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation 
and the Modernisation of Russian Naval Capabilities.” Russian Studies, NATO 
Defense College, no. 2/17 (June 2017). 
Cote, Owen R. jr. “The Third Battle - Innovation in the U.S.Navy’s Silent War Struggle with 
Soviet Submarines.” Naval War College Newport Papers, no. 16 (2003). 
Cowan, Nicholas P. “Rethinking Command and Control of Intelligence, Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance (ISR).” U.S. Air Force, July 2015. https://dodccrp-
testorg.squarespace.com/s/094-i2ln.pdf. 
Cullen, Patrick J., and Erik Reichborn-Kjennerud. “Understanding Hybrid Warfare.” MCDC 
Countering Hybrid Warfare Project. Multinational Capability Development Campaign 
(MCDC), January 2017. 
Danskine, William B. “Aggressive ISR in the War on Terrorism - Breaking the COld War 
Paradigm.” Air & Space Power Journal 19, no. 2 (Summer 2005). 
Day, Dwayne A. “Above the Clouds: The White Cloud Ocean Surveillance Satellites.” The 




Deptula, David A., and R. Greg Brown. “A House Divided - The Indivisibility of 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance.” Air & Space Power Journal 22, no. 2 
(Summer 2008). 
Deptula, David A., and Michael Fransisco. “Air Force ISR Operations - Hunting versus 
Gathering.” Air & Space Power Journal 24, no. 4 (Winter 2010). 
Donnelly, Harrison. “Q&A - Lt.Gen. John C. Koziol, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, 
Joint and Coalition Warfighter Support, Directore DoD ISR Task Force.” Geospatial 
Intelligence Forum 8, no. 6 (September 2010). 
Downs, Michael L. “Rethinking the Combined Force Air Component Commander’s 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Approach to Counterinsurgency.” Air 
& Space Power Journal 22, no. 3 (Fall 2008). 
Duvsete, Svein. “Fra Luftforsvar Til Strategisk Angrep. Norsk Luftmilitær Doktrine 1945-
1955.” Forsvarsstudier 2 (1998). 
Dyndal, Gjert Lage. “How the High North Became Central in NATO Strategy: Revelations 
from the NATO Archives.” Journal of Strategic Studies 34, no. 4 (2011): 557–85. 
———. “The Northern Flank and High North Scenarios of the Cold War.” Zentrum für 
Militärgeschichte und Sozialwissenschaften der Bundeswehr, Potsdam, Germany, 
2013. 
———. “The Rise of the Soviet Navy, a Re-Visited Western View.” Tidsskrift (Kungliga 
Krigsvetenskapsakademien), no. 3 (September 2013).  
Egeland Moen, Knut. “Selvpålagte Restriksjoner i Nord, 1945-65.” Oslo: Institutt for 
Forsvarsstudier, 1998. 
Elder, Gregory. “Intelligence in War: It Can Be Decisive.” Studies in Intelligence 50, no. 2 
(2006). 
Espenes, Øystein, and Gjert Lage Dyndal. “The Changing Focus of NATO-Intelligence - 
From Southern Scandinavia to the ‘High North’ at the End of the 1950s.” Tidsskrift 
(Kungliga Krigsvetenskapsakademien), no. 2 (June 2013).  
Ferris, John. “Netcentric Warfare, C4ISR, and Information Operations: Towards a Revolution 
in Military Intelligence?” Intelligence and National Security 19, no. 2 (2004): 199–
225. 
Ferris, John, and Michael I. Handel. “Clausewitz, Intelligence, Uncertainty and the Art of 
Command in Military Operations.” Intelligence and National Security 10, no. 1 
(1995): 1–58. 
Foggo, James, and Alanik Fritz. “The Fourth Battle of the Atlantic.” United States Naval 
Institute Proceedings 142, no. 6 (June 2016). 
Forden, Geoffrey. “Viewpoint: China and Space War.” Astropolitics 6, no. 2 (2008): 138–53. 
Foust, Jeff. “Current Issues in NewSpace.” The Space Review. March 5, 2007. 
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/823/1. 
———. “The Evolving Ecosystem of NewSpace.” The Space Review. August 15, 2011. 
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1906/1. 
Fowler, Mike. “The Future of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.” Global Security and Intelligence 
Studies 1, no. 1 (Fall 2015). 
Frayter, Slava, and Koen Willems. “Increased Efficiency or Beyond Line-of-Sight in 
Airborne ISR Operations.” National Geospatial Agency (NGA), 2013. 
proceedings.spiedigitallibrary.org/proceeding.aspx?articleid=1688649. 
Galeotti, Mark. “I’m Sorry for Creating the ‘Gerasimov Doctrine.’” Foreign Policy, March 5, 
2018. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/05/im-sorry-for-creating-the-gerasimov-
doctrine/. 
Gao, Charlie. “Russia’s New Husky-Class Stealth Submarines: Armed with Hypersonic 





Friedman, Norman. “World Naval Developments: The Typhoon Saga Ends.” United States 
Naval Institute Proceedings 125, no. 2 (February 1999). 
Gerasimov, Valery. “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight.” Military-Industrial Kurier 
(VPK), February 26, 2013. https://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/14632. 
Haley, Jaylan M. “An Evolution in Intelligence Doctrine - The Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance Mission Type Order.” Air & Space Power Journal 26, no. 5 (Fall 
2012). 
Hamilton, Shane P., and Michael P. Kreuzer. “The Big Data Imperative - Air Force 
Intelligence for the Information Age.” Air & Space Power Journal, Spring 2018. 
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASPJ/journals/Volume-32_Issue-1/F-
Hamilton_Kreuzer.pdf?mc_cid=a2eed12543&mc_eid=c0b972d50d. 
Handel, Michael I. “Intelligence and Military Operations.” Intelligence and National Security 
5, no. 2 (1990): 1–95. 
Hanley, John T. jr. “Creating the 1980s Maritime Strategy and Implications for Today.” 
Naval War College Review 67, no. 2 (Spring 2014): 11. 
Hattendorf, John B. “The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977-1986.” 
Naval War College Newport Papers, no. 19 (2004). 
———, ed. “U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1990s - Selected Documents.” Naval War College 
Newport Papers, no. 27 (2006). 
Hattendorf, John B., and Peter M. Swartz, eds. “U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s - Selected 
Documents.” Naval War College Newport Papers, no. 33 (2008). 
Håvoll, Harald. “Airborne Maritime Surveillance and ASW - Status and Development: 
Consequences for Norway.” Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt (NUPI), 2015. 
Heidenrich, John G. “The State of Strategic Intelligence. The Intelligence Community’s 
Neglect of Strategic Intelligence.” Studies in Intelligence 51, no. 2 (2007). 
Herman, Michael, J. Kenneth McDonald, and Vojtech Mastny. “Did Intelligence Matter in 
the Cold War?” Forsvarsstudier, no. 1/2006 (2006). 
Hicks, Kathleen, Andrew Metrick, Lisa Sawyer Samp, and Kathleen Weinberger. “Undersea 
Warfare in Northern Europe.” CSIS International Security Program. Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, July 2016. 
Hinrichs, Jeff S. “Education in Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance beyond the 
‘Green Door.’” Air & Space Power Journal 22, no. 2 (Summer 2008). 
Holst, Johan J. “Norsk Sikkerhetspolitkk i Strategisk Perspektiv.” Internasjonal Politikk 24, 
no. 5 (1966): 463–90. 
Holzer, Jenny R., and Franklin L. Moses. “Autonomous Systems in the Intelligence 
Community: Many Possibilities and Challenges.” Studies in Intelligence 59, no. 1 
(2015). 
Hulnick, Arthur S. “What’s Wrong with the Intelligence Cycle?” Intelligence and National 
Security 21, no. 6 (2006): 959–79. 
Ingebrigtsen, Jan. “En Studie Av Norskehavets Strategiske Betydning Som Funksjon Av 
Sovjetunionens Nordflåtes Operasjoner (A Study of the Norwegian Sea’s Strategic 
Importance as a Function of the Soviet Union Northern Fleet Operations).” Oslo: 
NUPI, August 1975. 
International Institute for Strategic Studies. “Reviving Russia’s Navy.” Strategic Comments 
6, no. 6 (July 2000). 
Jasper, Scott. “Does Maritime Patrol Have a Future?” United States Naval Institute 
Proceedings 123, no. 4 (April 1997). 
256 
 
Johnson, Lock. “Bricks and Mortar for a Theory of Intelligence.” Comparative Strategy 22, 
no. 1 (2003): 1–28. 
Kahn, David. “An Historical Theory of Intelligence.” Intelligence and National Security 16, 
no. 3 (2001). 
Kobzeva, Mariia. “China’s Arctic Policy: Present and Future.” The Polar Journal 9, no. 1 
(2019). 
Kremidas-Courtney, Chris. “Countering Hybrid Threats in the Maritime Environment.” The 
Maritime Executive, November 6, 2018. https://www.maritime-
executive.com/editorials/countering-hybrid-threats-in-the-maritime-environment. 
Krepinevich, Andrew, Barry Watts, and Robert Work. “Meeting the Anti-Access and Area-
Denial Challenge.” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), 2003. 
http://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/2003.05.20-Anti-Access-Area-Denial-A2-
AD.pdf. 
Kriendler, John. “NATO Intelligence and Early Warning.” Swindon, England: Conflict 
Studies Research Centre, Defense Academy of the United Kingdom, March 2006. 
httpS://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/39988/06_Apr.pdf. 
Kristensen, Hans M., and Robert S. Norris. “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2011.” Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists 67, no. 3 (2011): 67–74. 
———. “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2013.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 69, no. 3 (2013): 
71–81. 
———. “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2014.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 70, no. 2 (2014): 
75–85. 
———. “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2015.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 71, no. 3 (2015). 
Norris, Robert S., and William N. Arkin. “Russian (C.I.S.) Strategic Nuclear Forces End of 
1995.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 52, no. 2 (April 1996): 62–63. 
———. “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2000.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 56, no. 4 (August 
2000): 70–71. 
Norris, Robert S., William N. Arkin, Hans M. Kristensen, and Joshua Handler. “Russian 
Nuclear Forces, 2001.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 57, no. 3 (June 2001): 78–79. 
———. “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2002.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 58, no. 4 (August 
2002): 71–73. 
Norris, Robert S., and Hans M. Kristensen. “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2004.” Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists 60, no. 4 (August 2004): 72–74. 
———. “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2006.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 62, no. 2 (April 
2006): 64–67. 
———. “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2007.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 63, no. 2 (April 
2007): 61–67. 
———. “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2008.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 64, no. 2 (June 
2008): 54–62. 
———. “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2009.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 65, no. 3 (June 
2009). 
———. “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2010.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 66, no. 1 (February 
2010). 
Parnemo, Liv Karin. “Russia’s Naval Development — Grand Ambitions and Tactical 
Pragmatism.” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 32, no. 1 (2019): 41–69. 
Pedlow, Gregory W. “NATO Strategy Documents 1949-1969,” October 1997. NATO, online 
archive. http://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/intro.pdf. 
Perkins, William. “Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare - A Forecast for Maritime Air 
ASW in the Future Operational Environment.” Joint Air Power Competence Centre 
(JAPCC), June 2016. 
257 
 
Polmar, Norman. “The Russian Navy - Beneath the Waves.” United States Naval Institute 
Proceedings 138, no. 6 (June 2012). 
Reade, David. “NAS Keflavik, Iceland - The ASW Training Capital of the World.” Maritime 
Patrol Aviation 3, no. 2 (March 1995). 
Reade, David. “Worldwide P-3 Status Report.” Maritime Patrol Aviation, September 1992, 
62–68. 
Reade, David, and Bob Harper. “Naval Air Station Keflavik, Iceland.” Airborne LOG, no. 
Fall 1994 (1994): 8–11. 
Rhodes, Carl, Jeff Hagen, and Mark Westergren. “A Strategies-to-Tasks Framework for 
Planning and Executing Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) 
Operations.” RAND, Project Air Force, 2007. 
Robideau, Larry. “Third Battle for the North Atlantic 1962-1991.” Cold War Times 6, no. 1 
(February 2006). http://www.coldwar.org/text_files/coldwartimesfeb2006.pdf. 
Savolainen, Jukka, Terry Gill, Valentin Schatz, Lauri O Jala, Tadas Jakstas, and Pirjo 
Kleemola-Juntunen. “Handbook on Maritime Hybrid Threats - 10 Scenarios and 
Legal Scans.” Helsinki, Finland: The European Centre of Excellence for Countering 
Hybrid Threats, November 2019. 
Seagle, Adriana N. “Intelligence Sharing Practices within NATO: AN Englisg School 
Perspectvie.” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 28, no. 3 
(2015). 
Sergunin, Alexander, and Valery Konyshev. “Russia in Search of Its Arctic Strategy: 
Between Hard and Soft Power?” The Polar Journal 4, no. 1 (2014). 
Sherman, Kenneth B. “Feet Dry: Maritime Patrol Goes Ashore - New Roles and Missions 
Mean No Safe Harbor for Land Forces.” The Journal of Electronic Defense (JED), 
no. March 2001 (2001): 37–43. 
Shibilski, Daniel P. “Future of Air Force Intelligence.” United States Naval Institute 
Proceedings 132, no. 2 (February 2006). 
Simon, Luis. “The ‘Third’ US Offset Strategy and Europe’s ‘Antiaccess’ Challenge.” Journal 
of Strategic Studies 39, no. 3 (2016): 417–45. 
Singh, Jasjit. “Aerial Surveillance for Maritime Security.” Strategic Analysis 7, no. 12 
(1984). 
Smith, Clyde A. “The Mearning and Significance of the Gorshkov Articles.” Naval War 
College Review 26, no. 5 (April 1974): 18–37. 
Smith, R. Jeffrey. “Hypersonic Missiles Are Unstoppable. And They’re Starting a New 
Global Arms Race.” New York Times Magazine. June 19, 2019. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/19/magazine/hypersonic-missiles.html. 
Staar, Richard. “Russia’s Navy Remains in Decline.” United States Naval Institute 
Proceedings 124, no. 8 (August 1998). 
Skogrand, Kjetil, Olav Njølstad, and Rolf Tamnes. “Hot Spot - Cold War, the High North, 
and Grand Strategy.” Institutt For Forsvarsstudier (IFS) Info 5/1998 (1998). 
Stavridis, James. “Maritime Hybrid Warfare Is Coming.” United States Naval Institute 
Proceedings 142, no. 12 (December 2016). 
Tamnes, Rolf. “Integration and Screening - The Two Faces of Norwegian Alliance Policy.” 
Forsvarsstudier, no. 6 (1987). 
Tamnes, Rolf, Kate Hansen Bundt, Trond Grytting, Alf Håkon Hoel, Janne Haaland Matlary, 
Asle Toje, and Julie Wilhelmsen. “A Unified Effort to Strengthen the Defence of 
Norway.” Norwegian Ministry of Defense, April 28, 2015. 
Tice, Brian P. “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles - The Force Multiplier of the 1990s.” Air & Space 
Power Journal 5, no. 1 (1991). 
258 
 
White, Jonathan, and Sean Filipowski. “Know the Environment, Know the Enemy, Know the 
Target.” United States Naval Institute Proceedings 140, no. 7 (July 2014). 
Whitman, Edward. “SOSUS - The ‘Secret Weapon’ of Underseea Surveillance.” Undersea 
Warfare 7, no. 2 (Winter 2015). 
Wicken, Olav. “Stille Propell i Storpolitisk Storm - KV/Toshiba-Saken Og Dens Bakgrunn.” 
Institutt for Forsvarsstudier, 1988. 
Vengstad, K. “Fleksibilitet Og Slagkraft. Luftforsvaret Og NATOs Infrastrukturprogram 
1950-1957.” Forsvarsstudier 3 (2006). 
Warden, John A. III. “The Enemy as a System.” Airpower Journal 9, no. 1 (1995): 40–55. 
Yegorova, Natalia. “Stalin’s Conception of Maritime Power: Revelation from the Russian 
Archives.” Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 2 (2005): 157–86. 
Yeh, Puong F. “The Case for Using Robots in Intelligence Analysis.” Studies in Intelligence 
59, no. 4 (2015). 
Young, Adam B. “Employing Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance -  Organizing, 
Training, and Equipping to Get It Right.” Air & Space Power Journal 28, no. 1 
(February 2014). 
Zeytoonian, Dan, Laura Geldhof, Maureen Green, Remi Hajjar, Chris Litwhliler, Christine 
Locke, James Myers, David Perrine, and Cameron Weathers. “Intelligence Design: 




Aid, Matthew M., and Cees Wiebes, eds. Secret of Signals Intelligence During the Cold War 
and Beyond. London: Frank Cass, 2001. 
Aldrich, Richard J. GCHQ - The Uncensored Story of Britain’s Most Secret Intelligence 
Agency. London: Harper Press, 2011. 
Berkowitz, Bruce. The National Reconnaissance Office at 50 Years: A Brief History. 
Chantilly, Virginia: Center for the study of national reconnaissance, 2011. 
Birkeland, John O., and Gjert Lage Dyndal. “Fremtidig Autonom Droneteknologi Og -
Konsepter.” In Når Dronene Våkner, edited by Tor Arne Berntsen, Gjert Lage 
Dyndal, and Sigrid Redse Johansen. Oslo: Cappelen Damm Akademiske, 2016. 
Blackman, Tony. Nimrod - Rise and Fall. London: Grub Street Publishing, 2011. 
Breemer, Jan S. Soviet Submarines - Design, Development and Tactics. Surrey, UK: Jane’s 
Information Group Ltd, 1989. 
Brodie, Bernard. Strategy in the Missile Age. 8th ed. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1991. 
Chamayou, Gregoire. Drone Theory. New York: Penguin Random House, 2015. 
Børresen, Jacob, Gullow Gjeseth, and Rolf Tamnes. Allianseforsvar i Endring, 1970-2000. 
Norsk Forsvarshistorie 5. Bergen: Eide Forlag, 2004. 
Cole, Paul, and Douglas Hart, eds. Northern Europe: Security Issues for the 1990s. London: 
London Westview Press, 1986. 
Crickmore, Paul F. Lockheed Blackbird - Beyond the Secret Missions. Revised edition. 
Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2016. 
Donald, David. The Encyclopedia of World Aircraft. Etobicoke, Ontario: Prospero Books, 
1997. 
DUPI. “Grønland under Den Kolde Krig. Dansk Og Amerikansk Sikkerhedspolitik 1945-68.” 
Copenhagen: Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Institut, 1997. 
259 
 
Efjestad, Svein. “Norway and the North Atlantic: Defence of the Northern Flank.” In NATO 
and the North Atlantic - Revitalizing Collective Defence, by John A. Olsen. Whitehall 
Paper 87. London: Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 2017. 
Eriksen, Knut E., and Helge Ø. Pharo. “Kald Krig Og Internasjonalisering, 1945-1965.” In 
Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Historie, Bd.5. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1997. 
Ford, Christopher, and David Rosenberg. The Admiral’s Advantage - U.S. Navy Operational 
Intelligence in World War II and the Cold War. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 
2005. 
Friedman, Norman. Seapower and Space. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000. 
Friedman, Norman. Submarine Design and Development. London: Conway Maritime, 1984. 
Furquhar, John T. A Need to Know: The Role of Air Force Reconnaissance in War Planning, 
1945-1953. Maxwell AFB, Montgomery, Alabama: Air University Press, 2005. 
Gaddis, J.L. Strategies of Containment. A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National 
Security Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982. 
Gibson, Chris. Nimrod’s Genesis - RAF Maritime Patrol Projects and Weapons since 1945. 
Manchester: Hikoki Publications, 2015. 
Goldstein, Walter, ed. Clash in the North. Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey’s 
International Defense Publishers, 1988. 
Gordon, Doug. Tactical Reconnaissance in the Cold War. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Aviation, 
2006. 
Green, Michael. United States Naval Aviation 1911-2014. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Aviation, 
2015. 
Grove, Eric, ed. NATO’s Defence of the North. London: Brassey’s, 1989. 
Grove, Eric, and Graham Thomson. Battle for the Fjords. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 
Press, 1991. 
Herman, Michael. Intelligence Power in Peace and War. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996. 
Herrick, Robert W. Soviet Naval Strategy: Fifty Years of Theory and Practice. Annapolis, 
MD: Naval Institute Press, 1968. 
Hopkins, Robert S. III. Spyflights and Overflights - US Strategic Aerial Reconnaissance - 
Volume I 1945-1960. Manchester: Hikoki Publications, 2016. 
———. U.S. Strategic Aerial Reconnsaissance and the Cold War, 1945-1961. University of 
Virginia, 1998. 
Hudson, Peter, and Peter Roberts. “The UK and the North Atlantic: A British Military 
Perspective.” In NATO and the North Atlantic - Revitalizing Collective Defence, by 
John A. Olsen. Whitehall Paper 87. London: Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 
n.d. 
Jervell, Sverre, and Kare Nyblom. The Military Buildup in the High North. American and 
Nordic Perspectives. London: UP of America, 1986. 
Jones, Barry. Avro Shackleton. Ramsbury, UK: Crowood Press, 2002. 
Jordan, John. Soviet Submarines - 1945 to the Present. London: Arms & Armour Press, 1989. 
Lashmar, Paul. Spy Flights of the Cold War. Phoenix Mill: Sutton Publishing Limited, 1996. 
Lehman, John. Oceans Ventured: Winning the Cold War at Sea. New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, Inc, 2018. 
Leighton, Marion K. The Soviet Threat to NATO’s Northern Flank. New York: National 
Strategy Information Centre Inc, 1979. 
Luddy, John. “The Challenge and Promise of Network-Centric Warfare.” Arlington, VA: 
Lexington Institute, February 2005. 




MccGwire, Michael. “Current Soviet Warship Construction and Naval Weapons 
Development.” In Soviet Naval Policy: Objectives and Constraints, edited by Michael 
MccGwire, Ken Booth, and John McDonnell. New York: Praeger, 1975. 
———. “Soviet Strategic Weapons Policy - 1955-70.” In Soviet Naval POlicy: Objectives 
and Constraints, edited by Michael MccGwire, Ken Booth, and John McDonnell. 
New York: Praeger, 1974. 
MccGwire, Michael, James M. McConnell, and Robert G. Weinland. “Admiral Gorshkov on 
‘Navies in War and Peace.’” Arlington, VA: Center for Naval Analysis, September 
1974. 
Mutza, Wayne. Lockheed P2V Neptune - An Illustrated History. Atglen, PA: Schiffer 
Publishing, Ltd., 1996. 
Nordenman, Magnus. The New Battle for the Atlantic - Emerging Naval Competition with 
Russia in the Far North. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2019. 
Norris, Pat. Spies in the Sky - Surveillance Satellites in War and Peace. Chichester, UK: 
Praxis Publishing Ltd, 2008. 
Olsen, John A., ed. Future NATO: Adapting to New Realities. Whitehall Paper 95. London: 
Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 2019. 
———, ed. NATO and the North Atlantic - Revitalizing Collective Defence. Whitehall Paper 
87. London: Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 2017. 
———, ed. Security in Northern Europe: Deterrence, Defence and Dialogue. Whitehall 
Paper 93. London: Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 2018. 
Owen, David. Anti-Submarine Warfare - An Illustrated History. Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 2007. 
Oxlee, Geoffrey. Aerospace Reconnaissance. London: Brassey’s, 1997. 
Palmer, Michael A. Origins of the Maritime Strategy - The Development of American Naval 
Strategy, 1945-1955. Reissue edition. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990. 
Podvig, Pavel, ed. Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces. 2004 paperback edition. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2001. 
Polmar, Norman, and John F. Bessette. Spyplanes - The Illustrated Guide To Manned 
Reconnaissance And Surveillance Aircraft From World War I To Today. Minneapolis, 
USA: Quarto Publishing Group Inc, 2016. 
Reade, David. The Age of Orion - The Lockheed P-3 Story. Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing, 
Ltd., 1998. 
Richelson, Jeffrey T. The US Intelligence Community. Seventh edition. Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 2016. 
Riste, Olav, and Arnfinn Moland. Strengt Hemmelig - Norsk Etterretningstjeneste 1945-1975. 
Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1997. 
Roberts, Michael D. Dictionary of American Naval Aviation Squadrons - Volume 2. Vol. 2. 
Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, 2000. 
Schelling, Thomas C. Strategy of Conflict. London: Oxford University Press, 1970. 
Skogan, John, and Arne Brundtland, eds. Soviet Sea Power in the Northern Waters. New 
York: St.Martin’s Press, 1990. 
Skogrand, Kjetil. Alliert i Krig Og Fred. Norsk Forsvarshistorie 4. Bergen: Eide Forlag, 
2004. 
Sontag, Sherry, and Christopher Drew. Blind Man’s Bluff - The Untold Story of American 
Submarine Espionage. New York: HarperPaperbacks, 1999. 




Tamnes, Rolf. “The Significance of the North Atlantic and the Norwegian Contribution.” In 
NATO and the North Atlantic - Revitalizing Collective Defense, edited by John A. 
Olsen. Whitehall Paper 87. London: Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 2017. 
Tamnes, Rolf.The United States and the Cold War in the High North. Oslo: Ad Notam, 1991. 
Tart, Larry, and Robert Keefe. The Price of Vigilance - Attacks on American Surveillance 
Flights. New York: Ballantine Books, 2001. 
Thetford, Owen. British Naval Aircraft Since 1912. London: Putnam, 1978. 
Thomas, Rick. Global Hawk - The Story and Shadow of America’s Controversial Drone. 
Great Britain: Amazon, 2015. 
Tunander, Ola. Cold Water Politics - The Maritime Strategy and Geopolitics of the Northern 
Front. London: SAGE Publications, 1989. 
Weir, Gary E., and Walter J. Boyne. Rising Tide - The Untold Story of The Russian 
Submarines That Fought The Cold War. New York: Basic Books, 2003. 
Wilkes, Owen, and Nils Petter Gledistch. Onkel Sams Kaniner - Teknisk Etterretning i Norge. 
Oslo: Pax Forlag, 1981. 
Wilson, Stewart. Combat Aircraft since 1945. Fyshwick, Australia: Aerospace Publications 
Pty Ltd, 2000. 
Wood, John. Russia, the Asymmetric Threat to the United States - A Potent Mixture of Energy 
and Missiles. Santa Barbara, California: Praeger Security International, 2009. 
 
Presentations 
ADM Lewis, Andrew. “One Arctic: Maintaining Stability and Propserity in the High North.” 
Presented at the Henry Bacon seminar, Washington, D.C., May 8, 2019. 
Gressel, Gustav. “Russia’s Quiet Military Revolution, and What It Means for Europe.” Policy 
Brief. European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2015. 
Johnstone, Clive. “NATO’s Maritime Moment: A Watershed Year in Alliance Sea Power.” 
Speech presented at the Allied Ambassador’s Lunch, Residence of Belgian 
Ambassador to the United Kingdom, London, January 17, 2017. 
https://mc.nato.int/media-centre/news/2017/nato-maritime-moment-a-watershed-year-
in-alliance-sea-power.aspx. 
Nordenman, Magnus. “NATO’s next Consortium: Maritime Patrol Aircraft.” Issue Brief. 
Washington, D.C.: Atlantic Council, Brent Scowcroft Center on International 
Security, May 2016. 
Rear Admiral Thomas Ernst. “Agile Command and Control in a Degraded Environment.” In 
Preparing NATO for Joint Air Operations in a Degraded Environment. Joint Air & 




Ambrose, Gary. “Transforming Maritime Patrol Aviation.” Master’s Thesis, USMC 
Command & Staff College, 2003. 
Bergstrøm, Øyvind. “NATOs Maritime Strategi Etter 1990 - Fra Sjømakt Til Ordensmakt?” 
Master’s Thesis, Norwegian Armed Forces Staff College, 2009. 
Birkeland, John O. “The Potential of LIDAR as an Anti-Submarine Warfare Sensor.” M.Phil 




———. “The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier - An American Response to the Chinese Anti-
Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) Challenge.” Master of Military Operational Art and 
Science, Air Command & Staff College, USAF, 2013. 
file:///C:/Users/JohnO/Downloads/ADA603131.pdf. 
Breemer, Jan S. “Estimating the Soviet Submarine Missile Threat: A Critical Examination of 
the Soviet Navy’s SSBN Bastion Strategy.” PhD, International Relations, University 
of Southern California, 1987. 
Dyndal, Gjert Lage. “Land Based Air Power or Aircraft Carriers? The British Debate about 
Maritime Air Power in the 1960s.” PhD, History, University of Glasgow, 2009. 
Klevberg, Håvard. “Maritime Surveillance in the North: 333 Squadron in Norwegian Security 
Politics.” PhD, History, University of Oslo, 2011. 
Marshall, James P. “Near-Real Time Intelligence on the Tactical Battlefield.” Research 
Report. Maxwell AFB, Montgomery, Alabama: Air University, January 1994. 
Morton, Tyler. “Ears and Eyes in the Sky: The Evolution of Manned Airborne ISR.” Master’s 
Thesis, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 2012. www.dtic.mil/get-tr-
doc/pdf?AD=AD1019401. 
———. “From Kites through Cold War: The Evolution of United States Air Force Manned 
Airborne ISR.” PhD, Air University, 2016. 
Rekstad, Jan Egil. “P-8 and the Trilateral Partnership - The Operational Significance and 
Influence on Norwegian Security Policy.” Master’s Thesis, The Norwegian Drfence 
University College, 2018. 
Simensen, Thor A. “Link-11 Communication.” Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS), 1992. 
Trefz, John L. “From Persistent ISR to Precision Strike - The Expanding Role of UAVs.” 
Master’s Thesis, Naval War College, 2003. 
Winkler, Robert P. “The Evolution of the Joint ATO Cycle.” Master of Science in Joint 
Campaign Planning and Strategy, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, 2006. 
dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA451239. 
Smith-Windsor, Brooke A. “NATO’s Maritime Strategy and the Libya Crisis as Seen from 
the Sea.” Research Paper. Rome: NATO Defense College, March 2013. 
 
Online resources 
Boeing. “P-8A Poseidon.” Accessed November 28, 2019. 
https://www.boeing.com/defense/maritime-surveillance/p-8-poseidon/index.page. 
Bosbotinis, James. “The SDSR and the Future of British Airborne ISTAR.” DefenseIQ 
(blog), June 12, 2015. http://www.defenceiq.com/air-forces-and-military-
aircraft/articles/the-sdsr-and-the-future-of-british-airborne-istar. 
Dassault Aviation. “Atlantic - Origins and Context.” Dassault Aviation. Accessed March 23, 
2017. http://www.dassault-aviation.com/fr/passion/avions/dassault-militaires/atlantic/. 
Devereaux, Ryan. “The Drone Papers - Manhunting in the Hindu Kush.” The Intercept, 
October 15, 2015. https://theintercept.com/drone-papers/manhunting-in-the-hindu-
kush/. 
GE Aviation. “Boeing Team Wins $3 Billion Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft Program.” GE 
Aviation Online. June 14, 2004. https://www.geaviation.com/press-release/jv-
archive/boeing-team-wins-3-billion-multi-mission-maritime-aircraft-program. 
GlobalSecurity.org. “AA-13 ARROW / K-37/R-37 / RVV-BD,” February 6, 2018. 
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/aa-13.htm. 
Human Rights Watch. “Heed the Call - A Moral and Legal Imperative to Ban Killer Robots.” 





Kimball, Daryl. “The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) on Tactical Nuclear Weapons at 
a Glance.” Arms Control Association, July 2017. 
https://www.armscontrol.org/printpdf/111. 
Natalucci, Matteo. “Top 5 Ports in Northern Europe.” Port Technology, August 30, 2019. 
https://www.porttechnology.org/news/top-5-ports-in-northern-europe/. 
Naval Air Museum Barbers Point. “Lockheed P-3C Orion - BuNo 160770.” Accessed 
September 6, 2018. http://nambp.org/lockheed-p-3c-orion. 
Naval History and Heritage Command. “P-3 Orion,” May 29, 2014. 
https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/naval-aviation-history/naval-
aircraft/current-aircraft-inventory/p-3-orion.html. 
nti.org. “U.S. Senate Ratifies New START in 71-26 Vote, Despite Top GOP Opposition.” 
NTI Online, December 22, 2010. https://www.nti.org/gsn/article/us-senate-ratifies-
new-start-in-71-26-vote-despite-top-gop-opposition/. 
Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). “Russia Submarine Capabilities.” NTI, June 10, 2014. 
https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/russia-submarine-capabilities/. 
Oliker, Olga. “Unpacking Russia’s New National Security Strategy.” Csis.Org. January 7, 
2016. https://www.csis.org/analysis/unpacking-russias-new-national-security-strategy. 
PAX. “Killer Robots - What Are They and What Are the Concerns?” PAX, 2018. 
https://www.paxforpeace.nl/media/files/pax-booklet-killer-robots-what-are-they-and-
what-are-the-concerns.pdf. 
Proc, Jerry. “CS2F TRACKER.” RADIO COMMUNICATIONS  AND SIGNALS 
INTELLIGENCE  IN THE ROYAL CANADIAN NAVY (blog), February 18, 2019. 
http://jproc.ca/rrp/rrp3/tracker.html. 
Sadiq, Sheraz. “Silicon Valley Goes to Space.” Kqed.Org, November 18, 2013. 
https://www.kqed.org/science/11135/silicon-valley-goes-to-space-2. 
Sutton, H I. “Husky_SSN.” Covert Shores (blog), December 30, 2019. 
http://www.hisutton.com/Husky_SSN.html. 
TeleGeography. “Submarine Cable Map.” TeleGeography. Accessed October 23, 2019. 
https://www.submarinecablemap.com/. 
US Navy. “Fact File - P-3C Orion and EP-3 Aries.” US Navy, December 3, 2018. 
https://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=1100&tid=1400&ct=1. 
———. “Fact File - P-8A Posdeidon Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA).” US Navy, 
December 3, 2018. 
https://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=1100&tid=1300&ct=1. 
Williams, Ian. “The Russia - NATO A2AD Environment.” Missile Threat Project (CSIS), 
January 3, 2017. https://missilethreat.csis.org/russia-nato-a2ad-environment/. 
 
 
 
 
 
